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U.S. Military Courts and the War in Iraq
Michael J. Frank*
ABSTRACT

Throughout its history, the United States has frequently
entrusted to military courts the task of prosecuting insurgents
and terroristsduring instances of military occupation.
Instead of carrying on this tradition in Iraq, the United
States created the Central Criminal Court of Iraq (CCCI) and
entrusted a band of Iraqi judges with this task. Infected with
corruption, nationalism, tribal loyalties, and anti-U.S. animus,
this court has repeatedly thwarted the United States by
acquitting or only lightly punishing Iraqi terrorists. Thus, the
terrorists have learned that they face an excellent chance of
acquittal in the CCCI, or if per chance they are convicted, they
must simply bide their time until their short sentences have
expired, at which point they will be free to kill again.
This Article discusses the numerous problems engendered
by the CCCI and proposes a return to the tradition of using
military courts. It demonstrates the superiority of U.S. military
courts and the advantages they would entail, including major
gains toward winning the war in Iraq.

* In 2004, as an Army Judge Advocate, the Author served as a special prosecutor
for Multi-National Force Iraq, during which time he prepared cases against terrorists
for prosecution in the Central Criminal Court of Iraq. The views expressed in this
article are solely those of the Author and are not those of the U.S. Army.
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U.S. MILITARY COURTS AND THE WAR IN IRAO.

An important incident to the conduct of war is the adoption of measures
by the military command, not only to repel and defeat the enemy, but to
seize and subject to disciplinary measures those enemies who in their
attempt to thwart or impede our military effort have violated the law of
1
war.

Long before the advent of modern warfare, the Supreme Court
described martial strife as "a suit prosecuted by the sword. '2 In the
contemporary world, however, the sword has been replaced by more
potent weapons and thus the sword is almost never used in battles
anymore. 3 War does continue to be the prosecution of a suit, though
perhaps not in the form the Supreme Court would have recognized in
1827 when it made its observation about warfare. Increasingly,
litigation in criminal, civil, or specially-created courts has become a
facet of martial conflict. 4 This is perhaps a natural extension of both
warfare and litigation considering that the goal of each of these
endeavors is resolution of the underlying dispute. Martial dispute
resolution differs from legal dispute resolution mainly in the form of
the combat, but their essence shares more similarities than most
would like to admit. "What we call judicial proceeding is obviously
taking the place of a fight" 5 and the courtrooms in which these fights
occur may be thought of as simply another battlefield of increasingly
complex wars.

6

Insofar as litigation has been used to attack political foes or
obtain political goals, 7 it should come as no surprise that litigation

1.
Exparte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 28-29 (1942).
2.
Harcourt v. Gaillard, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 523, 528 (1827).
3.
Iraq is a key exception: Islamic terrorists have been known to decapitate
their victims particularly for propaganda purposes. Their affinity for outdated
weaponry is akin to their affection for their outdated ideology and their longing for a
resurrection of the ancient Islamic caliphate. See Michael Ware, Chasing the Ghosts,
TIME, Sept. 26, 2005, at 36 (noting that Iraqis who cooperate with U.S. troops are often
subject to beheadings at the hands of Moslem terrorists).
4.
Robin Tolmach Lakoff, From Ancient Greece to Iraq, the Power of Words In
Wartime, N.Y. TIMES, May 18, 2004, at E3 (stating that "bullets and bombs are not the
only tools of war").
5.
HENRY SUMNER MAINE, INTERNATIONAL LAW: A SERIES OF LECTURES
DELIVERED BEFORE THE UNIVERSITY CAMBRIDGE 12 (Hyperion 1979) (1888).
6.
In the words of Machiavelli: "You must know, then, that there are two
methods of fighting, the one by law, the other by force: the first method is that of men,
the second of beasts; but as the first method is often insufficient, one must have
recourse to the second." NICCOLO MACHIAVELLI, THE PRINCE 92 (1999) (1532). Of
course, these two methods of waging war are not mutually exclusive: litigation may
complement efforts at combat, and vice-versa.
7.
McCalden v. Cal. Library Ass'n, 955 F.2d 1214, 1227 (9th Cir. 1992) (noting
that litigation can "be a bludgeon for striking at political adversaries"); THOMAS F.
BURKE, LAWYERS, LAWSUITS, AND LEGAL RIGHTS 8-11 (2002) (discussing the political
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has become a key instrument of modern warfare. Warfare, after all,
"is not merely a political act but a real political instrument, a
continuation of political intercourse, a conduct of political intercourse
by other means." Recently martial litigation has been tactically and
offensively employed against the United States,9 but the United
States has also used this weapon during previous conflicts and in
post-conflict stability and reconstruction operations. 10 The recent use

nature of litigation); ARCHIBALD Cox, THE WARREN COURT: CONSTITUTIONAL DECISION AS AN

INSTRUMENT OF REFORM 1 (1968) ("Count de Tocqueville remarked more than a century ago that
hardly a political issue arose in the United States that was not converted into a legal question and
taken to the courts for decision. Today de Tocqueville's observation is even closer to the mark...
."); ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 270 (J. P. Mayer ed., 1969) (1840)
("[tiherc is hardly a political question in the United States that does not sooner or later turn into a
judicial one.").
8.
KARL VON CLAUSEWITZ, WAR, POLITICS, AND POWER: SELECTIONS FROM ON
WAR, AND BELIEVE AND PROFESS 83 (trans. Edward M. Collins, 1962). One etymology
for the word "litigation" suggests the common root of litigation and other forms of
combat. JEROME FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL: MYTH AND REALITY IN AMERICAN JUSTICE
5 (1949).
'Litigation' derives from two Latin words, litis and ago. The first, litis, means
contention, strife, a quarrel. Ago means 'to go'. So, apparently, litigo--from
which we get our word litigate-originally meant to 'go to it' in a quarrel, or to
carry on a quarrel, to dispute, to engage in strife, to brawl-and later, 'to go to
law' in the sense in which the phrase is now popularly used.
9.
See Jonathan Mahler, The Bush Administration vs. Salim Hamdan, N.Y.
TIMES MAG., Jan. 8, 2006, at 87 ("The government considers the legions of adversarial
defense attorneys working pro bono for the detainees ... to be an impediment to their
ability to prosecute the war on terror. Among other things, the lawyers have filed
hundreds of habeas corpus petitions ....); Josh White, Levin Protests Move to Dismiss
Detainee Petitions, WASH. POST, Jan. 5, 2006, at A2 (noting that "nearly all of the
approximately 500 prisoners in Guantanamo Bay now have cases pending in federal
courts"); Lindsey Graham, Rules For Our War, WASH. POST, Dec. 6, 2005, at A29.
There are now close to 200 habeas petitions filed by enemy combatants
requesting better mail delivery, more exercise, judge-supervised interrogation,
Internet access and the right to view DVDs. These lawsuits are undermining
our ability to gain good intelligence and are placing federal courts in a role
never before known in wartime.
See also Keith Johnson, Spanish Judge Orders Arrest of U.S. Soldiers, WALL ST. J.,
Oct. 20, 2005, at A13 ("Spain's High Court issued an arrest and extradition order
yesterday for three U.S. soldiers who fired on a hotel and killed a Spanish television
cameraman during the battle for Baghdad in April 2003.").
The motive of those initiating the Guantanamo habeas litigation is, of course,
irrelevant to its martial impact. Some of the attorneys behind these legal attacks
presumably are well intentioned, although columnist Robert Novak suspects otherwise.
See Robert D. Novak, On Detainees, a Victory for Bush, WASH. POST, Nov. 17, 2005, at
A31 (intimating that those brining the Guantanamo lawsuits have malevolent
intentions).
10.
See Tracy Wilkinson & Christina Mateo-Yanguas, Spanish Tribunal
Convicts 18 of Terror Charges, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 27, 2005, at Al (discussing a Spanish
tribunal's conviction of eighteen al Qaeda terrorists, some of whom were involved in
the September 11, 2001 attack on the United States). This is consistent with Justice
Rutledge's observation that war "compels invention of legal, as of martial tools
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of martial litigation has even resulted in the coining of a new term:
"lawfare." 11 Although this term originally was used primarily to
denote lawsuits filed against the United States to hamper its ability
to wage war against Islamic terrorists, 12 one would be remiss in
failing to note that litigation-primarily the prosecution of war
criminals and terrorists in occupation courts-has from time-to-time
proven to be an effective weapon in the U.S. military arsenal, such as
in the trials at Nuremberg after World War 11.13
In various conflicts, lawfare has been used to demoralize the
United States' enemies and garner support for the war effort, at home
and abroad, particularly when occupying enemy territory. Although
lawfare is not literally an act of force, forceful litigation can affect the
outcome of a war just as effectively as kinetic weaponry. Thus, for
example, throughout history various individuals have attempted to
use judicial proceedings to demonstrate the moral depravity of their
enemies or the justness of their cause. 14 This often assists the war
effort by emboldening potential allies, inhibiting support for the

adequate for the times' necessity." Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 461 (1944)
(Rutledge, J., dissenting).
See, e.g., David B. Rivkin, Jr., & Lee A. Casey, Friendor Foe?, WALL ST. J.,
11.
Apr. 11, 2005, at A2 ("[T]he ICRC has become the leading practitioner of 'lawfare'-a
form of asymmetrical warfare that aims to constrain American power using the law");
Editorial, The Pentagon and 'Lawfare, WASH. TIMES, Mar. 24, 2005, at A20 ("The
Pentagon didn't quite call it 'lawfare,' but there it was,... a candid reference to the illintentioned use of international law and the courts to harm American interests."); John
Fonte & Ivo Andric, Democracy's Trojan Horse, NAT'L INT., July 1, 2004, at 117 (noting
that certain NGOs have waged 'lawfare' against the exercise of democratic sovereignty
by the American nation-state"); Dan Izenberg, Ex-Diplomat: US Sees 'Lawfare' Being
Waged Against It, JERUSALEM POST, Dec. 17, 2003, at 2 (Professor David Scheffer said
that "lawfare" describes "foreign attempts to hamper the US in defending its security
and national interest, including the promotion of human rights in the world").
"Lawfare" may be defined as the use of legal proceedings or accusations of violations of
"international law" by unelected elites in an effort to obstruct the United States'
pursuit of its interests or its attempt to promote respect for natural rights throughout
the world, particularly when the United States employs or seeks to employ military
force to realize these goals. Izenberg, supra note 11, at 2. Lawfare has harmed U.S.
interests by: (a) causing the United States to divert resources to litigation that it
might use more effectively elsewhere; (b) fomenting attacks by U.S. enemies by
claiming the United States is violating international law; (c) discouraging potentially
allies in cooperating with the United States; and (d) causing the United States to alter
its polices to prevent litigation or the attacks that lawfare participants might foment.
12.
This litigation requires the United States to expend its limited resources
and is aimed at breaking the U.S. will to fight. As Clausewitz observed: "there are
many ways to the object of war. The defeat of the enemy is not always necessary."
CLAUSEWITZ, supra note 8, at 99. Victory on the battlefield is unnecessary when merely
destroying a nation's will to fight is sufficient to defeat it, as the United States
demonstrated in Vietnam.
13.

See generally TELFORD TAYLOR, THE ANATOMY OF THE NUREMBERG TRIALS

(1992).
The use of judicial trials for this purpose with respect to foreign enemies,
14.
however, is a phenomenon of recent origin.
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enemy from its own civilian populace or third parties, and serving as
a reminder to would-be aggressors that, unless they abandon their
aggressive plans, their fate might include a trip to the dock. 15 When
properly managed and publicized, lawfare can devastate morale and
sow dissension in the ranks of enemy troops, thereby inhibiting the
enemy's will to fight and impeding the essential support from the
16
civilian population.
Martial litigation can also be used to deter war crimes, both by
the immediate enemy and, more generally, against future enemies
who want to avoid the same fate. As Chief Justice Stone, writing for
the Supreme Court, noted, "The trial and punishment of enemy
combatants who have committed violations of the law of war is . . .a

part of the conduct of war operating as a preventive measure against
such violations .... ,,17 The systematic presentation of reasoned
arguments and objective evidence also allows for a dispassionate
review of war criminals' misdeeds and an opportunity to affix guilt
and apportion blame. Though always imperfect, expensive, and timeconsuming, an organized system for waging lawfare can pay
dividends both on and off the immediate battlefield.18 The key to its
effective use, of course, is recognizing when martial litigation can
supplement traditional military action-the direct use of force-and
when it will prove an obstacle to traditional military operations. 19

15.
Charles Krauthammer, Man For A Glass Booth, WASH. POST, Dec. 9, 2005,
at A31 (asserting that "war crimes trials are, above all and always, for educational
purposes").
16.
The strength of the enemy's will to fight is a key component of its capacity
to resist the United States. CLAUSEWITZ, supra note 8, at 66-67 (An enemy's power of
resistance "is a product of two factors: the extent of the means at his disposal and the
strength of his will."). Once the enemy's will to fight is substantially undermined, his
defeat his simply a matter of time.
Likewise, as Iraq's CCCI has demonstrated, the morale of U.S. troops-and thus
their willingness to fight-can be sapped when the troops see that their efforts and the
dangers they face only result in the CCCI releasing captured terrorists. See Elaine M.
Grossman, New Rules in Iraq May Make It Tougher to Keep Insurgents Behind Bars,
INSIDE THE PENTAGON, Dec. 1, 2005, available at 2005 WLNR 19334043 (noting that
U.S. officers are disillusioned with the CCCI and with orders that require them to hand
the terrorists over to this court and that the CCCI's "policies are also affecting U.S.
troop morale"). At a certain point, the troops conclude that it is not worth the risk to
capture terrorists when they will simply be released.
17.
Yamashita v. Styer, 327 U.S. 1, 11 (1946).
18.
Litigation is merely one facet of warfare insofar as it is a means of
channeling force. A judge's decree, however, unless backed up by moral or physical
force, is powerless against, for example, a foreign invasion. As Justice Cardozo
observed: "The decree of a court will not stay the clash of war ....... BENJAMIN N.
CARDOZO, THE PARADOXES OF LEGAL SCIENCE 59 (1928).
19.
For example, a litigation strategy heavily reliant on the testimony of
combat troops when those troops are short supply will probably prove
counterproductive to effective battlefield operations, unless the propaganda value
enormously outweighs the reduction in combat strength that absence from the
battlefield will necessarily entail for the soldiers who testify.
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Unfortunately, the United States has not fully taken advantage
of and enjoyed the fruits that can be reaped from the prosecution of
war criminals, particularly with respect to terrorists operating in the
Iraqi theatre of operations. This is due in part to the effects of the
lawfare being waged against the United States with respect to the
prisoners at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. 20 This lawfare, in turn, has
resulted in the abdication of the duty to ensure that Iraqi terrorists
who murder and attack U.S. troops and British troops are properly
punished for their crimes. Rather than prosecute these insurgents
before U.S. military judges-a purely executive function and well
within the ken of the U.S. Armed Forces-the U.S. government
elected to entrust this task to Iraqi prosecutors and Iraqi judges of
the Central Criminal Court of Iraq (CCCI).2 1 For reasons discussed
more fully below, this has proven to be an egregious mistake.
For starters, the prosecutors and judges of the CCCI have made
every effort to protect the insurgents who are tried before their court.
Steeped in a peculiar brand of Islamic and European civil law, 2 2 the
CCCI judges use arcane procedures and bizarre rules to keep these
terrorists from experiencing the full effect of the law and the full force

20.
The Author does not question the integrity or the motives of the U.S.
attorneys who have assisted the Guantanamo detainees in their legal attacks.
21.
Gregg Zoroya & Rick Jervis, When Shooting Stops, Troops Turn Detective,
USA TODAY, Aug. 10, 2005, at Al ("In a little-noticed decision made within months of
the U.S.-led invasion in 2003, the United States authorized creation of an Iraqi
criminal court that would treat insurgents not as enemy combatants but as
criminals."). Besides the desire to avoid the left-wing criticism that would have
resulted from using military commissions, the United States also hoped to avoid
appearing as heavy-handed "occupiers" as opposed to "liberators" of the Iraqi people.
See John C. Williams, Establishing Rule of Law in Post-War Iraq: Rebuilding the
Justice System, 33 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 229, 230 (2004) ("we were always mindful of
not being too heavy-handed lest we ruin our image as liberators"). Some occupation
forces have not been liberators, as the various Nazi forays in Europe and Africa during
the 1930s and '40s demonstrated. But the terms "liberator" and "occupier" are not
necessarily contradictory, as the United States demonstrated in Europe after World
War II and, more recently, in Iraq.
The Coalition clearly liberated Iraq from a despotic regime. At the same time, the
United States and its Coalition partners served as an occupying force-as that term is
commonly understood in international law-to lay the foundation for the creation of a
democratic government in Iraq. Justice Day, writing for a unanimous Court observed
that there "has been considerable discussion in the cases and in works of authoritative
writers upon the subject of what constitutes an occupation which will give the right to
exercise governmental authority. Such occupation is not merely invasion, but is
invasion plus possession of the enemy's country for the purpose of holding it
temporarily at least." Macleod v. United States, 229 U.S. 416, 425 (1913). Under this
definition, the United States was an occupier of Iraq. See also MAINE, supra note 5, at
178 ("An invader is said to be in military occupation of so much of a country as is
wholly abandoned by the forces of the enemy.").
22.
Iraqi criminal law is an amalgam of French, English, Ottoman, Roman,
Egyptian, and Sunni and Shiite Islamic law. S.H. AMIN, MIDDLE EAST LEGAL SYSTEMS
165, 166, 167 n.1, 178, 179, 222 (1985).
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of U.S. justice. 23 For example, the CCCI refuses to convict defendants
unless at least two witnesses testify that they personally observed the
defendant commit every element of the crime charged. 24 Ever hostile
to the accusations made by U.S. soldiers, the judges refuse to crossexamine defendants and their alibi witnesses; they instead
aggressively interrogate U.S. witnesses in an attempt to elicit even
the smallest contradiction.2 5 The judges then acquit the defendants
based on these purported contradictions. In other cases, family
members who have assisted terrorists in escaping or covering up their
crimes are not convicted of obstructing justice, and instead the Iraqi
judges give them complete immunity for their actions, 26 thereby
encouraging members of dissident tribes to conspire against U.S.
forces. The CCCI judiciary also refuses to impose the mandatory
minimum sentences that the Coalition Provisional Authority enacted,
and they find any excuse to acquit or impose laughably lenient
27
sentences on brutal terrorists.
It would be difficult to catalogue the full panoply of tactics used
by the CCCI judges to foil justice and shield their countrymen from
prosecution. Accordingly, this Article discusses but a few of the more
egregious policies.
This Article also articulates the various
motivations behind the judges' behavior, including their loyalty to the
Baath Party, nationalism and tribalism, corruption, and their
devotion to various tenets and practices of their Islamic faith. The
Article concludes that, because the judges have greater affinity for
the insurgents who share a common religion, ethnicity, citizenship,

23.
Of course, the "prime object of military organization is Victory, not Justice."
John H. Wigmore, Some Lessons for Civilian Justice to be Learned from Military
Justice, 10 J. AM. INST. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 170, 170 (1920). But in punishing
terrorists, justice can be a tool in the pursuit of victory.
24.
Based on the Author's firsthand experience.
25.
Based on the Author's firsthand experience.
26.
See Jonathan Finer & Andy Mosher, For Soldier, A Posthumous Day in
Iraqi Court, WASH. POST, June 28, 2005, at All (relating that a murder defendant's
"brother was acquitted because of a precedent in Iraqi law that absolves people who
help family members conceal crimes after they occur").
27.
The CCCI acquits almost 40% of the Iraqi defendants charged by the
United States, and many cases are never even brought to trial because prosecutors
know that they cannot obtain a conviction before the CCCI judges. Zoroya & Jervis,
supranote 21, at Al; see also Bing West, American as Jailer,NAT'L REV., July 17, 2006,
at 27 ("In the U.S., one male in 75 is in jail. In Iraq, it is one in 500. So either Iraqis
are seven times more law-abiding than Americans, or the judicial system in Iraq is a
mess.").
The provisional laws provided for stiff mandatory minimum sentences, but the
Iraqi criminal court ignored these. COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY ORDER NO. 3,
Weapons Control § 6,
2(b) (imposing a mandatory minimum sentence for the
possession or transportation of "special category weapons") (Dec. 2003) available at
http://www.iraqcoalition.org/regulations/20031231_CPAORD3REVAMD_.pdf
(last
visited Nov. 8, 2004).
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language, and often the same political affiliation or tribe, 28 the judges
frequently find ways to treat insurgents leniently, thereby
encouraging terrorism at the expense of U.S. lives. 29 Of course, they
frequently do so in a way that obfuscates their true motivations.
Given these biases and the travesty of justice they have
produced, the Article suggests an alternative approach: trying Iraqi
terrorists in U.S. military tribunals, 30 or perhaps even joint U.S.Iraqi tribunals. This approach would prevent Iraqi judges from
hijacking justice and instead would give Iraqis a firsthand view of the
rule of law, among other things. In light of these potential benefits,
the Article concludes that the better approach would have been to
follow the U.S. tradition of trying insurgency cases in military courts
staffed by U.S. military and civilian personnel, rather than Islamic
courts run by Iraqis who sympathize with the insurgency or are
hostile to U.S. influence in the Middle East.
Thus far in the war against Islamic terrorism, lawfare has been
successfully waged almost exclusively to the benefit of the terrorists.
But that could change. The United States can turn the tables and
employ the tactics of lawfare to advance justice. This can be done by
using courtrooms to demonstrate to the world the moral depravity of
the terrorists, perhaps thereby convincing open-minded Iraqis and
others of the justness of the U.S. efforts in Iraq. If nothing else,
lawfare could be employed to effectively punish captured terrorists
while demonstrating the cowardice of their terrorist acts. This, in
at
turn, might deter their less-crazed comrades to give up the fight or 31
least cause potential recruits to think twice before joining the jihad.

28.

See Carole A. O'Leary & Karna A.J. Eklund, Pluralism vs. Modern Iraqi

Nationalism: Root Causes of State-Sponsored Violence Against Iraq's Kurdish
Community and the Search for Post-Conflict Justice, 13 MICH. ST. J. INT'L L. 91, 91

(2005) ("Iraq, like other states in the Middle East, is in fact a pluralistic society
comprised of various communal groups defined on the basis of ethno-linguistic,
religious or sectarian, and tribal factors.").
Bing West, America As Jailer, NAT'L REV., July 17, 2006, at 27 ("Iraqi
29.
judges, often intimidated and openly suspicious of written testimony from American
soldiers, ten to free the accused. Net result: Over 85 percent of those detained are
released within six months.").
30.
Military Commissions are authorized under Article 21 of the Uniform Code
of Military Justice, which states: "The provisions of this chapter conferring jurisdiction
upon courts-martial do not deprive military commissions ... of concurrent jurisdiction
with respect to offenders or offenses that by statute or by the law of war may be tried
by military commissions, provost courts, or other military tribunals." Unif. Code of
Military Justice, Art. 21, 10 U.S.C.S. § 821 (2006).
Bing West, America as Jailer,NAT'L REV., July 17, 2006, at 27 ('The policy
31.
of releasing . . . insurgents has the tragic consequence of attenuating deterrence. What
do insurgents have to lose from being arrested for fighting if they know they will soon
be released by authorities?"). Because men will often totally abandon a cause or at
least minimize their investment of time and energy in enterprises in which they foresee
troubles, it is important for the United States to place as many obstacles in the path of
jihadists as possible. The United States must send the message to prospective
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I. THE INHERENT DEFECTS OF THE CENTRAL CRIMINAL COURT OF IRAQ

A. Classified Evidence and Fearful Witnesses
Since its creation by the United States in 2003, thwarting justice
has been the standard procedure for many of the judges serving on
the CCCI. 32 They utilize a host of tactics to acquit guilty defendants,
reduce more serious charges to petty offenses, and hand down paltry
33
sentences to those few terrorists whom they ultimately do convict.
Yet some of the key defects of trying terrorists in Iraq's civil law
courts are not attributable to the animus of the judges but are instead
weakness inherent in the nature of Iraq's civil law courts and the
very approach of using Iraqi courts to try Iraqi defendants.
One of the chief limitations of prosecuting terrorists in an open
Iraqi forum is the inability to utilize classified or sensitive evidence to
demonstrate the defendants' guilt. Frequently intelligence reports
that linked various Iraqi defendants to terrorist cells were classified.
Furthermore, the human sources of the intelligence reports had to
remain confidential to preserve their safety and future efficacy.
Information contained in these classified reports sometimes linked
defendants to a coterie of Baathist or Sunni terrorists. If used in the

terrorists: Join the jihad, and the United States will do everything it can to eliminate
you; survive the onslaught and the United States will still do everything in its power to
have you punished.
32.
In light of the CCCI's overt efforts to thwart justice, it is almost comical
that the National Security Council has highlighted the efforts of the CCCI as though
these were some significant accomplishments in the war or a step towards the
implementation of the rule of law in Iraq.
See NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL,
NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR VICTORY IN IRAQ 16-17 (2005) ("In the first two weeks of
September 2005 alone, the Court prosecuted more than 50 multi-defendant trials, and
conducted over 100 investigative hearings."). But justice is not a volume business and
statistics about the quantity of legal proceedings indicates nothing about their quality,
or lack thereof. Thus, the NSC's statement that, in 2005, the "Iraqi courts are on track
to resolve more than 10,000 felony cases," is practically meaningless to any attempt to
ascertain whether the Iraqi courts are making progress in dispensing justice and
punishing terrorists. Id. at 17. For all the NSC knows, the Iraqi judges "resolve" cases
by acquitting substantial numbers of defendants or by imposing punishments that
amount to a mere slap on the wrist. See Bing West, American as Jailer, NAT'L REV.,
July 17, 2006, at 27 (describing the Iraqi judicial system and the method of trying
insurgents as "a mess"). Although these are two ways to "resolve" a case, they do
nothing to promote justice or discourage attacks on U.S. soldiers. In light of the CCCI's
high acquittal rate and paltry sentences-which, it is worth noting, are thorny paths
down which the NSC Report chose not to tread-Americans should prefer statistics
showing that the CCCI is hearing fewer cases, rather than more.
It is sad, then, that the NSC also announced that the CCCI is "expanding its reach
throughout Iraq with separate branches in the separate provinces." See id. at 17. If
the CCCI branch offices are anything like its headquarters, this expansion will actually
prove detrimental to U.S. interests.
33.
Jackie Spinner, Iraq's New Form of Justice Seems to Satisfy Few, WASH.
POST, Aug. 4, 2004, at A12 ("Americans as well as Iraqis have expressed surprise and
disappointment at how light the judges have gone on security detainees .... ").
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CCCI trials-presuming fair and open-minded judges-this evidence
often would have proven a defendant's participation in a conspiracy
beyond a reasonable doubt.
Classified evidence would have been particularly useful to refute
various defendants' alibis, claims that evidence was fabricated, 34 or
claims that U.S. witnesses were untruthful. It also is frequently the
best evidence that the United States can marshal in a particular case,
because, for example, it might prove the defendant's role or rank in
the jihadist command structure or his ties to a terrorist conspiracy.
But because the Iraqi judges, clerks, security personnel and
spectators lack the requisite security clearances, this evidence could
never be submitted to the court and could not even be mentioned to
the Iraqis.3 5 Indeed, in some cases it was this classified evidence that
36
would have unequivocally demonstrated the defendants' guilt.
In other instances, U.S. prosecutors were prevented from using
valuable evidence which, though not classified per se, would have
revealed the intimate details of the manner and means by which
intelligence was gathered, including sources and methods of
collection. Revelation of these details would have educated the
insurgents on ways to evade surveillance and interception by U.S.
forces, to the deadly detriment of U.S. troops. 37 The contents of such

34.
The Federal Rules of Evidence permit the introduction of such evidence,
even though it might otherwise be considered hearsay. See FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(B)
(a statement is not hearsay if the declarant testifies at trial or hearing and is subject to
cross-examination concerning the statement, and that statement is "consistent with
the declarant's testimony and is offered to rebut an express or implied charge against
the declarant of recent fabrication ...."). This rule is based on the long-standing
common law practice. See Tome v. United States, 513 U.S. 150, 156 (1995) ("The
prevailing common-law rule for more than a century before adoption of the Federal
Rules of Evidence was that a prior consistent statement introduced to rebut a charge of
recent fabrication or improper influence or motive was admissible if the statement had
been made before the alleged fabrication, influence, or motive came into being, but was
inadmissible if made afterwards.").
The CCCI investigative judges liberally admitted evidence that would constitute
hearsay, so it is likely that the classified documents would have been admitted into
evidence had these judges been cleared to receive such evidence.
35.
Michael Chertoff, Why Is This Ball In Our Court?, WALL ST. J., June 17,
2004, at A18 (It is often true that "intelligence is not in a form that can be used in a
criminal trial.").
36.
Intelligence reports "ought not be published to the world." Chicago &
Southern Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 111 (1948).
37.
As Judge Bork has observed:
[I]n open trials our government would inevitably have to reveal much of our
intelligence information, and about the means by which it is gathered. Charles
Krauthammer notes that in the trial of the bombers of our embassies in Africa,
the prosecution had to reveal that American intelligence intercepted bin
Laden's satellite phone calls: "As soon as that testimony was published, Osama
stopped using the satellite system and went silent. We lost him. Until Sept.
11. Disclosures in open court would inform not only Middle Eastern terrorists
but all the intelligence services of the world of our methods and sources.
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documentary or testimonial evidence might permit insurgent
networks to determine the identities of confidential sources or the
names of Iraqi citizens who occasionally provided valuable tips to the
U.S. Army. 38 Clearly their lives would have been endangered if their
identities were revealed in open court, especially since the insurgents
regularly monitored CCCI proceedings and their leadership would
39
have quickly obtained any information revealed in the court.
Unfortunately, there is no provision in Iraqi law to permit in
camera introduction of evidence outside the presence of both the
defendant and the public.4 0 But even if this limited introduction were
permitted by the rules-perhaps through the use of closed court
sessions so that most of the trial would remain to be public-neither
the CCCI judges nor the various defense counsels possessed the
requisite security clearances to view the classified materials, making
it impossible to utilize them in the prosecution.
Of course, U.S. prosecutors were not entrusted with the
authority to declassify evidence or share it with the CCCI, thereby
foreclosing another theoretical solution. 4 1
In other cases, the
evidence was merely sensitive-and releasable to the Iraqis as
needed-but not classified as "secret." In such cases prosecutors
would be faced with the Hobson's choice of: (1) presenting the
sensitive information to the CCCI-and thereby ensuring its
dissemination among the ranks of insurgents-with the hope, but not
the guarantee, that it would convince the court of the defendant's
guilt; or (2) electing not to present the evidence but instead running

Robert H. Bork, Having Their Day in (a Military) Court, NAT'L REV. ONLINE, Dec. 17,
2001, availableat http://www.nationalreview.comJ17decO1/borkl21701.shtml.
38.
Jonathan Finer, Informants Decide Fate of Iraqi Detainees, WASH. POST,
Sept. 13, 2005, at Al, A20 (discussing how the evidence against detainees often
depends on hearsay from Iraqi informants whose identify must be kept secret to
protect them from retaliation).
39.
Rod Nordland et al., Unmasking the Insurgents, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 7, 2005,
at 20 (noting that the insurgents have a "ready-made intelligence network" based on
tribal, familial, and business connections).
Perhaps their faces could have been
shielded and their voices disguised, as has been done in the trial of Saddam Hussein,
but often the very content of a witness's testimony would reveal his identity, making
such procedures useless. For example, if an IED was planted in a location visible only
to one house, testimony that the witnesses saw the defendants plant the IED would
immediately lead to the conclusion that the witnesses lives in the adjacent house and
the terrorists would quickly take retaliatory action.
40.
Iraqi law contains a provision which permits trial courts to hold non-public
trials. IRAQI LAW ON CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS
152 (1971) available at https://www.
jagcnet.army.milJAGCNETInternetHomepages/AC/CLAMO-Public.nsf/0/85256alcO06
ac77385256d34006030dc?OpenDocument (last visited Nov. 8, 2004) ("Trial sessions
must be open unless the court decides that all or part should be held in secret and not
attended by anyone not connected with the cases, for reasons of security or maintaining
decency."). But the "defendant may not be removed from the court room during
consideration of the case unless he violates the rules of court ....
Id.
158.
41.
Even if this were possible, the trustworthiness of most Iraqi judges cannot
be verified to the extent that would permit sharing of such information.
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the risk that the defendant could not be prosecuted or would be
acquitted. 42 Unfortunately, the second course of action was usually
the more prudent one, which meant that some terrorists got off scotfree. Such cases might make it to trial but suffered from gaping
evidentiary holes specifically because the key evidence was sensitive
thereby precluding a conviction.4 3 Some of the defendants who
benefited from the inability to use sensitive information as evidence
used their freedom to commit further attacks against the United
44
States and its allies.
A third and better alternative-the best approach under the
circumstances, but one not available to U.S. prosecutors-would have
avoided these two problems through rules that prevent full disclosure
of evidence to the terrorists. 45 That is,establishing a forum for trying
terrorists where classified evidence could be shared with the court,
such as would be the case in a U.S. military court. 46 One of the

42.
Congress addressed this problem with respect to federal prosecutions
through the Classified Information Procedures Act. 18 U.S.C. app. III, §§ 1-16; see
United States v. Baptista-Rodriguez, 17 F.3d 1354 (lth Cir. 1994).
43.
Military commissions could have ameliorated this problem. See Military
Order of Nov. 13, 2001, Detention, Treatment and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the
War Against Terrorism, 66 Fed. Reg. 57833, at § 1(f) (Nov. 16, 2001) (providing for
modified rules of evidence). Section 4(c)(4) of the Executive Order also permits the
Commissions to hold closes sessions and protect classified information from disclosure.
44.
Hannah Allam, Bomb Suspect Detained in '04, PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER,
Nov. 14, 2005, at 1 (noting that one of the suicide bombers who attacked Amman
Jordan in November 2005, Safah Mohammed Ali, was captured in Iraq near Fallujah
by the United States military in 2004, but was released when it was determined that
there was insufficient evidence to prosecute or detain him); Aparisim Ghosh, Professor
of Death, TIME, Oct. 24, 2005, at 44 (discussing a former Iraqi Republican Guard
officer-operating under the pseudonym Abu Qaqa al-Tamimi-who trains, houses,
and organizes suicide bombers for Zarqawi and other terrorists, who was captured by
U.S. forces and detained at Abu Ghraib prison before being released). The Author
possesses no knowledge of either of these terrorists, other than news reports, and does
not mean to suggest that Safah Mohammed Ali or Abu Qaqa al-Tamimi was released
because only classified or sensitive evidence would have supported their prosecution.
45.
The Author realizes that this is hardly a perfect solution, and prevents an
enemy combatant from fully participating in his defense, perhaps when he is most
needed. The Author also recognizes that intelligence is sometimes "less reliable" than
the "evidence we demand in court." Chertoff, supra note 35, at A18. But it may be
better than the alternatives: not prosecuting terrorists, sharing intelligence with
terrorists, and permitting military units to deal with captured insurgents in an ad hoc
fashion. See Bing West, America as Jailer,NAT'L REV., July 17, 2006, at 27 ('The lack
of a justice system inspires vigilantes ....).
46.
A plurality of the Supreme Court recently opined that excluding accused
terrorists from their trials while the prosecution presents classified evidence violates
international law and perhaps due process. See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749,
2798 (2006) (plurality opinion) ("[A]t least absent express statutory provision to the
contrary, information used to convict a person of a crime must be disclosed to him.").
Of course, the Sixth Amendment includes the right to be present at one's trial, and the
exclusion of a civilian defendant from his own trial in a U.S. civilian court would be
both unconstitutional and an abomination. U.S. military courts operating during a
military occupation of foreign territory and trying dangerous alien combatants who
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reasons the United States elected to use military commissions to
prosecute al Qaeda terrorists captured in Afghanistan was the
concern about revealing classified evidence in civilian courts.
Military commissions offered a workable solution to the problem that
avoided acquittal or outright dismissal of all charges. It was hoped
that through the adoption of certain evidentiary rules, military
commissions would prove to be a suitable forum to accomplish the
goal of prosecuting terrorists according to fair procedures without
compromising national security and valuable intelligence. 4 7 Experts

refuse to abide by the Geneva Conventions, however, must be flexible, and fairness to
the accused must be balanced with the need to protect intelligence and, ultimately, the
national security of the United States.
With respect to this balancing, it is important to point out, first, that even
American citizens can forfeit their right to be present at their own trials, so this right
to be present at one's trial in not an absolute one. See Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337
(1970) (holding that a criminal defendant could be excluded from his own trial where
his outbursts repeatedly interrupted the proceedings). Second, non-resident aliens not
present on American soil are entitled to even fewer protections than non-citizens.
Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 522 (2003) ("Congress may make rules as to aliens that
would be unacceptable if applied to citizens."); Yamashita v. Styer, 327 U.S. 1, 17
(1946) (holding that a military tribunal defendant is not entitled to all of the
protections afforded defendants in an American criminal court). Third, the United
States has a compelling interest in protecting its intelligence assets. Snepp v. United
States, 444 U.S. 507, 509 n.3 (1980) (per curiam) ("The Government has a compelling
interest in protecting both the secrecy of information important to our national security
and the appearance of confidentiality so essential to the effective operation of our
foreign intelligence service.").
Thus, a reasonable balancing of the interest of the accused with the interest of
preserving the secrecy of intelligence is both necessary and lawful. Since, sharing
intelligence with accused terrorists is not an option, if the Hamdan plurality's view is
ever adopted by a majority of the Court, the only alternative may be to decline to
prosecute such cases. Essentially this would leave it to individual soldiers on the
battlefield to determine whether to punish accused terrorists or release them, an
unacceptable and unsavory solution fraught with its own perils for the accused, yet one
that will inevitably occur if unelected judges cut off other reasonable options. See
Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 349 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring) (If "resolution
cannot be reached by judicial trial in a court of law, it will be reached elsewhere and by
other means, and there will be grave danger that liberty, equality, and the order
essential to both will be lost.").
47.
Editorial, Due Process for Terrorists?, WALL ST. J., Mar. 22, 2002, at A14
("A trial may be closed if classified or other sensitive material is presented. Again, this
is a matter of common sense. Fighting terrorism is hard enough without compromising
intelligence sources in open court. That said, the defendant's military lawyer will see
every piece of evidence."). President Bush's Executive Order authorizing military
tribunals for al Qaeda members mentions that applying the usual rules of evidence is
not practicable, due to dangers this would pose to the United States, presumably
because of the classified materials that would have to be revealed.
Detention,
Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War Against Terrorism, 66 Fed.
Reg. at § 1(f) ("Given the danger of the safety of the United States . . . it is not
practicable to apply in military commissions under this order the principles of law and
the rules of evidence generally recognized in the trial of criminal cases in the United
States district courts."); see also David B. Rivkin, Jr. & Lee A. Casey, Hamdan, WALL
ST. J., June 30, 2006, at A12 ("Of course, military commissions were initially
established because the rules applicable in courts-martial are not consistent with
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can debate the suitability of military commission on other grounds,
but they must concede that trials in U.S. military courts would have
permitted the use of classified and sensitive information that cannot
be used in the CCCI.
Another related problem concerned Iraqi witnesses who were too
fearful of suffering reprisals at the hands of terrorists to testify in
open court that a particular defendant committed the crime
charged, 48 a problem that prosecutors of Saddam Hussein have also
encountered.4 9 With zealous terrorists operating in nearly every
Iraqi town, it stands to reason that their activities are frequently
observed by their neighbors and countrymen, 50 at least a minority of
whom remains loyal to the current Iraqi government or the Coalition.
But some of these cannot openly support the current government and
the Coalition, nor defy the insurgents, out of fear that the guerillas
will murder them or their families. 51 The judges of the CCCI know
this threat well, as many of them have been the targets of
assassination attempts. That is why the government provides each
CCCI judge with a security detail and why many of the judges have
moved inside the "green zone" near the U.S. embassy. The terrorists
in Iraq have repeatedly shown their willingness to murder scores of
innocent women and children who never lifted a finger against

either the practical realities of the war on terror, or the illegitimate status, under the
laws and customs of war, of capture al Qaeda members.").
48.
These fears were justified. See, e.g., Tom Lasseter, U.S. Soldiers Make
Inroads In the Role of Private Eyes, MIAMI HERALD, July 8, 2006 (describing how and
Iraqi who had promised to become an informant was murdered shortly thereafter).
Because the CCCI was likely to acquit the defendant or give him a slap on the wrist
regardless of the testimony presented, it became senseless to endanger innocent Iraqi
witnesses simply to prove the case, so they were infrequently used. Similarly, when
U.S. military witnesses were required to travel through dangerous areas to appear at
the CCCI, it was determined that their safety was more important than pursuing a
case for which it was unlikely the United States would obtain justice anyway.
49.
Toby Harnden & Aqeel Hussein, Death Threats To Witnesses Halt Saddam
Trial, LONDON SUNDAY TELEGRAPH, Oct. 23, 2005, at 30 ("The trial of Saddam Hussein
is in danger of collapsing because dozens of witnesses are refusing to testify against
him after being told the former dictator had issued death threats from his cell."); Paul
Martin, Saddam's Lawyers Fear Shiite Attacks, Hiring Bodyguards, WASH. TIMES, Oct.
23, 2005, at Al ("Witnesses to be called in the trial [of Saddam Hussein and his
accomplices for the Dujayl massacre] are reluctant to testify ....
").
50.
When U.S. soldiers asked to use the roof of one Iraqi's Baghdad home as a
vantage point to observe terrorists, the woman responded that she feared that her
neighbors would see and would inform the terrorists of her cooperation: "You can't live
in safety if you cooperate with either side .... What would I say to the neighbors?"
Sabrina Tavernise, Middle-Class Family Life In Iraq Withers Amid the Chaos of War,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 2, 2005, at 1.1 (quoting Nesma Abdul-Razzaq). A similar phenomenon
was observed in Vietnam.
See TOMMY FRANKS, AMERICAN SOLDIER 98 (2004)
(recounting an IED attack in Vietnam in which the villagers knew the identity of the
attackers but were too terrified of the communists to inform the U.S. troops).
51.
See Morton Kondracke, Making a Better Case, WASH. TIMES, Sept. 13, 2005,
at A21 (noting that "Saddamists and jihadists return and kill ... those [Iraqis] who
Icollaborated" with the United States).
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them, 52 so these jihadists would have no qualms about killing
witnesses who cooperated with the United States by testifying
against them and their comrades in the CCCI. 53 Sadly, a few who
took the risk of cooperating with the United States did so at the cost
54
of their lives or those of their family members.
It is understandable, then, that fear and the desire for selfpreservation has discouraged many Iraqis from testifying against the
terrorists. 55 Too often this reluctance has resulted in freedom for the
worst of the insurgents, as these are the most ruthless of the bunch,
and witnesses know that testimony against these insurgents will
56
result in immediate retaliation against the witness or his family.
For example, in one case originating just outside of Fallujah, the
Marines engaged in a firefight with several young, Arab males,
completely clad in black. The men attacked the Marines by firing
RPGs, automatic rifles, and by throwing hand grenades.
The
attackers fled when the Marines started focusing their firepower on
the house invaded by the terrorists. Still clad in their black suits, the

52.
Sabrina Tavernise, Iraq's Violence Sweeps Away All the Norms, N.Y. TIMES,
May 6, 2005, at Al ("Car bombs seem to be the weapon of choice for the insurgents.
They are usually aimed at army convoys, but often kill more civilians than soldiers.").
53.
The same is true with respect to witnesses testifying in U.S. courts against
terrorists operating in the United States. See Eric Lichtblau, Trial Starts for Student
in Plot to Kill President, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 1, 2005, at A51 (In the trial of Ahmed Omar
Abu Ali, accused of conspiring to assassinate President George W. Bush, spectators "in
the courtroom were allowed to listen to audio of the depositions but were blocked from
viewing it, to protect the Saudis' identities.").
54.
Grossman, supra note 16 (noting that "insurgent retribution against Iraqi
informants exposed in the judicial process 'has occurred several times"').
55.
Nordland et al., supra note 39, at 20.
The insurgents had a ready-made intelligence network ... that told them very
quickly who was collaborating with the occupation and who wasn't.
Intimidation aimed at those people was sometimes massive, as car bombs
targeted people signing up for jobs with the Coalition, and sometimes very
personal, but always ferocious.
Even the Iraqi police are afraid of the terrorists, so it should come as no surprise that
the common Iraqi is also fearful.
American officers describe having Iraqi police officers who would talk to them
candidly only if they were in a room without any other Iraqis. This atmosphere
made working with Iraqis almost impossible. In one case, Iraqi police jumped
out of the second-story windows of a police building when they saw Americans
coming, to avoid being seen with them.
Richard Lowry, What Went Right, NAT'L REV., May 9, 2005, at 31.
56.
The General Accounting Office reports that there is a nascent witness
protection program in Iraq. Gen. Accounting Office, Rebuilding Iraq, GAO-04-902R
(June 2004) ("[W]hile a team of U.S. Marshals began establishing a witness protection
program in March 2004, witness intimidation continues to be a problem, according to
DOJ officials."). The key term is "nascent."
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common dress of many insurgent groups in and around Fallujah,5 7
the Marines captured them in a neighboring home. When the
Marines asked the residents of the dwellings to testify against the
men, they all declined out of fear that their testimony would result in
their own deaths. 58 Their qualms about testifying were entirely
justified, 59 particularly in light of their location in the so-called
"Sunni Triangle" which continues to be infested with dangerous
militants. Had the witnesses been able to testify anonymously, or in
a forum not saturated with insurgent spies, it is at least possible that
they would have cooperated with the prosecution, as the insurgents
had brought them only carnage and anxiety, destroying their
neighborhood and making it perilous to reside in those environs.
The CCCI has further exacerbated this problem by acquitting or
lightly sentencing defendants who are obviously guilty. This leads
potential witnesses to conclude that: (a) their testimony will be futile
because the CCCI will acquit the terrorists anyway; (b) even if the
terrorists are convicted, the CCCI will not sentence the insurgents to
any considerable period of imprisonment, so it is hardly worth the
witnesses risking their lives; and (c) because so many insurgents
whom the United States originally detained have been released
(frequently for lack of evidence to prosecute them in the CCCI),6 ° it is
likely that any insurgent that the witnesses testify against will
similarly be released 6 1-their freedom will necessarily entail the

57.
See John Hendren, Few ForeignersAmong Insurgents, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 16,
2004, at 1 (noting a number of "insurgents believed to be foreigners wore similar black
'uniforms,' each with black flak vests .... "); Patrick J. McDonnell, Forces Cross Key
Road Into Fallouja'sHeart, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 11, 2004, at 1 (noting in various houses in
Fallujah "Iraqi soldiers found black outfits and masks similar to ones that insurgents
have worn in videotapes that show foreign hostages."); Jim Krane, Many Fallujah
Fighters Escaped, Military Says Warnings Gave the Insurgents Weeks to Flee, PHIL.
INQUIRER, Nov. 11, 2004, at A2 (U.S. military officials describing "the black garb the
U.S. military says is characteristic of the insurgents" in and around Fallujah).
Insurgents in Baghdad also sport the latest fashion, and thus sometimes wear these
same black outfits. Richard Lloyd Parry et al., Rebels Roam Free in Central Baghdad,
LONDON TIMES, Nov. 13, 2004, at 61.
58.
See Josh Meyer & Mark Mazzetti, In a Battle of Wits, Iraq's Insurgency
Mastermind Stays a Step Ahead of U.S., L.A. TIMES, Nov. 16, 2005, at 1.
59.
In the words of Saddam Hussein's defense counsel and former U.S.
Attorney General Ramsey Clark, "How can you ask a witness to come in when there's a
death threat?" See Tom Vanden Brook, Ex-Attorney General Joins Saddam Defense,
USA TODAY, Nov. 29, 2005, at A10.
60.
See Bing West, America as Jailer, NAT'L REV., July 17, 2006, at 27 ("In
Ramadi, for instance, an unemployed youth is paid $40 to emplace a roadside bomb. It
is unlikely that he will be caught in the act, and, if he is caught, he knows the odds
greatly favor his release. Our soldiers mock the arrest of insurgents as a 'catch and
release' fishing tournament.").
61.
These releases have not only discouraged witnesses from testifying, they
have discouraged Iraqi troops from handing insurgents over to the United States and
have created ill feelings in Iraqi officers and soldiers who would like to see an end to
the insurgency. Julian E. Barnes, Cracking an Insurgent Cell, U.S. NEWS & WORLD
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freedom to exact revenge on those witnesses who testified against
them. 62 It is no wonder, then, that Iraqis are reluctant to testify
63
against the terrorists.
Of course, this problem of witness trepidation and intimidation is
not exclusive to Iraq. The United States itself contains veritable "war
zones" where the police battle sophisticated gangs who intimidate
witnesses with subtle and not so subtle threats of violence. 64 As U.S.
law enforcement officials have acknowledged:
"If we can't get
witnesses to cooperate, the entire rule of law breaks down, '65 a
truism that transcends borders. To protect witnesses, some U.S.
jurisdictions permit them to testify anonymously, 66 a practice that
the CCCI judges initially did not permit. 67 By refusing to assist these
witnesses in remaining anonymous, the CCCI judges made the
68
terrorists' threats and intimidation completely efficacious.
Witnesses knew that if they showed their faces in court, they would
not be long for this world. Bowing to U.S. pressure, the CCCI has
since relented (or at least it did in one case) and apparently now will
sometimes permit witnesses to testify anonymously before the
investigative judge. However, because the court security personnel,
and perhaps even some of the judges, have ties to the insurgency,

REPORT, Jan. 9, 2005, at 40 ("If the evidence doesn't meet American standards,
military lawyers will release the detainees-angering the Iraqi forces who originally
captured them.").
62.
Grossman, supra note 14 (noting that Iraqis are "more reluctant" to provide
the United States with intelligence after "terrorists and criminals return to their
neighborhoods").
63.
Id. ('It is almost impossible to get witnesses to testify."').
64.
Witness intimidation is a serious problem in parts of the urban United
States:
Police and prosecutors in Boston say uncooperative witnesses are a major
reason about two-thirds of last year's homicides remain unsolved.
[Suffolk County District Attorney Daniel F.] Conley said he was surprised to
learn from his gang prosecutors that 90 percent of their cases involve some
form of intimidation. He heard how a man was shot while coaching a
basketball game-and no one saw anything. Same story for a 10-year-old hit by
a stray bullet during a crowded football practice.
Sometimes, Conley said, the intimidation comes right into the courtrooms.
Julie Bykowicz, As Boston Boosts Witness Protection,Baltimore Take the Legal Route,
BALTIMORE SUN, Apr. 13, 2005, at 1A.
65.
Id. (quoting Lt. Gov. Kerry Healey).
66.
Id. Of course, in U.S. courts this raises issues concerning the right to a
public trial and the Confrontation Clause, but not in Iraq.
67.
The author is aware of only one case in which the CCCI investigative
judges permitted a witness to testify anonymously.
68.
Anonymous testimony should never be the norm in any legal system, but
things are far from normal in Iraq, and creative solutions must be found to combat the
terrorist threat that is tearing that nation apart.
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there is some question whether this anonymous testimony is
sufficient to protect witnesses from reprisal.
It is also important, for Iraq's future, that the CCCI affirm that
anonymous testimony is a temporary, extraordinary measure that is
necessary only because of the extraordinary nature of the terrorist
insurgency and the danger that it poses. The judges must ensure
that this dangerous practice will be discarded after terrorism has
been extirpated in Iraq, lest the court make a habit of convicting
defendants on the basis of testimony from "anonymous" witnesses. It
is simply too easy for corrupt police officers to manufacture evidence,
and the Iraqi judges and attorneys are insufficiently skilled at crossexamination to root out these fabrications, particularly under Iraq's
civil law system. Unless the new Iraqi justice system commits itself
to transparency it will be no better than the Baathist courts it was
designed to replace.
B. Crime Scene Depictions and Submission of Weapons to the Court
The difficulty of convincing frightened witnesses to testify
against violent criminals is not a defect directly attributable to the
Iraqi judiciary, although Iraqi judges certainly could have taken steps
to ameliorate this problem. But the CCCI judges were directly
responsible for imposing other impediments to the prompt and
effective prosecution of Iraqi terrorists. Sometimes these took the
form of picayune evidentiary or procedural rules that seemed to
appear spontaneously or to have their genesis only in the whim of a
particular panel of judges. For example, on more than one occasion
the CCCI investigative judges demanded a photograph or sketch of
the crime scene, refusing to allow a case to progress to trial without
one. 69 This rule was enforced regardless of the number of witnesses
and weight of the evidence and regardless of whether a sketch would
be relevant or would assist the court in assessing the merits of a
case. 70 For example, it would be senseless to provide a sketch of the

69.
See, e.g., Bing West, America as Jailer, NAT'L REV., July 17, 2006, at 27
(noting that the "arresting American soldiers filed two sworn statements for each
arrest, together with photos from the crime scene"). This demand was probably made
pursuant to the Iraqi criminal procedure law, which states that the scene of an incident
shall be examined by the magistrate and he shall "arrange for a sketch-map of the
scene of the incident to be made." IRAQI LAW ON CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS
52(B)
(1971) available at https://www.jagcnet. army.mil/JAGCNETInternet/Homepages/AC/
CLAMO-Public.nsf/0/85256a lc006ac77385256d34006030dc?OpenDocument

(last

visited Nov. 8, 2004).
70.
Another creative tactic the CCCI employed to delay or completely avoid
hearing a case was its requirement that the United States provide a photograph of the
defendant. At one point the CCCI trial court refused to schedule trials unless it had
been given a photograph of the defendant or his identification card. Since the prisoners
were generally kept at Abu Ghraib Prison, which was a dangerous IED-encountering
drive from the CCCI courthouse, obtaining photographs of the defendants was not a
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crime "scene" in cases involving a defendant found in his car to be in
possession of weapons, yet the court required sketches even in such
cases and they are now a regular component of the submission to the

CCCI.71

Apparently the CCCJ's demands have become enshrined as a
mandatory rule of production that has expanded to include the
production of other articles of sometimes-irrelevant evidence, such as
notations as to the distance between a particular terrorist and
incriminating evidence as well as the distances between the various
pieces of contraband. 72 Imagine how ridiculous U.S. soldiers must
appear to Iraqis as they measure distances between insurgents and
the weapons they threw down when they fled or surrendered.
Ridicule is the least of their problems, however, insofar as this

simple task. Because the defendants appeared before the court in person, there was
also little reason to also provide a mug shot, which further suggest this was simply a
ploy to stymie the prosecution of the terrorists. Producing a photograph of the
defendant neither ensured that the defendant was guilty nor that the defendant was
who he claimed to be. Similarly, if the judges were so enamored with photographs of
defendants, there was nothing to stop the investigative judges from taking these
photographs themselves when the defendants appeared for their hearings. No effort
was made to do this, however, which further suggests that the photograph prerequisite
was simply an excuse to avoid holding trials of insurgents or at least delay them.
In a similar fashion, the CCCI informed U.S. prosecutors that it would not hear
cases unless the written submission to the court contained a proper identification of the
defendant, meaning the correct Arabic spelling of the defendant's name, and his correct
name. This may sound easy enough, but transliterating Arabic script into the English
alphabet often results in "misspellings," since there are numerous ways to spell the
most common Iraqi names. Thus, the name 'Mohammed," the most common name in
Iraq, can be spelled at least fifteen different ways, depending on the transliteration.
Doug Smith & Raheem Salman, Long JailingsAnger Iraqis,L.A. TIMES, May 29, 2005,
at Al ("'There are 15 ways to spell Mohammed,' said Lt. Col. Darwin Concon ....").
The name can be spelled: Mohammed; Mohommed; Mohamed; Mohomed; Muhamed;
Muhammed; Muhomed; Muhommed; Mahamed; Mahammed; M'hamed; M'hammed;
Mohamad; Mahamad; Muhamad.
Compounding this problem is the fact that
defendants used various names to identify themselves, not including aliases. Thus, for
example, they sometimes provided their tribal name, other times not.
Some
defendants also utilized a host of aliases, so it was not always possible to determine the
defendant's true name. In the end, the CCCI apparently never dismissed any cases on
this ground, but the delay caused by the demand doomed some cases and is yet another
example of the court's willingness to inhibit the prosecution of terrorists.
71.
Zoroya & Jervis, supra note 21, at 1 (noting that the files U.S. prosecutors
assemble "can include details on informants, diagrams, a summary written by each
Marine involved in the case, a chain-of-custody report tracing the handling of evidence
and photographs from the scene of an attack or capture.").
72.
See Grossman, supra note 16.
The evidence packet now must also include the two direct-witness statements;
diagrams of the target area that depict the locations and distances between any
pieces of incriminating evidence; a chronology of events; photos of the suspect,
target area, contraband and its original location, and sight lines between the
suspect and the location where contraband was found; and the methodology
and results of any explosives testing performed.
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burden of crime-scene measurement leaves soldiers vulnerable to
secondary attack by snipers. 73 Because the United States thus far
has demonstrated a naive willingness to play along with the CCCI's
childish game of "scavenger hunt," there is no telling what additional
pieces of evidence the court will require the United States to furnish
in the future.
As for photographs, they are certainly a nice touch, occasionally
valuable, and prosecutors worth their salt make liberal use of them
whenever they are available. But photographs usually are not
essential to proving beyond a reasonable doubt that a defendant
committed a crime. Anyway, soldiers in deployed settings like Iraq do
not always have access to digital cameras or the means to print
photographs, which was particularly true in the early stages of the
war, and thus they cannot always provide photographs of the
defendants or contraband seized. Furthermore, when engaging the
enemy in the heat of battle, soldiers usually do not have time to snap
a couple of glamour shots while dodging bullets. Even after a battle
subsides, the risk of snipers and secondary explosive devices limits
the extent of any crime scene investigation. During "combat and
immediately thereafter, the security of the occupying forces and the
occupant's duty to maintain law and order are always paramount and
there is little time for legal niceties. '74 Indeed, one tactic favored by
insurgents involves planting multiple bombs in an area but initially
detonating only one, waiting for rescue crews and investigators to
arrive, and then detonating the other bombs, thereby maximizing
lethality and disrupting investigations. 75 But the CCCI judges,

73.
Secondary attacks are a commonly used tool of the Iraqi terrorists. Robert
C.J. Parry, The War You Didn't See, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 12, 2006, at 1 (noting that after
detonating car bombs the terrorist often initiate secondary attacks to kill those soldiers
who have responded to treat the victims of the initial attack).
74.

ELI E. NOBLEMAN, AMERICAN MILITARY GOVERNMENT COURTS IN GERMANY

149 (1961). As Lieutenant Colonel John Dunlap stated, "It is very, very rare to catch
one of these guys [insurgents] and have what we need to nail him." Finer & Mosher,
supra note 26, at All. It is difficult to collect evidence while actively fighting a war
and fending off lethal attacks, particularly when explosive devices litter the roads that
must be used to reach "crime scenes" and these "crime scenes" are seldom in hospitable
areas.
The United States should have learned this lesson long ago. Consider, for example,
that "the Clinton administration declined Sudan's offer in 1996 to turn over Osama bin
Laden because there was not sufficient probable cause to try him in U.S. courts."
Kenneth Anderson, What to Do with Bin Laden and Al Qaeda Terrorists: A Qualified
Defense of Military Commissions and United States Policy on Detainees at Guantanamo
Bay Naval Base, 25 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POLY 591, 608 (2002). Bin Laden constituted a
threat to the United States, and the United States therefore should have utilized its
resources to defend U.S. interests, and lives, rather than waiting around for sufficient
evidence to litigate the matter.
See David S. Cloud, Insurgents Using Bigger, More Lethal Bombs, U.S.
75.
Officers Say, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 4, 2005, at A9 ("As the military has begun conducting
post-bombing investigations, insurgents have increasingly been planting multiple

666

VANDERBILTJOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[VOL. 39-645

despite their own military experience in the Iran-Iraq War,
disregarded such danger when making their evidentiary demands,
probably because they were not the ones facing the dangers.
Similarly, the CCCI judges demanded that prosecutors submit to
the court the weapons and armaments captured with a defendant.
U.S. advisors repeatedly informed the CCCI judges that most U.S.
military units lack the capacity to transport and store enemy
weapons and explosives securely, and thus these weapons are usually
destroyed on-site.7 6 Yet judges continued to issue adverse rulings
based on the failure to transport dangerous weaponry through enemy
7v
territory to the CCCI courthouse.
The Iraqi judges seem oblivious to the necessary prioritization of
resources on the battlefield-similar to the prioritization performed
by police forces when confronted with natural disasters. 78 Under the
U.S. battlefield priority scheme, the task of collecting admissible
evidence correctly falls somewhat lower on the list of priorities than,
say, killing the enemy, protecting civilians, and evacuating the
wounded. 79
Under battlefield conditions, the CCCI demand for
mountains of irrefutable, non-circumstantial evidence is unrealistic
and counter-productive:
[A] number of officers in Iraq say they lack the resources to
consistently construct prosecutable cases for Iraqi courts-and at the
same time fight the insurgency, protect the population from attack, and
build and train new Iraqi security forces.
Top commanders and policymakers in Washington "are asking our
soldiers and Marines to be law clerks and expert crime scene
detectives," says one officer. "Most tactical commanders do not have

devices at the same location, apparently to disrupt investigative teams sent to the blast
site, or at least delay their work while they clear the site of any secondary bombs.").
76.
Sabrina Tavernise, Along the Syria-Iraq Border, Victory is Fleeting In An
Effort to Rout Out Foreign Fighters,N.Y. TIMES, June 26, 2005, at 19 (noting that after
capturing enemy machine guns, rocket launchers and other military items, they were
"blown up on site").
77.
Presumably this was done in accordance with Iraqi law, which holds that
courts should require "items seized be brought to the court room whenever
possible .. " IRAQI LAW ON CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS
164 (1971) available at
https://www.jagcnet.army.milJAGCNETlnternetHomepages/AC/CLAMO-Public.nsf/O/
85256alc006ac77385256d34006030dc?OpenDocument (last visited Nov. 8, 2004).
78.
See Scott Gold, Justice is Another Victim of Katrina, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 26,
2005, at A12 (noting that in post-Katrina New Orleans police "officers are as stretched
as everyone else" and that they have placed a priority on tracking "down more than 100
registered Louisiana sex offenders" as opposed to protecting property from looting);
Thomas M. Burton, In Katrina's Wake Louisiana Legal System Is Snarled, WALL ST. J.,
Sept. 9, 2005, at A13 (noting that in Louisiana after Hurricane Katrina, "most lawenforcement authorities have been preoccupied with maintaining the peace as much as
they can, and haven't had a chance to focus on courts or evidence").
79.
Those who find this assessment disturbing or are surprised by this
revelation would be wise to consider that the "goal of our enemies is to kill Americans,"
and they must be stopped before they do so. Jack Kelly, Letting Down Our Troops,
WASH. TIMES, Nov. 17, 2005, at A18.

20061

US. MILITARY COURTS AND THE WAR IN IRAQ_
the operational patience necessary to develop the type of insurgent
targets was are going after."
Sometimes military units in Iraq "stumble on a big fish who is
subsequently turned loose for lack of evidence" because the
investigative groundwork typical of police detective work has not been
laid, this officer says. The "result is their cells go deeper underground
and are thus hard to target."
In fact, the bigger the fish, the less likely it is he will be found with
incriminating evidence, according to U.S. military personnel in Iraq. (It
is the insurgent foot soldiers, rather than their commanders, who
typically are found with weapons and ammunition in their car trunks,
80
officials say.)"

The CCCI's outrageous evidentiary requirements are, therefore,
assisting the insurgency rather than helping to dismantle it.
Unfortunately these requirements are just the tip of the iceberg.
C. The Refusal to Draw Inferences or Accept CircumstantialEvidence
All of the foregoing obstacles to justice in the CCCI may be
explained away as the requirements of a bureaucratic system typical
of some civil law countries-the excuse put forward by apologists for
the court. But such bureaucratization cannot explain other defects of
the court, such as the CCCI's refusal to make logical inferences and
deductions.
Consistent with Islamic law, when adjudicating cases, the judges
of the CCCI require direct testimony for every element of an
offense.81 The trial judges usually refuse to rely on circumstantial
evidence,8 2 make logical deductions, or draw inferences,8 3 practices

80.
Grossman, supra note 16.
81.
See Bing West, America as Jailer, NAT'L REv.., July 17, 2006, at 27 ("The
American soldiers who had made the arrest were required to appear at that trial. In
the majority of cases, this has not been possible. Iraqi judges, often intimidated and
openly suspicious of written testimony from American soldiers tend to free the
accused."). Theoretically, in Islamic legal practice the only acceptable evidence is
"testimony, confession, and oath." Brinkley Messik, Literacy and the Law: Documents
and Document Specialists in Yemen, in LAW AND ISLAM IN THE MIDDLE EAST 61 (Daisy
Hilse Dwyer ed., 1990).
82.
Grossman, supra note 16 ("The bottom line is that Iraqi judges tend to
demand overwhelming physical evidence before deciding to keep a suspected insurgent
locked up, U.S officials say."). Although CCCI judges do not make the initial custody
determination, they do decide guilt or innocence, and the sentence imposed on
convicted terrorists, and they do so according to this obsession for physical evidence
that is non-existent in many cases.
83.
This has led Iraqi defense attorneys to argue vigorously that a prosecutor's
case relied on circumstantial evidence, as though this were a fatal defect requiring
acquittal. See Iraqi Man Found Guilty in Death of U.S. Reservist, SAN JOSE MERCURY
NEWS, Dec. 12, 2004, at 13A (noting that "defense lawyers argued the case was based
on circumstantial evidence and a coerced confession").
Sadly, reliance on
circumstantial evidence often does doom a case in the CCCI.
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they probably inherited from Islamic law,8 4 which in turn was
probably derived from Jewish law.8 5 An example of the CCCI's
application of this rule demonstrates its unsuitability to modern
criminal jurisprudence. Consider cases in which U.S. soldiers testify
that they were fired upon with small arms and that when they were
able to look in the direction from which the attack came, they saw
nothing but a vehicle fleeing the scene. They gave chase and
eventually came upon the car, found a rifle inside with the keys in the
ignition and the car running, but no defendant. Rather, he is
apprehended nearby where he is acting suspiciously, perhaps even
trying to conceal himself. In such a case the court would not convict
the defendant of unlawful possession of a weapon, much less
attempted murder or assault, because when the soldiers originally
saw the car and the defendant they did not see any weapon, but when
they found the weapon in the vehicle the defendant was no longer in
that car. Furthermore, they never saw the defendant in the vehicle,
fire the rifle, a key element of assault or attempted murder under
Iraqi law.
For some reason, the court could not or would not see the logical
connection between the defendant and the recovered rifle. Although
the soldiers saw the defendant in the vehicle, saw weapon in the
vehicle, the vehicle fled from them, and they apprehended the
defendant adjacent to the vehicle, the CCCI fixed its gaze on the fact
that the soldiers never saw the rifle in the vehicle at the same time

84.

MATTHEw LIPPMAN ET AL., ISLAMIC CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE: AN

INTRODUCTION 70 (1988) ("Islamic rules of evidence stipulate that should there be no
confession, a defendant's guilt must be established by direct rather than circumstantial
evidence ...").
85.
Theodore Spector, Some Fundamental Concepts of Hebrew Criminal
Jurisprudence, 15 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 317, 320 (1925) (In Jewish law, no

"evidence as to the prisoner's antecedents was admissible. No previous conviction
might be urged against him, no proof of character good or bad, was permitted to
impeach the witnesses. Hearsay evidence was rejected as worthless and circumstantial
evidence was inadmissible."). In light of the presence of Judaism and Christianity in
the Arab world prior to the advent of Islam, and Islam's appropriation of Jewish and
Christian traditions, it is likely that this aspect of criminal jurisprudence had its origin
in Jewish Law:
[At the time Islam was founded, the] bulk of the Arab population were
idolaters, but there were some among them who had adopted Christianity, and
some were Magians in religion. A large and influential community of Jews had
for a long time settled in Medina with their own laws and usages, and also in
southern Arabia. How far they influenced the customary law of the Arabs must
to a great extent be a mere matter of conjecture, but that on some points it
bears features of resemblance to the Rabbinical code will be apparent.
Abdur Rahim, A Historical Sketch of Mohammedan Jurisprudence,7 COLUM. L. REV.
101, 105 (1907). According to Islam, the "Qur'an is a continuation of other divine books
such as the Old and New Testaments, but these latter, it is believed, have been
considerably tampered with." Id. at 186.
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they saw the defendant in the vehicle. Without direct testimony from
a witness that he saw the defendant with the weapon, the court
would not infer that the defendant possessed the rifle, despite the
spatial and temporal impossibility that someone other than the
defendant placed the weapon in the vehicle.8 6 The court would not
deduce or infer that the defendant possessed the rifle despite the
credible evidence to support this view (including his flight from the
soldiers), nor would it infer that he was the person who fired the
87
weapon.
More problematic, from a deterrence perspective, is the fact that
the terrorists who ordered, financed, or planned the attack were
immune from prosecution so long as they did not actually fire the
weapon. Assuming that the terrorist who actually carried out the
attack will not testify against his comrades in arms 8 8 -and this is a
safe assumption in light of experience-the masterminds of the
terrorist attacks have nothing to fear from the CCCI so long as they
stay at least one causal link away from the attack. They remain safe
from any inference that could otherwise bridge the gap.
Of course, this is contrary to the ordinary practice of humans,
who make deductions and inferences every day. Indeed, inferences
and deductions are such a ordinary part of everyday life that U.S.
domestic courts don't bat an eyelash when circumstantial evidence is
presented.8 9 As the U.S. Supreme Court has stated: 'Circumstantial

86.
Experienced prosecutors will wonder why the prosecution did not submit
evidence that the defendant owned the vehicle. While this seems like a rather simple
matter, in Iraq almost nothing is simple. For starters, in many instances there is no
vehicle registration or ownership documents by which to track a vehicle. Similarly,
even if such documents existed, they would have to be obtained from often-hostile
locations, necessitating a small company of soldiers to obtain them. Such resources
were hard to come by. Similarly, any documentation would be in Arabic, which would
further necessitate the services of a translator, a commodity also in short supply.
Ultimately, even if such documentation could have been obtained, the CCCI judges
would not permit such evidence to substitute for the requisite eyewitness testimony
that the defendant fired or possessed the weapon.
87.
In contrast, in an attempted murder cases involving a defendant who shot
an AK-47 at an U.S. soldier, one of the CCCI trial judges told the soldier/victim that
the defendant obviously wasn't trying to kill him, since he missed. This demonstrates
that the judges are capable of drawing inferences, apparently just faulty ones.
Even then-pursuant to the two-witness rule imposed by the CCCI-the
88.
mastermind would escape punishment unless there were two witnesses who testified
that he was responsible for a terrorist attack.
89.

The inferences that the court permits the jury to educe in a courtroom
do not differ significantly from inferences that rational beings reach
daily in informally accepting a probability or arriving at a conclusion
when presented with some hard, or basic evidence. A court permits the
jury to draw inferences because of this shared experience in human
endeavors.
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evidence is not only sufficient, but may also be more certain,
satisfying and persuasive than direct evidence."' 90 Yet the CCCI
judges refuse to go down this path.
There are several explanations for the CCCI's aversion for
circumstantial evidence and logical inferences. First, Islamic law
frowns upon circumstantial evidence, considering it to be unreliable,
because circumstantial evidence requires inferences and deductions
to make it useful in judicial proceedings. 91 Commentaries on Islamic

Edward J. Sweeney & Sons, Inc. v. Texaco, Inc., 637 F.2d 105, 116 (3d Cir. 1980); see
also Holland v. United States, 348 U.S. 121, 140 (1954) (in criminal cases
circumstantial evidence is "intrinsically no different from testimonial evidence").
90.
Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 100 (2003) (quoting Rogers v.
Missouri Pacific R. Co., 352 U.S. 500, 508, n.17 (1957)); see CHARLES F.
CHAMBERLAYNE, A TREATIES ON THE MODERN LAW OF EVIDENCE § 15, at 18 (1911):
But circumstantial evidence has also its claim to credibility of a high order.
Under the environing conditions of time, space and causation certain evils as
fabrication, collusion and mistake, to which direct evidence is peculiarly and
almost necessarily exposed, can seldom be carried over into the proof of a large
number of probative facts, frequently of slight individual evidentiary effect.

Id.
91.
To be sure, Islamic law-at least as understood by the Sunnis-makes use
of analogical reasoning, and even on occasion logical deduction and inference. Rahim,
supra note 85, at 266 (Because the specific proscriptions of the Quran and Hadith are
limited in their scope, "the Mohammedan jurisprudence has been largely built up by
means of juristic deductions.") But some of the analogies they draw-such as that
between marriage and theft-are rather peculiar.
When faced with new situations or problems, scholars sought a similar
situation in the Quran and Sunna. The key is the discovery of the effective
cause or reach behind a Sharia rule. If a similar reason could be identified in a
new situation or case, then the Sharia judgment was extended to resolve the
case. The determination of the minimum rate of dower offers a good example of
analogical deduction. Jurists saw a similarity between the bride's loss of
virginity in marriage and the Quranic penalty for theft, which was amputation.
Thus, the minimum dower was set at the same rate that stolen goods had to be
worth before amputation was applicable.
JOHN L. ESPOSITO, THE STRAIGHT PATH 83 (1991); see also LIPPMAN ET AL., supra note
84, at 32 ("Analogical reasoning, or qiyas, is the fourth major source of Islamic law.
This is the method used by jurists to broaden an existing rule to encompass what
appears to be a situation not addressed by the Koran or the Sunna."); Theodore P. Ion,
Roman Law and Mohammedan Jurisprudence, 6 MICH. L. REV. 44, 46 (1907)
(discussing 'Kyiass;' namely, opinions or decision by analogy or comparison"). Using
analogical reasoning, some jurists "inflicted the penalty of stoning for the crime of
sodomy, reasoning that sodomy is similar to the offense of adultery and therefore
should be punished by the same penalty the Koran requires for adultery." Id. Many of
the Shia tradition have rejected the use of analogy in interpreting sharia. ESPOSITO,
supra, at 91 (noting that "the Shii reject analogy and consensus as legal sources, since
they regard the Imam as the supreme legal interpreter and authority").
Of course, the Anglo-American legal tradition extensively uses analogical
reasoning.
See Int'l News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 262 (1918)
(Brandeis, J., dissenting) ("The unwritten law possesses capacity for growth; and has
often satisfied new demands for justice by invoking analogies . . ."); RICHARD A.
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law note that sharia precludes circumstantial evidence and prohibits
judges from making logical inferences in criminal cases:
Islamic rules of evidence stipulate that should there be no confession, a
defendant's guilt must be established by direct rather than
circumstantial evidence; documents have no independent evidentiary
value. A homicide, for instance, cannot be proved by the fact that
witnesses overheard a violent struggle, saw the accused emerge from
his house with a blood-stained knife, and then discovered the victim's
92
body in the house.

Iraq is a pervasively Moslem nation, 93 and this bias against
circumstantial evidence that exists in Islamic law apparently has
been carried over to the "secular" legal system, which it is simply one
branch of Iraq's culture, which frequently relies on the predominant
4
religion for guidance in important legal matters
Second, since at least the time Saddam Hussein began ruling
Iraq, it was seldom necessary for the criminal courts to rely on
circumstantial evidence. Once a suspect was apprehended, the police
frequently would torture and imprison him until they obtained a
confession. 95 Actual guilt or innocence was simply irrelevant. Armed
with this confession, at the defendant's trial there was no need for
prosecutors to rely on mere circumstantial evidence except to bolster

POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW 13 (1995) (Reasoning by analogy is "the standard judicial
technique for dealing with novelty."); ROSCOE POUND, LAW FINDING THROUGH
EXPERIENCE AND REASON 46 (1960) (Legal reasoning "proceeds upon analogies.").
92.
LIPPMAN ET AL., supra note 84, at 70. Some brands of sharia, however, do
permit circumstantial evidence and the logical inferences that this evidence entails:
Jurists differ as to whether a qadi may rely upon circumstantial presumptions
to establish a defendant's guilt. The Maliki school permits fornication to be
legally established by the birth of a child to a female who has never been
married and who has not made a prior claim of rape. Possession of stolen
property and the odor of alcohol on the breath are recognized by some jurists as
presumptions that establish the crimes of theft and drinking alcohol.
Id. at 71.
93.
At certain points this article discusses Islamic terrorism and the
relationship of Islam and Moslems to this terrorism. In so treating these issues, it is
important to note, as Pope Benedict XVI did, that "Islam is not a uniform thing. In
fact, there is no single authority for all Muslims .... No one can speak for Islam as a
whole; it has, as it were, no commonly regarded orthodoxy."
Cardinal Joseph
Ratzinger, quoted in John L. Allen, Jr., Pope Benedict on Islam, NAT'L CATH. REP., Aug.
12, 2005, at 20. In light of this heterodoxy and heteropraxy, describing something as
"Moslem" or "Islamic," or stating that certain terrorists are 'Moslems" or that Islam
entails a certain belief does not mean that all people describing themselves as Moslems
are so implicated. Some Moslems advocate terrorism. Others do not.
94.
JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN, THE CIVIL LAW TRADITION 149 (2d ed. 1985) ("The
law is rooted in the culture...").
95.
Liz Fabian, U.S. Attorney Plans to Return to Iraq Next Month, THE MACON
TELEGRAPH, Dec. 23, 2005, available at 2005 WLNR 20814118 (noting that-according
to United States Attorney for the Middle District of Georgia, Maxwell Wood, who is
working in Iraq revamping the Iraqi judicial system-the Iraqis would "make an
arrest, beat a confession out of somebody and that's their trial").
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their case. Having been trained under this primitive system, it is
little surprise that the CCCI judges hold circumstantial evidence in
such disdain.
Although this phenomenon is easily explained, it is not so easily
overcome. But if Iraqi officials ever hope to create competent and
respected judicial system, they must transcend their bias against
inferences and their anachronistic views of evidence. Until they do
so, U.S. efforts to seek justice in the CCCI will continue to be a futile
endeavor.
D. Disproportionateand DisparateSentences
Another of the CCCI's
shortcoming is its use
of
disproportionately
lenient
sentences-sentences
that
are
insufficiently light to punish the offender and deter similar acts-and
its disparate sentences-sentences which differ in magnitude
although they are meant to punish nearly identical acts. One reason
for the adoption of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines in the United
States was the belief that sentences should be handed out by the
courts in a consistent fashion and that similar crimes warrant similar
punishments. 96
Under the rule of law, sentences should be
commensurate with a defendant's guilt, and should not depend, for
97
example, on the defendant's wealth or standing in the community.
Sentencing disparities reek of injustice, both for the unfortunate

96.
28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1)(B) (stating that the purpose of the Sentencing
Commission is to formulate policies that avoid "unwarranted sentencing disparities");
United States v. Haynes, 985 F.2d 65, 69 (2d Cir. 1993) (the "sentencing guidelines
were adopted by Congress to achieve uniformity in federal sentencing for similarly
situated defendants."). See also KENNETH CULP DAVIs, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE: A
PRELIMINARY INQUIRY 218-19 (1971) (noting that principles of equal justice and equal
protection require similar treatment for similar crimes).
They merit similar
punishments, not necessarily identical punishments, because justice requires a
consideration of more than merely the crime committed. See id., at 209 ("Mwo persons
who have committed the same offense need not be equally treated, because the
treatment should depend upon factors in addition to the offense committed ....");
POSNER, supra note 91, at 181 (noting that "a difference in treatment does not violate
the equal protection clause if it is justifiable ....
").
97.
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment "is essentially
a direction that all persons similarly situated should be treated alike." City of
Cleburne, Tex. v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985). This extends to the
manner in which laws are administered among different people or groups of people.
Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 373-74 (1886) (noting that if a law "is applied and
administered by public authority with an evil eye and an unequal hand, so as
practically to make unjust and illegal discrimination between persons in similar
circumstances, material to their rights, the denial of equal justice is still within the
prohibition of the Constitution").
Similarly, "[tihe touchstone of due process is
"protection of the individual against arbitrary action of government." County of
Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 845 (1998).
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criminals who are treated more harshly than their leniently-treated
comrades and society, which is denied the justice vital to its survival.
U.S. jurisprudence, at least since Reconstruction, has sought to
minimize judicial arbitrariness and disparities in sentences. This
includes U.S. military jurisprudence in occupied settings like Iraq.
For example, U.S. military courts in Germany-after World War I
and World War II-were forced to address the need for consistent
sentences for native Germans convicted of crimes. 98 After World War
I, the problem was solved, and harmony with the local population
enhanced, by the creation of a council of judges where the judicial
officers exchanged views and debated appropriate sentences.99 After
World War II, uniformity was produced via implementation of
sentencing tables that specified an appropriate sentence for each
10 0
crime.
Beyond the inherent injustice of the CCCI's sentences is the fact
that disparate sentences are inimical to crime prevention insofar as
they (a) inhibit a calculating criminal from ascertaining with any
certainty what his crime might cost him if caught, or (b) lead him to
conclude that he will bear only a slight cost for his crimes, and only if
he is caught and convicted. 10 ' That is, to the extent the CCCI
sentences are disproportionately light, they present an insufficient

98.
NOBLEMAN, supra note 74, at 126-27; I.L. HUNT, AMERICAN MILITARY
GOVERNMENT OF OCCUPIED GERMANY, 1918-1920 94-95 (1943). Many aspects of the

German people and the nature of the German defeat made military government of
Germany much easier than the government of Iraq, which in turn lightened the load
the U.S. military tribunals in Germany. Still, these tribunals tried cases involving
many of the crimes which the CCCI handles in Iraq:
Violators of military government rules and orders were hailed before military
government officers who served as judges in a hierarchy of military government
tribunals presided over by the legal officer or some other officer assigned by the
local detachment. These included cases where Germans ignored the curfew
regulations, used certain highways reserved for military traffic and committed
petty theft, as well as various other offenses. More serious cases involving
possession of fire arms, stealing of American military property, and assault
might be given a preliminary hearing in the lowest military government
tribunal, but they were then referred to a general military government tribunal
which operated in the areas an had as judge an officer trained in the law. A
final military government tribunal heard appeals and had to concur in any
sentence involving the death penalty. This tribunal which had three judges to
hear or review cases was required to have at least one officer who was a
professional lawyer.
HAROLD ZINK, AMERICAN MILITARY GOVERNMENT IN GERMANY 131 (1947).

99.
HUNT, supra note 98, at 94-95.
100.
NOBLEMAN, supra note 74, at 126-27.
101.
See Everett P. Wheeler, Reform in Criminal Procedure, 4 COLUM. L. REV.
356, 356 (1904) ('The principal object of judicial punishment is to protect the innocent
members of society. The authorities on criminal jurisprudence are agreed that this
may most effectively be done by swift and certain punishment."). Not every criminal is
a rational maximizer, but substantial punishments have a strong deterrent effect.

674

VANDERBIL TIOURNAL OF TRANSNA TIONAL LA W

[VOL. 39:645

deterrent to would-be attackers; 10 2 in fact, they encourage and
embolden terrorists who perceive these paltry sentences as a sign of
weakness. 10 3
These defects are acutely felt in Iraq, where a
substantial number of insurgents are simply common criminals
whose primary motivation is profit. 10 4 If these criminals cannot
predict what their punishment would be if caught, or accurately
predict that their sentences would be extremely light, they will be
more likely to commit their terrorists acts, thinking that the cost of
any punishment is a manageable investment risk. Stiff penalties,
consistently administered, might convince these profit-maximizing
terrorists otherwise. 10 5 If the certainty of being punished increased,
along with the certainty and severity of the punishment, the
leadership of the insurgency would then be forced to increase
expenditures to satisfy their hirelings at the risk of losing them to
some less-lucrative but ultimately safer venture. At worst, this will
result in a swifter depletion of insurgency funds, and therefore the
end of the insurgency. 10 6 (Admittedly, this still leaves the insane

102.
Bing West, America as Jailer, NAT'L REV., July 17, 2006, at 27 ("What do
insurgents have to lose from being arrested for fighting if they know they will soon be
released by authorities?"). When considering the appropriate sentences for terrorists,
it is worth remembering that many terrorists are more than just common criminals:
they are part of a larger military organization whose short-term goal is to drive the
United States out of Iraq. CLAUSEWITZ, supra note 8, at 101 ("Combat in war is not a
combat of individual against individual, but an organized whole made up of many
parts.").
103.
See Abraham D. Sofaer, Solidarity on Iraq will Help Beat Terrorism, WALL
ST. J., July 13, 2005, at A14 ("Allowing acts or threats of terror to diminish a state's
efforts against terrorism will in the long run encourage terrorism.").
104.
Rowan Scarborough, Pentagon Has Clearer View of Iraq Insurgency, WASH.
TIMES, March 29, 2005, at A9 ("Officials now think that criminals make up more of the
insurgents than first thought, meaning many are driven by money, not ideology.").
105.
The penalties need not be judicially administered to be effective. Indeed,
the delay engendered by judicial proceedings may limit their efficacy.
Victor Davis Hanson surmises that a more forceful U.S. military response might
have prevented many of the problems that the United States faced in Iraq, because the
United States' enemies would have been put on notice that the United States was
willing to respond to any threat with overwhelming force:
It would have been extremely messy to have shot the first 400 looters who
began a cascading riot that ruined $13 billion in Iraqi infrastructure. Storming
rather than pulling back from Fallujah in April 2004 would have offended the
press, the professors, and the Europeans. Arresting or killing Moqtada al-Sadr
in June 2003 might have angered the Arab world and invited parlor debate
among the mandarins back home, but such measures also would have shown
Ironclad American resolve and eventually would have impressed even our
enemies.
Victor Davis Hanson, Postmodern War, CITY JOURNAL ONLINE, (Winter 2005),
available at http://www.city-journal.orglhtmlll 5_ postmodern-war.html.
106.
Even if it were "impossible to prevent all attacks" it is "still possible to
make life more difficult for the terrorists." Walter Laqueur, The Danger That Lies in
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suicide bombers to carry on, but they also need Iraqi money to
thrive 0 7 and there are a finite number of suicidal zealots.) At best, it
could discourage a sufficiently large number of insurgents to abandon
their fight that organizers of the insurgency would be forced to
abandon their war and seek to influence events through political
channels.
Considering that the U.S. federal courts and military tribunals
long suffered from sentencing disparities and disproportionate
sentences before Congress's enactment of measures to prevent these
problems, it is not surprising that the CCCI suffers from these same
afflictions. But remember that disparities in the U.S. federal courts
were among hundreds of judges dispersed throughout ninety-three
judicial districts. 08 Contrast that to the CCCI, which has six judges
that hear cases in three-judge panels. This gives the CCCI judges a
greater opportunity to interact and determine amongst themselves
the appropriate level of punishment for specific types of crimes. With
so few judges it should be relatively easy to form a consensus as to
proper sentences in particular types of cases, or at least definite
sentencing ranges. But that has not happened. Instead, there are
great disparities in sentences and irrational variations that show no
correspondence to the severity of the underlying crimes.1 0 9 Thus, in
the CCCI, defendants involved in relatively minor offenses are
sentenced to more severe punishments than defendants who
orchestrated terrorist schemes that harmed or had the potential to
disrupt Iraqi society and the U.S.-led Coalition. Furthermore, even
among this latter group there were substantial disparities in the
length of imprisonment imposed by the CCCI.
Take, for example, three desultory sentences handed down by a
CCCI panel in 2004. In the first case, a single defendant was
apprehended while transporting the following items in his car: a
sniper rifle, two AK-47 rifles, a small quantity of ammunition, and an
infrared scope. The CCCI panel sentenced the defendant to three
years in prison. 110
In the second case, with the exact same panel of judges, two
defendants were found to possess in their vehicle: three IEDs, a 60-

Our Midst, WALL ST. J., July 12, 2005, at A16. Proportional sentences are one means
of doing this.
107.
Bradley Graham, U.S. Officers In Iraq Put Priority on Extremists, WASH.
POST, May 9, 2005, at Al, A19 ("Though foreigners may drive the suicide cars, Iraqis
are frequently behind the scenes operating the networks that provide safe houses,
assemble the explosives and arrange other support.").
108.
See United States District Courts, available at http://www.uscourts.gov/
districtcourts.html.
109.
This can be an indicator of corruption, as it suggests that bribes or an
affinity for particular defendants is motivating minimized sentences.
110.
News Release, United States Central Command, Illegal Weapons Bring
Insurgents Three Years in Prison (Sept. 20, 2004) (on file with Author).
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millimeter mortar round with a remote detonation transmitter
attached, a 155-millimeter artillery round, a triggering device, and
other materials related to emplacing improvised explosive devices."'
The same CCCI panel sentenced these now ebullient defendants to
three years in prison-the same sentence that the defendant caught
112
carrying three rifles received.
Similarly, in a third case involving two brothers-Qusai
Mohammed Id Hamid Al Jbouri and Jassim Mohamed Id Hamid Al
Jbouri-these defendants were caught in possession of three 135millimeter mortar rounds, two of which were wired and packed with
blasting caps. In other words, the defendants possessed an IED, but
it lacked the remote triggering mechanism of the device discussed
above in the second case. In an effort to save his brother, Jassim
decided to take the wrap and admitted possessing the device. The
court, therefore, acquitted Qusai based solely on his brother's
testimony and disregarded the evidence that inculpated Qusai.
Regardless, with respect to sentencing Jassim, because he had
admitted possessing the IED, the CCCI had little basis for
dissembling or claiming that a more lenient sentence was appropriate
in light of uncertainties as to the defendant's guilt. The court
sentenced Jassim to an unconscionable four years in prison.
Although the three sentences were nearly identical in their
severity, they were factually disparate. The latter two cases-which
involved IEDs-entailed substantially more danger to Iraqis and U.S.
troops than merely possessing a few rifles. And among the two IED
cases, the defendants with remote triggering devices possessed
substantially greater lethality than those without this enhancement.
The automatic rifles transported by the first defendant clearly
are a menace in the already heavily-armed Iraq,1 1 3 but one could at
least argue that this defendant possessed them for a legitimate
purpose:
self-protection and protection of family members,
particularly because firearms are the only form of protection
available in the crime- and violence-ridden Iraq. Explosive devices,
however, are clearly powerful offensive weapons for which there is

111.
In IEDs the "explosive is typically an artillery shell, thousands of which
existed in arms caches throughout the militarized country." Rowan Scarborough,
Rebels Improve Bomb Schemes In Iraq, WASH. TIMES, Apr. 25, 2005, at Al. "IEDs are
typically bombs made from Iraqi artillery shells and other ordnance." Eric Rosenberg,
Jammers Reduce Toll of Iraqi Road Bombs, ALBANY TIMES UNION, Apr. 3, 2005, at A7.
112.
See News Release, United States Central Command, supra note 110.
Compare the magnitude of these paltry sentences to various illegal fireworks
manufacturers, to whom United States federal courts typically hand out sentences in
excess of four years of imprisonment.
113.
Michael Moss, U.S. Struggling to Get Soldiers UpdatedArmor, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 14, 2005, at 1.1 ("Gunfire has killed at least 325 troops .... ).
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really no legitimate defensive use. 114 This fact alone suggests that
the possession of explosive devices warrants a stiffer sentence than
mere possession of a few automatic rifles.
It is also true that three rifles do not entail the destructive
capacity possessed by the Al Jbours' explosive devices; and three
rifles are certainly not as injurious as the multiple explosive devices
with remote triggering devices possessed by the second set of
defendants. Nearly every Iraqi male over the age of twelve possesses
at least one rifle, 115 which Iraqi law countenances-and frequently
multiple rifles, which the law forbids, but which is nevertheless
extremely common in Iraq. Unlike small arms-which blanket Iraqnot everyone in Iraq possesses explosive materials, nor does the
average Iraqi possess the skills necessary to manufacture explosive
devices, as the last two sets of defendants did. So the fact that a
defendant possessed several rifles does not make him much more
deadly than the average Iraqi. His lethality would depend largely on
his training and ability to use the weapons effectively, particularly
the sniper rifle and the infrared scope.
Defendants with explosives, on the other hand, are highly lethal
and armed to the teeth, to a much greater extent than the average
Iraqi. After all, a person can only fire one rifle at a time, and there is
a limit as to the number of bullets than can be discharged by the
rifles in a given timeframe, and thus there is a limit on the power a
rifle can project. In contrast, the magnitude of the harm produced by
an explosive device is limited only by its component parts and the
target attacked. The greater the amount of explosive material, the
greater the destructive capacity. Another relevant factor is the
discriminatory ability of the two types of weapons; explosive devices
are not as discriminating as carefully aimed rifles. When they
explode, they produce carnage of everything within the blast radius,
including innocent children. 116 That is why the Coalition in Iraq

114.
Theoretically an Iraqi could employ IEDs defensively to prevent invasion of
his farm or house, but the resulting carnage would be greatly disproportionate to the
benefit obtained. In short, blowing up one's home with an IED is not a rational
alternative to letting a thief take what he wants from the home.
115.

See Sharon Behn, Militia ID Cards are Keys to the City, WASH. TIMES, Oct.

31, 2005, at Al ("Weapons are easily available in Iraq. Some come from vast arsenals
of former dictator Saddam Hussein that were opened up after the U.S. military took
control of the country."); Anna Badkhen, Scared Civilians, Few Insurgents, S.F.
CHRONICLE, Oct. 7, 2005, at A14 ("Most Iraqi households have at least one gun for

protection, often a Kalashnikov rifle."); Jonathan S. Landay, Firm Arming Iraq
Military Faces Charges, MIAMI HERALD, Apr. 28, 2005, at A23 ("Iraq is awash in AK47s and other weapons ...");
Bill Gertz & Rowan Scarborough, Chinese Arms for Iraq?,
WASH. TIMES, Apr. 15, 2005, at A6 ("Iraq remains awash in weapons, including
thousands of new AK-47s...").
116.
Kirk Semple, Baghdad Bomb Kills Up to 27, Most Children, N.Y. TIMES,
July 14, 2005, at Al, A10 ('The car bomber made a deliberate decision to attack one of
our vehicles as the soldiers were engaged in a peaceful operation with Iraqi citizens,'
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considers crimes involving explosives to be more egregious than mere
possession of an extra rifle. 117 Explosives are considered "special
category weapons," and the United States, through the Coalition
Provisional Authority, mandated that criminals found possessing or
transporting such weapons would receive a mandatory sentence of
thirty years in prison. 118
Similarly, a remote triggering device magnifies the lethality of
an IED while minimizing danger to the insurgent. Remote triggering
devices reduce: (a) the need for the terrorist to remain near the IED,
and thus the chance that an insurgent's presence at the IED site will
alert troops to its presence, thereby permitting the soldiers to
discover the device and escape the danger unscathed; (b) the
possibility that an insurgent is harmed by the explosion once the
device is triggered, thus permitting him to carry out further attacks;
(c) the chances that a terrorist will be captured or implicated in the
explosion; and (d) the insurgents' opportunity to observe the IED site
and ensure that non-combatants have not wandered into the blast
zone. Thus, a remote triggering device enhances both the destructive
capacity of the IED and the insurgents' chances of evading detection,
capture, and conviction. Remotely-triggered devices have proven to
be extremely deadly to U.S. soldiers and innocent Iraqis, 119

said Maj. Russ Goemaere, a spokesman for the U.S. military in Baghdad. 'The
terrorist undoubtedly saw the children around the Humvee as he attacked."'); Sabrina
Tavernise, Iraq's Violence Sweeps Away All the Norms, N.Y. TIMES, May 6, 2005, at 1
("Car bombs seem to be the weapon of choice for the insurgents. They are usually
aimed at army convoys, but often kill more civilians than soldiers.").
117.
Possessing an extra rifle is so common in Iraq that U.S. soldiers frequently
do not arrest Iraqis for this crime.
118.
As Aristotle recognized, "unrighteousness is more pernicious when
possessed of weapons," and even more so when they are special category weapons.
ARISTOTLE, POLITICS 13 (H. Rackham, trans., 1978) (circa 350 B.C.).

119.

Mark Washburn, Iraq's Insurgents Build Bigger, Better Bombs, MIAMI

HERALD, June 10, 2005, at A20 ("Improvised explosive devices, the roadside bombs that
insurgents build from castoff artillery shells and munitions, have become the No. 1
killer of American troops in Iraq this year, despite a massive U.S. campaign to blunt
their effectiveness."); Bradley Graham & Dana Priest, Insurgents Using U.S.
Techniques, WASH. POST, May 3, 2005, at A15 ("Roadside bombs-the military calls
them 'improvised explosive devices,' or IEDs-continue to rank as the number one
killer of U.S. troops in Iraq, according to Pentagon figures. About half of all casualties
in Iraq are attributed to them."). According to an Army training report, the leading
cause of death among U.S. soldiers in Iraq between March 2003 and April 2005 was
actually small arms-fire, closely followed by IEDs. But if one considers car bombs to be
IEDs (the military usually calls them VBIEDs, or "vehicle-borne improvised explosive
devices") IEDs are the leading cause of death.
Small Arms Fire:
Improvised Explosive devices:
Car bombs:
Rocket-propelled grenade attack:
Mortar attack:
Sniper attack:

436 deaths
350 deaths
85 deaths
67 deaths
60 deaths
25 deaths
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particularly when the underlying explosive material is a155millimeter artillery round. In light of the destructive capacity and
the use of remote triggering devices, in Iraq bombs have killed
120
approximately twice as many soldiers as gunfire.
With these facts in mind, one would think that a defendant's
possession, manufacture, or transportation of multiple explosive
devices would warrant a punishment greater than mere incarceration
for three or four years; one would also think that the use of a remote
triggering device would entail a more substantial sentence than
simple possession of an IED. Even using the distorted calculus of the
CCCI judges, if possession of small arms merits three years in prison,
possession of a few explosive devices should merit three years plus a
few more (3 + n), and possession of multiple explosive devices with a
remote triggering mechanisms should merit and even greater
sentence (3 + n + x). But that is not the case with the CCCI.
These sentences are disproportionate in yet another manner. It
is well-known that rifles are ubiquitous in Iraq, while improvised
explosive devices are not found with the same frequency. Capturing
someone with multiple IEDs is even less common. Accordingly,
possession of an IED is the equivalent of holding an identity card that
says: "I'm a committed member of the insurgency." 12 1 Similarly,
possession of multiple IEDs suggests not just membership in the
insurgency, but a position of trust in the insurgency. 122 Someone
with two rifles might very well be seeking to protect his home and
family, 12 3 and when that appears to be the case, U.S. soldiers

Suicide bombs (not in vehicles):

23 deaths

Greg Jaffe & Yaroslav Trofimov, Iraqi Insurgents Change Their Focus, WALL ST. J.,
Apr. 21, 2005, at A8. Of course, these numbers do not include non-fatal casualties.
Because of the shrapnel produced by the IED explosions, IEDs produce a far greater
number of injuries than do small arms.
120.
Moss, supra note 113, at Al ("Gunfire has killed at least 325 troops, about
half the number killed by bombs, according to the Pentagon.").
121.
For this reason, an Assistant Secretary of Defense in the Regan
Administration recommends that those insurgents caught with IEDs "should not be
turned over to the broken Iraqi system." Bing West, America as Jailer, NAT'L REV.,
July 17, 2006, at 27.
122.
Those with the highest status in the insurgency probably stay far away
from IEDs and instead pay underlings to handle them.
123.
In a heavily armed country like Iraq, with porous borders across which
arms can and do freely flow, it is foolish to expect gun control legislation like Iraq's
"one man, one firearm" rule to reduce the level of violence. Indeed, the rule simply
makes innocent Iraqis prey to heavily-armed insurgents, who care nothing for abiding
by this ordinance. Solomon Morre, First the Insurgents, Then Marines, L.A. TIMES,
May 14, 2005, at Al ("The man told the Marines that that U.S. mandate limiting each
Iraqi household to one firearm and a small amount of ammunition has hindered the
town's ability to defend itself. He also said Iraq's porous borders were endangering
residents."). Where a government cannot or will not defend its citizens from violence, it
has no moral right to prevent the citizenry from defending itself. Similarly, when a
government takes affirmative steps to prevent people from defending themselves, it
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frequently deal leniently with the individuals and decline to arrest or
prosecute them. 124 But possession of an IED cannot be minimized or
explained away as a means of protecting one's life or property, much
less transporting an IED or multiple IEDs. Thus, to the extent the
CCCI judges factor the magnitude of certainty into their sentencing
calculus-this presupposes that they have a sentencing calculusIEDs greatly increase the magnitude of certainty that defendants
found possessing them are not innocent victims of circumstance, but
substantial players in the war against the United States and the
Iraqi people. The IEDs speak almost as loudly as their explosions
would have: "Our owners are brutal insurgents." The rifles may say
the same thing about their owner, but they do not do so with the
125
same force.
Furthermore, had the CCCI judges been in tune with
proportional sentencing, they also would have taken into account the
concerted activity of the two sets of defendants, and the increased
dangers it entailed. The two sets of defendants possessing IEDs were
members of what any judge could see was at least a two-man
conspiracy, although based on the size of the munitions they
possessed, the extent of the conspiracy was obviously much greater.
As with all conspiracies, this concerted effort increased their chance
of success. That is, concerted criminal activity increases the danger
posed by such criminals because their cooperation increases both
their chances of success and of evading detection. 126 In contrast, the
defendant with the rifles was, at least when arrested, a lone wolf and
thus solely dependent upon himself for aid and assistance in

owes them a duty of protection, particularly in environments where encounters with
violence are highly probable. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 833 (1994)
("having stripped them of virtually every means of self-protection and foreclosed their
access to outside aid, the government and its officials are not free to let the state of
nature takes its course").
124.
Doug Smith & Raheem Salman, Long Jailings Anger Iraqis, L.A. TIMES,
May 29, 2005, at Al ("A farmer caught with two guns in his house, one more than the
law allowed, probably would be let go .
) (quoting judge advocate Major Dean
Lynch).
125. This does not minimize the import of such crime-rifles are also instruments
of death. It does indicate, however, that under proportional sentencing standards, this
defendant's crime merited less punishment than the IED-defendants; based solely on
the rifles he possessed and not considering any other intelligence, it cannot be said as
certainly that the rifle-defendant was an insurgent as it can with respect to the IEDdefendants.
126.
United States v. Jimenez Recio, 537 U.S. 270, 275 (2003) ("The conspiracy
poses a threat to the public over and above the threat of the commission of the relevant
substantive crime-both because the combination in crime makes more likely the
commission of other crimes and because it decreases the probability that the
individuals involved will depart from their path of criminality."); RICHARD A. POSNER,
ECONoMic ANALYSIS OF LAW 230 (6th ed. 2003) ('The special treatment of conspiracies
makes sense because they are more dangerous than one-man crimes.").
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completing an attack and escaping. 127
This disparity further
demonstrates the irrationality of the nearly identical sentences the
various defendants received. The concerted action of four of the five
defendants should have led to stiffer sentences in their cases.
Because the CCCI refuses to take into account aggravating factors
and elementary notions of parity, consistency, and deterrence that
form the bedrock principles of the U.S. legal system, disparate
sentences are bound to continue for the foreseeable future, and only
128
the terrorists benefit from such a scheme.
E. Paltry and Inadequate Sentences
It is no simple feat for U.S. prosecutors to get the CCCI to
convict defendants of serious crimes. Inducing the Iraqi judges to
impose proportional sentences on the defendants they do convict is
yet another morass. The CCCI is extremely lenient, to put it mildly,
in sentencing Iraqi terrorists. 129 Criminals convicted of heinous
crimes against U.S. soldiers have repeatedly received anemic
sentences that were hardly proportional to the crimes they
committed. 130 At the same time the CCCI handed out particularly
harsh sentences-including death-sentences-to defendants accused
of attacking Iraqi officials. 13 1
Judging by the CCCI's light

127.
Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440, 448-49 (1949) (Jackson, J.,
concurring) ("[Tlhe strength, opportunities and resources of many is obviously more
dangerous and more difficult to police than the efforts of a lone wrongdoer.").
128.

When by indiscriminate penal laws a nation beholds the same
punishment affixed to dissimilar degrees of guilt, from perceiving no
distinction in the penalty, the people are led to lose all sense of
distinction in the crime, and this distinction is the bulwark of all
morality: thus the multitude of laws produce new vices, and new vices
can call for fresh restraints.

OLIVER GOLDSMITH, THE VICAR OF WAKEFIELD 144 (1961) (1766).

129.
Spinner, supra note 33, at A12 ("In cases in which Iraqis have been accused
of being threats to security, the Iraqi judges have imposed light sentences ....
").
130.
Id. ("Americans as well as Iraqis have expressed surprise and
disappointment at how light the judges have gone on security detainees ....
").
131.
James Glanz & Sabrina Tavernise, 3 Set to Hang As Executions Return to
Iraq, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 17, 2005, at Al ("Three men convicted of dozens of rapes,
kidnappings and killings in the southern city of Kut, in one case displaying the eyeballs
of an Iraqi soldier to obtain payment for his murder, will be put to death by hanging in
the first execution by Iraq's civilian courts ....");Jeffrey Fleishman, Justice is Swift
And Deadly in Baghdad, L.A. TIMES, June 6, 2005, at Al (describing the CCCI's
sentence of death by hanging for three defendants accused of murdering an Iraqi
official and a sentence of ten years of imprisonment for an accomplice); Neil
MacDonald, Baathist Purge May Stall Hussein Trial, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR,
July 28, 2005, at 6 ("In May, amid a stepped up suicide bombing campaign, Iraqi
criminal courts passed death sentences on several Iraqis convicted of manufacturing
bombs. Mohamed Khalaf al-Jumayli, chief prosecutor at the CCCI, confirmed that the
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punishments in cases involving U.S. victims, one would think that
the court deals exclusively with petty criminals, as opposed to
dangerous terrorists. As critics of the court have noted, "people found
to have hoarded or transported huge stashes of bombs, machine-guns
and rocket-propelled grenades are frequently being treated as
leniently as drunk drivers and pickpockets."'1 32 The CCCI cares
nothing about the harm inflicted by the insurgency on U.S. soldiers.
Contrast the approach of the Iraqi judges with that of U.S. military
judges in post-World War II Germany:
The paramount consideration in fixing the sentence was the protection
of the interests of the military government by deterring further
violations by the accused or others. Courts were also required to give
consideration to the question of whether or not the crime committed
was premeditated, deliberate or motivated by a desire to undermine or
133
circumvent the policies of the military government.

The U.S. military courts in Germany knew that the success of the
occupation depended upon punishing those who sought to thwart the
occupation. The CCCI does not share similar concerns with respect to
Iraq. It, therefore, treats many brutal terrorists with kid gloves,
despite the serious nature of their crimes, and strives to find any
reason to impose trivial sentences on terrorists motivated by a hatred
for the U.S. occupation.
For example, the CCCI convicted defendant Alaa Sartell Khthee
13 4
of murdering thirty-one-year old Navy Lt. Kylan Jones-Huffman.
The evidence indicated that the defendant knew that his victim was a
U.S. soldier, as Khthee had closely observed Jones-Huffman before
firing his weapon, 135 Despite this evidence, and the gravity of the
harm that Khthee inflicted, the CCCI sentenced him to a mere fifteen
years of imprisonment. 1 36 Because Khthee is only twenty-eight years

men have exhausted all of their appeals in the court system. All that remains is for
President Jalal Talabani to sign their death warrants.").
By August 2005, the Iraqi courts had handed down the death sentence in thirtyfour cases, none of which involved the killing of U.S. soldiers. Glanz & Tavernise,
supra ("The case against the men, who acted in concert, is one of the 34 in which death
sentences have been handed down since the death penalty was reinstated in Iraq in
August 2004.").
132.
Colin Freeman, Saddam's Old Judges Provoke US Fury with Their Lenient
Sentences for Insurgents, LONDON SUNDAY TELEGRAPH, Mar. 13, 2005, at 29. Actually
the terrorists come off better than drunk drivers, as they do not lose their driving
privileges. One objection to using the CCCI as the forum of choice for terrorism cases
is that the CCCI is a general criminal court, and terrorists "should not be treated on a
par with the day-to-day crime seen in stable societies .. " Grossman, supra note 16.
133.
NOBLEMAN, supra note 74, at 122-23.
134.
Iraqi Guilty in Death of Reservist, LONG BEACH PRESS-TELEGRAM, Dec. 12,
2004, at A16.
135.
Iraqi is Convicted in Shooting Death of Md. Serviceman, BALT. SUN, Dec.
12, 2004, at 1.
136.
Iraqi Guilty in Death of Reservist, LONG BEACH PRESS-TELEGRAM, Dec. 12,
2004, at A16.
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old, he can still look forward to a long and productive life after he
completes his sentence, 137 unlike Lt. Jones-Huffman. And if the
United States should eventually hand detention operations and
Khthee over to Iraqi prison guards, it is unlikely the Iraqis will
require Khtee to serve his full fifteen-year sentence. 13 s This and
other relatively miniscule sentences send a strong message to the
insurgents that killing U.S. soldiers is not considered a serious
offense in the CCCI.
In contrast, U.S. military courts operating in Puerto Rico
following the Spanish-American War, in Germany following World
War I and World War II, and in other contexts, imposed the death
penalty to punish those who murdered U.S. soldiers. 139 Those courts
thereby demonstrated to other would-be murderers that killing U.S.
soldiers was not a wise course of action and that swift and severe
punishment would follow. U.S. military courts did not often have to
impose the death penalty-and even commuted a death sentence or
two14 0-as the mere possibility that one would be punished by death
sufficiently inhibited homicidal activities.' 4 ' The threat of swift and

137.
The same is true of an Iraqi terrorist by the name of Ziyad Hassan, who
murdered Staff Sergeant Henry E. Irizarry. The CCCI also gave Hassan a 15-year
sentence despite irrefutable proof that he killed Irazarry. Teri Weaver, Insurgent's 15Year Jail Sentence is Little Consolation for Murdered Soldier's Unit, STARS AND
STRIPES, Mideast Edition, June 20, 2005, available at http://www.estripes.com/article.
asp?section=104&article=29868.
138.
There is also the very real possibility that he will "escape" from prison, as
the mastermind of the bombing of the U.S.S. Cole escaped from a Yemeni prison.
Ahmed Al-Haj, Plotter in USS Cole Attack Flees Jail,WASH. POST, Feb. 6, 2006, at A10.
Iraqi guards have been known to free terrorists for the right price. Paul Martin,
Interior Chief Aims to End Corruption,WASH. TIMES, Jan. 11, 2006, at A13.
139.
NOBLEMAN, supra note 74, at 25-26 & Appendix 10 227-28. The President
commuted the death sentence of at least one of the Puerto Rican defendants. See Ex
parte Ortiz, 100 F. 955, 956 (C.C. D. Minn. 1900).
[O]n March 27, 1899 .... Rafeal Ortiz was put upon trial before said military
commission upon the charge of murder of John Burke, private of Company C,
47th infantry, on February 24, 1899, and of carrying concealed weapons, and
was convicted and sentence to suffer death, which sentence was, on May 12,
1899, commuted by the president to imprisonment at hard labor for life in the
Minnesota state prison at Stillwater, Minn.
140.
ERNST FRAENKEL, MILITARY OCCUPATION AND THE RULE OF LAW:
OCCUPATION GOVERNMENT IN THE RHINELAND, 1918-1923 153 (1944) (noting that after
a German national killed a U.S. soldier in 1921, the U.S. command permitted the local
German court to try the case, with the caveat that the United States could remove
jurisdiction at any time; after the court sentenced the defendant to death, the High
Commission commuted his sentence to life imprisonment). The German courts served
as adjuncts to the U.S. military courts.
141.
Execution also precludes the possibility that a terrorist will escape from
prison, a problem that the United States has faced in Iraq and Afghanistan. See Dan
Murphy, Escape Spotlights Troubled US Detention Efforts, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE
MONITOR, Nov. 7, 2005, at 4 (discussing "the US military's revelation that four
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severe punishment may be one of the reasons that the Germans never
mounted an insurgency against U.S. forces after World War I or 11.142
Consider also the case of defendants Mahmed Ahmed Mansor,
Salam Ali Ghafil, and Mutaz Abdullkarim Habari, who were caught
transporting five-hundred rocket-propelled grenades in a truck
marked with a red crescent. 143 Of course, the use of the red crescent
symbol-which affords the vehicle protection from military attack
and cloaks the activities of its occupants with a mantle of
respectability-to transport weapons is itself a war crime. Perhaps
more important is the magnitude of harm the cargo could have
inflicted on the United States: merely one rocket-propelled grenade
can bring down an U.S. helicopter or airliner, and rocket-propelled
grenades can be fired from substantial distances.
Thus, the
defendants' cargo posed a significant danger to U.S. forces, not to
mention Iraqis. But again, the CCCI chose not to see it that way.
The court sentenced the defendants to incarceration for a mere six
years, 144 which is essentially a slap on the wrist in light of the death
and destruction the defendants would have created had the U.S.
soldiers not confiscated the RPGs.
The court also apparently never took into consideration that, in
light of quantity and destructive capacity of their cargo, the
defendant must have been either weapons suppliers to the terrorist
insurgency or mid-level members of the guerilla network. Apparently
this made no impression on the CCCI judges, and in their eyes these
factors did not warrant enhanced punishment. According to the U.S.
Supreme Court, "the fairness and integrity of the criminal justice
system depends on meting out to those inflicting the greatest harm on
society the most severe punishments. '145 Until the CCCI changes
course and begins to impose sentences commensurate with the crimes

detainees, including Omar al-Faruq-the most senior Al Qaeda operative ever arrested
in Southeast Asia--escaped from Bagram Airbase in Afghanistan last July").
142.
The German court at Leipzig, charged with punishing German war
criminals of World War I, also handed down notoriously lenient sentences, refused to
convict the guilty, and later those who were convicted managed to "escape" from prison.
HOWARD S. LEVIE, TERRORISM IN WAR-THE LAW OF WAR CRIMES 30 (1993) ('The trials

of three of the accused proposed by the British resulted in convictions, but with
inadequate sentences."). The Germans learned from this that the world did not
consider their war crimes particularly weighty, which in turn led the Nazis to commit
even greater atrocities. This fact more than any other demonstrates the need for
strong, swift punishment, and the foolishness of entrusting judges of a defeated nation
with the task of administering justice and punishing their fellow citizens. The
incentive to look the other way is simply too great.
143.
Bay Fang, Tell It to the Judge, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Oct. 6, 2003. at
25.
144.
Department of Defense,
Iraq Status 20 (2003), available at
http://www.export.gov/iraq/pdf/dod-wklyrpt 111803.pdf.
145.
United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625, 634 (2002).
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terrorists are committing, there is little point in the United States
continuing to prosecute such cases in the CCCI.
F. The Neglect of CapitalPunishment
As mentioned above, after World War I and II, U.S. military
occupation courts were authorized to impose the death penalty in
cases involving a threat-sometimes a minor threat-to the authority
of the United States as an occupying power. This was done even for
relatively minor crimes, such as possession of a weapon, to deter any
opposition to the occupation authority and to quash any rebellion
before it could gain traction. Similarly, in the U.S. occupation of the
Philippines, insurgents who refused to abide by the law of war were
frequently not even afforded a trial and, instead, were shot on
sight. 146 Those afforded a military trial were subject to execution by
hanging. 147 In the words of one U.S. military judge who tried, and
executed, insurgents who killed U.S. soldiers during the U.S.
occupation of the Philippines:
I am perfectly clear in my own mind that as society stands at present,
capital punishment is a necessary part of any sensible scheme for its
protection. I have no compunction about hanging any man for the
lawless taking of the life of another. We owe it to the community as a
measure of protection to your life and mine and all others. So far as

146.

According to Judge Blount:

In his Circular Order No. 5, dated Batangas, December 13, 1901, General Bell
announced that General Orders No. 100, Adjutant General's Office, 1863,
approved and published by order of President Lincoln, for the government of
the armies of the United States in the field, would thereafter be regarded as
the guide of his subordinates in the conduct of the war. This order is familiar
to all who have every made any study of military law. Ordinarily, of course, a
captured enemy is entitled to 'the honors of war,' i.e., he must be held, housed,
and fed, unless exchanged, until the close of the war. But where an enemy
places himself by his conduct without the pale of the laws of war, i.e., where he
does not 'play the game according to the rules,' he may be killed on sight, like
other outlaws
Under General Orders No. 100, 1863, men and squads of men who, without
commission, without being part or portion of the regularly organized hostile
army, fight occasionally only, and with intermittent returns to their homes and
avocations, and frequent assumption of the semblance of peaceful pursuits,
divesting themselves of the character and appearance of soldiers; armed
prowlers seeking to cut telegraph wires, destroy bridges and the like, etc., are
not entitled to the protection of the laws of war and may be shot on sight. In
other words, the game being one of life and death, you must take even chances
with your opponent.
JAMEs H. BLOUNT, THE AMERICAN OCCUPATION OF THE PHILIPPINES 387 (1912).
147.
Id. at 415-16 (1973) (Colonel Meyer got the men who killed [Captain]
Clark, and, upon due and ample proof, I hung them."). Judge Blount makes clear that
his court was a military one even though it was labeled a "civil" one for political and
propaganda purposes. Id.
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public order was concern in the country now under consideration [the
Philippines] in 1903, the 'civil government' was simply a well-meaning
sham, a military government with a civil name to it.
When the
constabulary would get in the various brigands, cut-throats, etc., who
might be terrorizing a given district, some of them masquerading as
patriots, others not even doing that, the courts would try them. None of
the judges cared anything about any particular brigand in any given
cases except to find out how many, if any, murders, rapes, arsons, etc.,
he had committed during the particular reign of terrors of which he had
been part. Wherever specific murders were proven, the punishment
' 14 8
would always be "a life for a life."

A similar approach would have gone a long way toward pacifying
Iraq.
But this was not the approach used in Iraq. Besides neglecting
to use U.S. military courts, the Coalition Provisional Authority
neglected to employ capital punishment. Although the CCCI was
initially barred from employing death as a punishment for terrorists,
that proscription was eventually lifted. 149 Nevertheless, the CCCI,
perhaps because it is divorced from the responsibilities that burden
an occupying power, has refused to utilize the death penalty to deter
attacks on the U.S. military and instead has used capital punishment
to punish only those who have murdered Iraqis. One of the CCCI's
most egregious failures to utilize the death penalty came in a case
involving a riot and attack on Coalition forces that occurred in the
village of Abu Ghraib. On October 31, 2003,150 a small band of
insurgents that included defendants Abass Majeed Rashed, Mohamad
Abdul Ameer, Ali Adnan Ali, Nabeel Abdul Ameer Ateya, and
Mouhand Jalil Amara, attacked a U.S. Army patrol with mortars,
rocket-propelled grenades, and automatic rifles. Although the United
States suffered no casualties, one Iraqi succumbed to the violence.
Armed rebellion against an occupying power normally is
punishable by death, particularly where the actions also constitute
felony murder. 151 Despite their commission of felony murder, the fact
that these terrorists openly conducted a rebellion against the
Coalition government, their general disregard for human life, the
extensive firepower and advanced weapons they employed, and
despite the substantial risk that U.S. soldiers and many more

148.
Id. at 427.
149.
Iraq Reinstates Capital Punishment, USA Today, Aug., 8, 2004, available at
http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/iraq/2004-08-08-cap-punishment-x.htm.
True,
during 2003, the Coalition Provisional Authority outlawed the implementation of the
death penalty, but arguably this did not prevent the CCCI from sentencing terrorists to
death, only from executing the sentence.
150.
Alex Berenson & Susan Sachs, The Struggle for Iraq: Security; G.I. 'sBattle
Guerillasas Protest Turns Violent, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 1, 2003.
151.
U.S. Army Field Manual 27-10, The Law of Land Warfare, Ch. 6, § VIII,
art. 438, availableat http://www.globalsecurity.org/militarylibrary/policy/army/fm2710/index.html.
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innocent Iraqis could have been killed, the CCCI sentenced each
defendant to a paltry two years of imprisonment. True, at that time
the Coalition Provisional Authority had suspended the execution of
death sentences, but arguably the CCCI still could have sentenced
such defendants to death and stayed the execution of the sentence
until such time as the suspension on capital punishment was lifted
(as it later was by the interim Iraqi government).15 2 Alternatively, it
could have sentenced the defendants to imprisonment for life.
The CCCI similarly shirked its duty in the case of another
jihadist, Bashir Khadir, who was caught red-handed while placing an
IED on a road. This explosive device made use of an artillery round
and a cellular telephone triggering device, a technique commonly
employed in Iraq because it permits the explosion to be detonated
from great distances and virtually guarantees that the attacker will
escape. 153 Of course, IEDs have killed scores of U.S. troops, 154 as well
as caused substantial collateral damage (i.e., death) to Iraqi women
and children. Despite these risks and the potential for destruction
that his IED entailed, the CCCI sentenced the defendant to a mere
one year in prison. Incidentally, the defendant also possessed a
loaded pistol in public, which itself is a crime.
Compare the CCCI's treatment of Khadir with that of the U.S.
military courts in post-World War II Germany. There, the U.S.
military courts were authorized to impose the death sentence simply
for possessing a firearm like Khadir's pistol, 155 not to mention the
possession of explosive devices, and not to mention the act of
implanting an explosive device on a roadway in an attempt to kill
U.S. troops. Had a U.S. tribunal tried this defendant, he would have
faced execution for his possession of the IED and his emplacement of
the IED, not to mention his possession of the pistol. Instead, if the
United States honors the CCCI's sentence and releases Khadir when
his one short year of imprisonment is up, he will be free to join the

152.
Even if the suspension of the death penalty prevented the CCCI from
executing terrorists or sentencing them to death, the judges of the CCCI frequently
flouted the orders of the CCCI with which they disagreed. Furthermore, a suspension
of the death penalty did not require the judges to sentence terrorist rebels to the mere
two years of imprisonment that these defendants received.
153.

Bill Johnson, Firsthand Lessons In War, DENVER ROcKY MOUNTAIN NEWS,

Apr. 11, 2005, at 6A (recounting an attack on U.S. forces with an IED remotely
detonated by a cellular telephone); Rowan Scarborough, Cell-Phone Technology An
Explosive Tool for Insurgents, WASH. TIMES, Mar. 7, 2005, at Al ("Bomb-makers also
use cell phone to remotely set off improvised explosive devices (IEDs), the roadside
devices that have killed scores of U.S. troops.").
154.
See, e.g., Caryle Murphy, Roadside Bomb Kills 3 U.S. Troops in Iraq,
WASH. POST, Feb. 26, 2005, at A15 ("A roadside bomb killed three U.S. soldiers and
wounded nine as they patrolled Friday in Tarmiya, a town about 20 miles north of
Baghdad ... ").
155.

NOBLEMAN, supra note 74, at 228.
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battle again, 156 as many other Iraqi terrorist haven done when they
were released. 15 7 Already a "number of high-profile attacks have
been attributed to insurgents who were earlier detained in Iraq but
subsequently released."'158 Next time Khadir might have better luck
with his IEDs, and, at best, a few more U.S. soldiers will come home
missing a limb or two. Worst case, more soldiers will not make it
home alive.
Fortunately for the United States, yet another defendant, Ali
Ibrahim Enad did not have an IED. His weapon of choice was simply
a fully-automatic AK-47 rifle, a ubiquitous weapon in Iraq. 159 On
December 29, 2003, Enad used his automatic rifle to fire on U.S.

156.
Grossman, supra note 16 (discussing an insurgent who, just days after
being released by an Iraqi judge, "shot and wounded an Army lieutenant colonel who
commanded the 1st Battalion of the 24th Infantry Regiment in Mosul").
157.
As most members of the Supreme Court have recognized, the United States
has a "weighty" interest "in ensuring that those who have in fact fought with the
enemy during a war do not return to battle against the United States." Hamdi v.
Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. 2633, 2647 (2004) (plurality opinion); Id. at 2675 (Thomas, J.,
dissenting); see also MAINE, supra note 5, at 161 ("[Ihe object of detaining prisoners of
war is to prevent their taking part again in the operations of war."); CLAUSEWITZ,
supra note 8, at 66 ("the disarming or the overthrow of the enemy-whichever we
choose to call it-must always be the aim of military action").
Released Iraqi detainees have repeatedly rejoined the jihad against the United
States and its allies. Grossman, supra note 16 ("American officers at the tip of the
spear are becoming increasingly alarmed by the number of insurgents who have
committed violence against troops or civilians after being freed from incarceration in
Iraq."); Allam, supra note 44, at 1 (noting that one of the suicide bombers who attacked
Amman Jordan in November 2005, Safah Mohammed Ali, was captured in Iraq near
Fallujah by the United States military in 2004, but was released when it was
determined that there was insufficient evidence to prosecute or detain him).
Similarly, more than ten former detainees of Guantanamo Bay have rejoined the
fight against the United States in Afghanistan, and there is every reason to believe
than many Iraqi defendants would choose a similar course of action. See Deroy
Murdock, Ex-Guantanamo Detainees Trends, WASH. TIMES, Dec. 15, 2005, at A20 ('The
Pentagon knows of roughly a dozen former Gitmo detainees who did not return to the
peaceful Koranic reflection from which their leftist defenders seem to believe they were
sidelined. At least for some Ex-Guantanamites, U.S. military custody was a mere
vacation from their violence."); Associated Press, Seventeen in Terror Ring Arrested,
Morocco Says, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 21, 2005, at A8 (two former Guantanamo detaineesBrahim Enchekroun and Muhammad Mazouz-were arrested and charged with
participation in an Islamic terrorist network in Morocco); Thomas Harding, ExGuantanamo Prisoners Fight On, LONDON DAILY TELEGRAPH, Sept. 2, 2005, at 15
("More than a dozen prisoners released from Guantanamo Bay have returned to the
'battlefield' to fight Americans, it was disclosed yesterday."); Rowan Scarborough,
Detainees' Data "Best" Resource On Al Qaeda, WASH. TIMES, Apr. 19, 2005, at 3 ("at
least 10 former detainees the Pentagon knows by name have rejoined the war against
coalition forces").
158.
Grossman, supra note 16.
159.
Ashraf Khalil & Patrick J. McDonnell, Iraq Violence Takes a Sectarian
Twist, L.A. TIMES, May 16, 2005, at 1 (quoting Deputy Speaker of the National
Assembly Hussein Shahristani, "There is hardly an Iraqi household without weapons
of all sorts."); Ellen Knickmeyer, Demise of a Hard-FightingSquad, WASH. POST, May
12, 2005, at Al (AK-47s are "ubiquitous in Iraqi households").
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forces, but alas, he was no marksman, and his bullets never struck
his intended targets. U.S. forces captured him and shipped him off to
the CCCI for trial and sentencing. In post-war Germany's U.S.
military courts, an attempt to kill U.S. soldiers would have earned
Enad a death sentence. But in the CCCI, the judges believed that
this crime merited only six months of incarceration, during which
time the defendant will receive better health care and nutrition than
free Iraqis generally can afford. It is obvious that this sentence is
disproportionately lenient considering the nature of the offense and
its potential for harm. By way of comparison, U.S. military courts in
Germany handed out six-month prison sentences for cases of simple
assault, and only when both the victim and perpetrator were German,
and the assault was not an attack on the United States or its
personnel.160
Because the interim Iraqi government reauthorized courts to
utilize capital punishment, the CCCI was one of the first courts to
employ this form of punishment. But it has done so only with
defendants who have attacked Iraqis, 161 and not with terrorists who
have murdered or attempted to murder U.S. soldiers. The Iraqis
whom the CCCI had ordered executed had killed, kidnapped, and
raped fellow Iraqis.1 6 2 In the words of one Iraqi legislator, the
executions sent the message to terrorists that they will be punished
"if they try to kill innocent Iraqis," but no mention is made of
163
punishing terrorists for killing Americans.
It should be unnecessary to convince U.S. leaders that U.S.
soldiers' lives are worth just as much as Iraqi lives, and there is no
reason why terrorists who kill U.S. soldiers should not meet the same
fate as those who kill Iraqis. But U.S. leaders continue to entrust
insurgency cases to Iraqi judges, and Iraqi judges assign value to life

160.

NOBLEMAN, supra note 74, at 110.

161.
Williams, supra note 21, at 234 ("[Tlhe Iraqis wanted to retain the death
penalty, but some of our allies in the Coalition disagreed. In the end, the death penalty
was suspended for the period of the occupation."). Of course, the occupation continues
and
the death penalty has been restored in Iraq.
162.
Jonathan Finer & Naseer Nouri, Capital Punishment Returns to Iraq,
WASH. POST, May 26, 2005, at A16 ("The three alleged members of the insurgent group
known as the Ansar al-Sunna were condemned to be hanged 'in the next 10 days,'
according to the sentence imposed by the special criminal court."). Similarly, the CCCI
gave a nephew of Saddam Hussein a life sentence for his efforts to aid terrorists,
although a similarly culpable co-conspirator was given the typically paltry six-year
sentence for manufacturing IEDs. See Saddam's Nephew Gets Life Term, BUFFALO
NEWS, Sept. 19, 2005, at A4 ("A nephew of Saddam Hussein was sentenced today to life
in prison for funding Iraq's violent insurgency and for bomb-making . . . Ayman
Sabawi, the son of Sabawi Ibrahim al Hassan, a half-brother of Saddam, was captured
in May be security forces during a raid on Tikrit, the former leader's hometown.").
163.
Borzou Darangahi & Caesar Ahmed, Iraq Carries Out First Post-Hussein
Executions, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 2, 2005, at A3 ("'Let those terrorists know that there will
be decisive laws waiting to punish them if they try to kill innocent Iraqis,' said Abbas
Bayati, a Shiite Muslim legislator.").
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according to the nationality, tribe, and religion of the victim. These
judges apparently have not realized that many terrorists who kill
U.S. soldiers similarly have no qualms about killing Iraqis, so to the
extent that stiff sentences deter terrorist acts, they benefit both U.S.
soldiers and Iraqis. Thus, it is not surprising that a few Iraqis have
also expressed disapproval of the inadequate sentences handed out by
164
if
the CCCI in terrorism cases involving attacks on U.S. soldiers,
not its refusal to fully implement the death penalty for anti-U.S.
terrorists. Peace-loving Iraqis realize that their fate is inextricably
tied to the ability of the United States to succeed in Iraq, and that
even terrorists who target only U.S. soldiers necessarily also inflict
harm on the Iraqis who depend on the United States for protection
165
and assistance.
In light of the enormity of the harm that U.S. forces are seeking
to prevent-the creation of a terrorist state such as existed in
Afghanistan, violent terrorist attacks including bombings, civil war,
and widespread murder-and the fact that the carnage is happening
in a war zone, the death penalty is absolutely essential to control
militants who comprehend only the language of force. 166 A prompt
imposition of the death penalty for terrorists would have gone a long
way toward defeating the insurgency. 167 Indeed, in Germany after
World War II, the United States authorized capital punishment for
serious crimes such as: an armed attack on Allied Forces; killing or
assaulting any member of the Allied Forces, possession of a firearm or
explosive, use of a firearm or explosive, and sabotage. 168 Realizing
that even minor crimes can help destabilize an occupation
government or give terrorists a foothold, relatively minor crimessuch as making a false statement to Allied authorities or misleading
any member of the Allied Forces in the performance of their duties69
were also capital offenses.1
Of course, the U.S. military courts in Germany frequently did not
impose capital punishment in these latter types of cases, nor was that

164.
Spinner, supra note 33.
165.
Id. ("Bashar, a 25-year-old [Iraqi] pharmacist who was kneeling on a prayer
rug behind the desk in his shop, said the violence will stop only if the detainees are
imprisoned longer.").
166.
As an officer from the Fourth Infantry Division noted, "the Iraqis seemed to
understand only force." "To an American, this might upset our sense of decency," he
added. "But the Iraqi mind-set was different. Whoever displays the most strength and
authority is the one they are going to obey. They might be bitter, but they obey."
Dexter Filkins, The Fall of The WarriorKing, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 23, 2005, at 52.
167.

WILLIAM EDWARD HALL, A TREATISE ON INTERNATIONAL LAW 562 (1924) ("If

the inhabitants of the occupied territory rise in insurrection, whether in small bodies or
en masse ... all persons found with arms in their hand can in strict law be killed, or if
captured be executed by sentence of court martial.").
168.
Military Government Ordinance No. 1, Listing Crimes and Offenses, Art. 1,
Capital Offenses, reprintedin NOBLEMAN, supra note 74, at 227-28, App. 10.
169.
Id.
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penalty deemed universally necessary to deter criminal conduct or
rebellions.' 70 The mere possibility of suffering the death penalty
discouraged potential insurgents and was one of the reasons that
residents of the U.S.-controlled zones of Germany elected not to stage
revolts, despite the efforts of Soviet spies to foment violence. 171 No
widespread insurgency was mounted even though the occupied
Germans suffered from: levels of nutrition grossly insufficient for
basic subsistence, horrendous living conditions, confiscation of their
property, and high unemployment.
Although there are notable
differences between the occupation of Germany and Iraq, 172 the
European occupation involved the United States enduring and
surmounting many of the obstacles to law and order that the
Coalition is facing in Iraq, from hatred and distrust of the United
States, a population suffering under extreme poverty and a total lack

170.
See id. at 122-37.
171.
Id.
172.
There are at least eight important differences: (1) the ratio of Allied troops
to Germans was greater than the ratio of Coalition troops to Iraqis, which gave the
Allied powers greater control over the Germans and ensured that any resistance was
futile; (2) unlike the Iraqis, the Germans had endured years of war, had hardly
recovered from World War I, and perhaps were tired of fighting; (3) Germany was
totally defeated and demoralized, while many Iraqis were barely affected by the war;
(4) whole cities, including many houses and civilian installations in Germany were
destroyed by the Allies, unlike in Iraq where the air campaign was extremely precise
and thus minimized collateral damage; (5) the German national ethos generally
encouraged obedience to law, unlike Iraq, where legislation from traffic ordinances to
copyright regulations are universally ignored; this difference led to general orderliness
in Germany, compared to widespread lawlessness and looting in Iraq; (6) the Iraqi
citizens are substantially more heavily armed than the Germans were at the end of
World War II; (7) the Germans had a stronger work ethic than most Iraqis, many of
whom are infected with a fatalism which holds that divine powers beyond their control
have placed them in this predicament, and thus there is no sense in trying to lift
themselves out of their miserable condition; and (8) German clerics were not promising
an eternity with sixty virgins to those insane enough to blow themselves up in suicide
missions against the Allies. See, e.g., HARVEY H. SMITH ET AL., AREA HANDBOOK FOR
IRAQ 167 (1969).
Iraqis tend to accept events with an attitude of detachment and acceptance,
generally called fatalism. This attitude has its roots in the environment and
economic conditions, and to a certain extent in religion. A person who has
suffered some misfortune will often say, 'It is from God,' or 'It is my portion
(fate).'
As described by one Marine helping to rebuild Iraq:
We had problems getting Iraqis to show on time for work. We would provide
Iraqi leaders with upfront payments for projects, but the work would not get
done. We had Iraqis complaining about myriad problems, but few seemed
interested in fixing them ....
Most Iraqis have a sense of religious fatalism ...
Beau Higgins, Please Help Us Help You-IfAllah is Willing, L.A. TIMES, July 3, 2005,
at M2.
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of government, to corruption engendered by vestiges of the former
regime. As to the occupation of Germany:
It involved the governing of millions of hostile natives who had been
taught to believe that the Allied forces were composed of decadent
degenerates, representing governments which were pursuing a course
designed to destroy or enslave them. In addition, from the very first
days of Allied occupation of German territory, German government on
all levels collapsed completely, and officials, including judicial
personnel, had, for the most part, fled in the wake of the Allied armies.
In any event, 12 years of National Socialism and six years of war had
reduced the German judiciary to such a feeble and corrupt stat that it
could not be trusted .... 173

This description of post-World War II Germany is strikingly similar
to that of present-day Iraq. Accordingly, it stands to reason that
techniques that proved effective in governing post-war Germanssuch as the use of military courts and imposition of commensurate
punishments, including the death penalty-might similarly have
1 74
served to overcome the same obstacles faced in governing Iraqis.
U.S. military courts in Iraq would not have had to go as far as
the U.S. military courts did in Germany. That is, U.S. military judges
would not have had to utilize the death penalty, for example, to
punish the crime of possessing more than one rifle in cases where a
defendant possessed only two or three rifles. Imposing the death
sentence only on defendants involved in attacks on Coalition Forces
or those found in possession of arsenals of special category weapons,
175
such as grenades, RPGs, and IEDs, would probably have sufficed.
And the tribunals would not have had to keep this up for very long, if,
as in Germany, sentences were published so that everyone knew what
their fate would be if they opposed the U.S. military. 176 After a few
executions, word would have spread among the Iraqi terrorists that
the U.S. courts were serious about punishing terrorism. 177 A credible
threat of capital punishment would deter all but the religiously-

173.
NOBLEMAN, supra note 74, at 46-47.
174.
"[C]ustomary law considers the death penalty to be the appropriate penalty
for all war crimes." William A. Schabas, InternationalSentencing: From Leipzig (1923)
to Arusha (1996), in INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW, Vol. III, 171 (M. Cherif Bassiouni,
ed., 2d ed. 1999) (1986). Regardless, the United States is free to depart from customary
law when justice so requires.
175.
Ghadanfar Hamood al-Jasim, "the chief general prosecutor of Iraq" has
opined that the death penalty would serve as a deterrent to violence in Iraq. Glanz &
Tavernise, supranote 130.
176.
NOBLEMAN, supra note 74, at 123 n.357.
177.
Al Qaeda representatives in Iraq have made use of public executions to
deter Iraqis from cooperating with the United States. Ellen Knickmeyer, U.S. Claims
Success in Iraq Despite Onslaught, WASH. POST, Sept. 19, 2005, at Al ("Al Qaeda
fighters recently carried out public executions of men suspected of supporting U.S.
forces or the Iraqi government."). They clearly understand the motivational power of
punishment, but perhaps have underestimated the willpower of people motivated by
goodness, rather than evil.
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crazed suicide bombers. The mere threat of the death penalty would
thus prevent a substantial number of Iraqi and Coalition deaths.
Unfortunately, however, in light of the CCCI's reluctance to sentence
defendants to even ten years of imprisonment for violent crimes,
there is little reason to believe they would ever impose the death
178
penalty on anti-U.S. terrorists.
The cases discussed above are just a few of those where the CCCI
has done its small part to sabotage the U.S. efforts to democratize
Iraq. 179 Perhaps each of these woefully inadequate sentences, viewed
separately, is merely an annoyance. But when viewed cumulatively,
and considering the message these sentences sends to insurgents and
would-be terrorists, they are nothing less than a full scale, judicial
attack on the United States. And, sadly, the United States not only
funded this attack insofar as it was the source of the judge's salaries,
it condones and encourages this judicial assault by continuing to feed
the CCCI more cases.1 80 The insultingly trivial sentences alone
should have resulted in demands for a new forum to prosecute enemy
insurgents, a forum where biased judges cannot place their thumbsor hands-on the scales of justice, and where defendants receive
sentences commensurate with the magnitude of their dastardly
attacks.

II. BIAS AND CORRUPTION OF CCCI JUDGES

The preceding discussion of the tactics used by the CCCI to
thwart justice is necessarily an abbreviated one. It hardly scratches
the surface. Indeed, the CCCI has employed approximately twenty
different tactics to delay trials, acquit defendants, or hand down
inadequate sentences.
The use of these various tactics demonstrates that the CCCI
judges overtly favor the terrorist-defendants who stand before them
for judgment. The judges have consistently exercised their judicial
power to assist these terrorists in evading justice. Daily, the CCCI
judges demonstrate an extreme bias in favor of Iraqi insurgents and

178.
To their credit, at least one Afghan court is now utilizing the death penalty
to punish those who attacked U.S. contractors. Carlotta Gall, 4 Sentenced to Death for
Bomb Attack, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 17, 2005, at A6 ("A Kabul court sentenced four men to
death for organizing a car bomb attack outside an office of the American security
concern DynCorp in August in which at least 10 people, including 3 Americans,
died ... "). But the court also gave a five-year term for a separate attack. Id. ("The
court also sentenced a man from Tunisia to five years in prison for ordering a suicide
bomb attack two months later at a popular tourist street. That attack killed a U.S.
woman and an Afghan girl and wounded eight other people.").
179.
Notably, sabotage also carried the death penalty in post-World War II
Germany. Military Government Ordinance No. 1, supra note 167.
180.

Id.
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enmity for the U.S. soldiers who risk their lives in an effort to make
It is worthwhile to examine various
Iraq a free country.1 81
explanations for the judge's biases, including nationalism and
opposition to the presence of foreigners in Iraq, loyalty to the Baath
Party, tribal loyalties, religious influences, and corruption.
A. Nationalism, Tribalism, and Ethnic Loyalties
It is the natural tendency of natives of any country to identify
with their neighbors and countrymen, especially when they share a
common language, dialect, religion, tribe, ethnicity, or culture-and
particularly in times of war. When faced with outsiders who do not
share the essential national characteristics, nationalists frequently
will band together to oppose those whom they perceive as different
from themselves.18 2 But these nationalistic loyalties can exist even
without a nation-state-think, for example, of the Kurds-and any
Still,
number of affinities can elicit this nationalistic impulse.
history-including the great wars of the twentieth century-has
proven that allegiance to the fatherland or one's tribe is a particularly
strong impetus for loyalist behavior. This national or tribal fealty
frequently becomes even more pronounced when it encounters a
common enemy-real or imagined-such as a competing nation, tribe,
or ethnic group.
It should come as no surprise, then, that Iraqis are not immune
from these influences, nor are Iraqi judges. Thus, it also should not
surprise anyone that in assessing guilt and imposing punishments on

181.
Freeman, supra note 131, at 29 (discussing the favorable treatment Iraqi
terrorists receive from CCCI judges). At least one Afghani judge was found to have
aided the insurgency in his country. Afghan Authorities Arrest Judge, WASH. POST,
Jan. 9, 2005, at 24 ("Afghan authorities have arrested a judge for allegedly harboring
the organizers of two bombings last year that killed about 12 people, including four
Americans, and believe the ringleaders took their orders from an Iraqi member of al
Qaeda. . .").
John Tierney, "Get Out, You Damned One", N.Y. TIMES, July 2, 2005, at
182.
A15 ("The natural impulse to dislike outsiders is so strong that it barely matters who
the outsiders are."). Similarly, when a country is invaded, even with the noble intent of
liberating the populace, there "are no peaceful people." See JOHN STEINBECK, THE
MOON IS DOWN 34 (1942). This nationalism is manifested even in international
business. Recently it was discovered that an Italian CEO, Gianpiero Fiorani, possibly
with collusion by Italian central banker Antonio Fazio, concocted fictitious deals and
falsified documents to ensure that the Italian company Banca Popolare Italiana would
acquire Banca Antonveneta SpA, rather than a foreign suitor. See Gabriel Kahn &
Sabrina Cohen, Wiretaps of an Executive in Italy Put Central Banker on Hot Seat,
WALL ST. J., Sept. 13, 2005, at Al.
The affair is the latest example of the lengths to which national leaders in
Europe sometime go to prevent foreign takeovers, in spite of the European
Union's push for a unified market. France is about to publish a list of whole
business sectors it regards as off limits to foreign control ....
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insurgents who attacked the United States, Iraqi judges considersometimes covertly, other times openly-the defendants' religion,
nationality, tribe, and ethnicity.' 8 3
Concomitantly, another
ingredient of the Iraqi judicial calculus is the fact that the U.S.
soldiers who were attacked generally are not Moslem, are not Iraqis,
do not hail from the judges' neighborhood, tribe, or an allied tribe,
84
and generally are not Arabs.
Beyond the regional and tribal affinities18 5 which have long
influenced judicial decisions in Iraq,18 6 Iraqi judges are also known
for their pride in their Arabic and Iraqi heritages.i 8 7 They are
fiercely loyal to their fellow Arabic-Iraqis, 18 8 including Iraqi
insurgents, especially when they share the same religious sect, and
those judges are willing to make judicial decisions based on these
loyalties rather than the law. It is incontrovertible that Iraqi judges

183.
Greg Jaffe, In Iraq, One Officer Uses Cultural Skills to Fight Insurgents,
WALL ST. J., Nov. 15, 2005, at Al ("U.S. commanders also struggled to understand
Iraq's deep tribal and sectarian divisions. American officers working with Iraq's
fledgling security forces frequently complain that police officers and soldiers sometimes
put tribal allegiance ahead of their duty as officers."); Nordland et al., supra note 39, at
20 ("'There are so many ways Iraqis are tied together by tribe, business, dealing,
family, religion or where they live. So some groups you never think are tied together
may have other links."') (quoting Major James West, an intelligence officer for the first
Marine Expeditionary Force).
184.
See David Romano, Whose House is This Anyway? IDP and Refugee Return
in Post-Saddam Iraq, 18 J. REFUGEE STUD. 430, 432 (2005) (noting the Iraqi
nationalism that developed amongst Arab Iraqis regardless of whether they were
Sunni or Shiite).
185.
Due in no small part to their matrimonial practices, many Iraqis identify
with their tribe more firmly than with their nation. Tierney, supra note 181 ("Because
marriage between cousins is so common in the Middle East-half of Iraqis are married
to their first or second cousins-Arabs live in tightly knit clans long resistant to
outsiders .... "); Sabrina Tavernise & Quais Mizher, In Iraq's Mayhem, Town Finds
Calm Through Its Tribal Links, N.Y. Times, July 10, 2006, at Al ('The tribe in Iraq is
the basic building block of society,' said Abd al-Karemm al Mahamedawy, a travel chief
from Amara .... ).
186.
Craig T. Trebilcock, Legal Cultures Clash in Iraq, ARMY LAWYER, at 48
(Nov. 2003) (noting that "the Iraqi courts have been characterized by bias and
favoritism, with verdicts being routinely influenced by payoffs and tribal affiliations,"
and that many "judges also acknowledged that a litigant's tribal and political
connections under the old regime would frequently be a prime consideration in the
outcome of both criminal and civil trials"); Mona Charen, Trial, Tribalism ... and
Momentum, WASH. TIMES, Oct. 24, 2005, available at http://wahsingtontimes.com/
functions/print.php?storyID-20051023-103413-3082r (noting that frequently in Iraq
"pride in one's own" tribe "trumps every other consideration-most definitely including
morality, compassion and a love of justice").
187.
Ash U. Bali, Justice Under Occupation: Rule of Law and the Ethics of
Nation-Building in Iraq, 30 YALE J. INT'L L. 431, 450 (2005) (noting the principles of
Arab unity and nationalism at work in Iraq).
188.
Ion, supra note 91, at 206 (noting that Arab Moslems consider themselves
superior to non-Arabs, and that they draw "a national division, which is that of the
Arabs on one side and the foreigners on the other side."). Obviously this is an overgeneralization and is probably not universally true.
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have stronger national and tribal ties 1 89-not to mention religious,
Arab-ethnic, regional, and lingual affinities-to the insurgents than
they do to members of the U.S. military. They also resent the U.S.
soldiers, who are the objects of the terrorist attacks, and thus, the key
witnesses testifying before the CCCI. 190 The Iraqi judges see these
soldiers primarily as foreign occupiers who may justly be attacked by
their fellow Iraqis, 19 1 even though their very lives depend on the
protection these "infidel occupiers" provide. 192
This tribal and
nationalistic loyalty has manifested itself in Iraq on multiple
occasions,19 3 most recently in a debate over whether to pardon or
grant amnesty to insurgents. The Iraqis are generally opposed to

189.
The United States has not demonstrated a full appreciation of the extent to
which tribal influence and loyalties play in Iraq, particularly with respect to the
insurgency. See Antonio Castaneda, Iraqis Cooperate After Insurgents Slay Tribal
Chief, WASH. TIMES, Dec. 5, 2005, at A14 ("Tribalism is rooted deeply in Iraqi society
and adds a dimension to the insurgency that outsiders find difficult to understand.
Some tribes support the insurgency, while others back the government."); Steve
Fainaru, A Unit's Fitful Year At War, WASH. POST, Dec. 13, 2005, at Al ("'The
complexities of the culture and tribal lives here exceed anything that anybody
understands."') (quoting U.S. Army LTC Jody L. Petery).
190.
Sean Rayment, Poll Finds Support for Attack on Coalition Forces, WASH.
TIMES, Oct. 24, 2005, available at http://wahsingtontimes.com/functions/print.php?
storyID=20051023-112228-5108r ("Forty-five percent of Iraqis think attacks against
British and American troops are justified... Eighty-two percent are 'strongly opposed'
to the presence of coalition troops.").
191.
Michael Matza, JordaniansDecry Bombings, AKRON BEACON J., Nov. 11,
2005, at Al ("Iraqis' resistance to occupation is often viewed as an act of Arab dignity
and patriotism."); Ghaith Abdul-Ahad, The New Sunni Jihad: 'A Time for Politics,'
WASH. POST, Oct. 27, 2005, at Al (noting that an Iraqi insurgent who goes by the name
"Abu Theeb" said "he will continue to wage war against the Americans, because he
views them as occupiers" and that when "the infidel conquers your home, it's like
seeing your women raped in front of your eyes and like your religion being insulted
every day."). In the words of Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice: 'For a proud people
like the Iraqis, nobody wants to have foreign forces on your soil,"' Paul Martin, Sunnis
Ready to Cooperate With U.S., WASH. TIMES, Dec. 18, 2005, at Al.
192.
See Greg Jaffe & Yochi J. Dreazen, As Bush Pledges to Stay in Iraq,
Military Talks Up Smaller Force, WALL ST. J., Oct. 5, 2005, at Al ("[T]he nearly
140,000 U.S. soldiers in Iraq have become a primary source of resentment for Iraqis
who blame them for the country's ills and dislike feeling that they are under foreign
military occupation.").
Recently, some ordinary Iraqis have turned against the insurgents, by reporting
them to Iraqi authorities. But, demonstrating the nationalism common among Iraqis,
they admit that they are only doing so to protect fellow Iraqis, and that they would not
do so to protect Americans, whom they despise. Mariam Fam, More Iraqis Report
Militants, AKRON BEACON J., Apr. 3, 2004, at A4 ("But some of those ready to turn in
militants say that have no sympathy for the U.S. forces, either. 'I don't think I would
have reported them if they were targeting only Americans,' [Omar Mohammed]
Abdullah said. 'After all, this is an occupier."').
193.
Consider, for example, the amphictyony formed by Shiite and Sunni Iraqis
to oppose the British occupation of Iraq following World War I.
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amnesty for anyone who spilt Iraqi blood, but those who killed U.S.
soldiers are a different story. 194 In the words of one Iraqi legislator:
There could be an amnesty regarding attacks on American targets.
American are viewed as occupiers. Some people think they have got a
right to have an armed resistance,' says Saad Jawas Kindil, a
lawmaker and head of the political bureau of Supreme Council for
Islamic Revolution in Iraq, the biggest component of the parliament's
Shiite majority. "But Iraqi soldiers and policemen are innocent, they're
195
here to protect the Iraqi people. Killing Iraqi soldiers is a crime."

The clear import of Kindil's comments-similarly expressed by other
Iraqis 196 -is that U.S. lives are worth less than Iraqi lives because
they are U.S. lives and not Iraqi lives. According to Kindil and his
ilk, Americans deserve to be attacked or at least there is nothing
criminal about attacking Americans, who are not of the same tribe,
nation, or ethnicity as Iraqis. Those who attack Americans are
blameless and therefore justly deserve accolades for the "bravery" of
197
their attacks.
If a legislator from one of Iraq's leading political parties openly
spouts such nationalist hatred, it does not take a giant leap of faith to
surmise that this is also the opinion of at least some of Iraq's judicial
officers.
Indeed, at least one Iraqi judge has expressed similar
sentiments. 198 The anonymous judge-whose admission comes as no

194.
Ellen Knickmeyer, Iraqi Cleric Hails Amnesty Idea, WASH. POST, Apr. 16,
2005, at 16 ("A prominent Sunni Muslim cleric on Friday welcomed an amnesty offer
for Iraq's Sunni-led insurgency and called on President Jalal Talabani to make it a
general amnesty that would also apply to those in U.S. detention.").
Of course, under the U.S. Constitution, only the President of the United States has
the power to pardon crimes committed against the United States. See U.S. CONST., art.
II, § 2 ("The President . . . shall have Power to grant Reprieves and Pardons for
Offences against the United States, except in Cases of Impeachment."). So an Iraqi
pardon of terrorists could only absolve these terrorists of responsibility for crimes
against Iraqi law, and not to the extent that their misdeeds were crimes against U.S.
law or the law of war, even though committed in Iraqi territory.
195.
Yaroslav Trofimov, Iraqi Leaders Consider Amnesty for Insurgents, WALL
ST. J., Apr. 15, 2005, at A8, A9.
196.
Awadh al-Taiee & Neil MacDonald, Jalawla Blast Shows Not All Iraq's
Suicide Bombers are Foreigners,LONDON FINANCIAL TIMES, Aug. 6, 2005, at 7 (noting
that the Sunni mother of one suicide bomber who killed two Iraqi civilians insisted
"that he must have been carrying explosives for use against American U.S. military
convoys," implying that this was sufficient justification for his conduct and rendered
him immune from criticism for being a suicide bomber).
197.
Iraqis are not the only ones who express these sentiments. See also
Mamoun Fandy, For Muslims, A Role in the War on Terror, USA TODAY, Aug. 12, 2005,
at 9A.
I have talked with many Muslims, especially in the West, who in public
condemn violent acts but in private conversations say, 'The West deserves this.'
In public, they will say it is a revenge for Palestine and Iraq, but in private I
heard blind hatred, a virus that is taking over too many Moslem minds.
198.
Instead, these judges speak through their judicial decisions, and they have
spoken eloquently to anyone willing to listen.
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surprise to U.S. military officers familiar with the CCCI and its
decisions 199 -- admitted that his loyalty to Iraqi defendants has led
him and other judges to order acquittals and lenient sentences to
insurgents who have attacked their common enemy:
the U.S.
military. 20 0 What is surprising is that the United States would
continue to permit Iraqi judges with these affinities and prejudices to
continue to exercise jurisdiction over Iraqi terrorist-defendants.201
Their nationalistic and "tribal mindset preludes a genuine rule of law.
The tribalist does not ask 'what has this man done?' but 'to whom did
he do it."' Perhaps recognizing the power of these prejudices, the U.S.
Supreme Court once noted that "there would be something
incongruous and absurd in permitting an officer or solider of an
invading army to be tried by his enemy, whose country he has
invaded. '20 2 Yet, that is essentially what is happening in Iraq. The
United States presents Iraqi terrorists as defendants before the
CCCI, but instead the U.S. soldiers who withstood the terrorist
attacks are put on trial in a forum in which they can never receive
justice. It is absolutely absurd to let biased Iraqi judges try cases
20 3
involving U.S. accusations made against Iraqi terrorists.

199.
"[E]ven some cases backed by strong evidence have been thrown out by
[Iraqi] 'judges who appear sympathetic to the enemy,' says one U.S. military official."
Grossman, supra note 16.
200.
Dhiya Rasan & Steve Negus, Iraqi Torture of Prisoners Seen as Open
Secret, THE FINANcIAL TIMES UK, Jan. 25, 2005, at 8 ("One judge who refused to
disclose his name said he tried to let off lightly insurgents who had targeted
Americans ...").
201.
It is possible that some soldiers are rebelling against such a policy, and
instead are taking the law into their own hands. U.S. soldiers are learning from the
CCCI that it would be better to ensure that justice is executed than to entrust this task
to the CCCI. William Cullen Dennis, Compromise-the Great Defect of Arbitration, 11
COLUM. L. REV. 493, 494 (1911) ("[Mien will continue to appeal to force to secure what
they deem to be their just rights until they become convinced that there is some surer,
better way of obtaining justice ....
").Soldiers realize that enemy combatants "must be
destroyed; that is, put into such condition that they can no longer continue the war," if
not by force of law or persuasion then by force of arms. CLAUSEWITZ, supra note 9, at
89. If the Iraqi courts will not incapacitate terrorists through imprisonment or
execution, U.S. soldiers are more than capable of taking the necessary actions. See
Weaver, supra note 136 (upon hearing that the CCCI gave a Iraqi terrorist a mere
fifteen years for killing a U.S. soldier, his fellow soldiers responded "We never should
have taken them in alive ...We should have killed them and their brothers.").
Because the U.S. military clearly possess the authority to eliminate by force
guerilla fighters, submitting their cases to an Iraqi court for its judgment is simply an
act of mercy on the part of the United States. See MAINE, supra note 5, at 152 ("The
first principle of war is that armed forces as long as they resist may be destroyed by
any legitimate means."). Soldiers might prove less merciful if they know that their
forbearance will result in injustice and the death of other U.S. soldiers.
202.
Coleman v. Tennessee, 97 U.S. 509, 516 (1878).
203.
"It may be stated generally that in time of war no nation will permit a
citizen of an enemy country to use its courts in any way which might be hurtful to it, or
helpful to the enemy, in the prosecution of the war." Bernheimer v. Vurpilot, 42 F.

20061

U.S. MILITARYCOURTSAND THE WAR IN IRAQ

Some might argue that at least a minority of Iraqi judges do not
harbor such biases, or at least do not bring them into the courtroom
when deciding cases. After all, they owe their freedom to the United
States. But the effect of the pervasive nationalism in Iraq-both
Iraqi nationalism and Arab nationalism-and tribalism, also operates
on the minority of "impartial" judges. For example, in their loyalty to
their fellow tribesmen and countrymen, when Iraqi judges were
confronted with allegations that Iraqis have committed heinous acts
of terrorism, they, like many Iraqis, denied the obvious truth of these
20 4
charges and instead affirmed the superiority of Iraq and Iraqis.
They denied that their fellow Iraqis and tribesmen could have
committed the atrocities that prosecutors ascribed to the insurgents
despite the overwhelming evidence that the insurgency is primarily
an Iraqi operation, 20 5 that also receives some assistance from
foreigners. 20 6 Instead of admitting this, the judges frequently blamed

Supp. 830, 831 (E.D. Pa. 1942). Instead, the United States currently permits the Iraqis
to use their own court, the CCCI, to undermine U.S. interests.
Feelings of national superiority are not confined to Iraqis, of course. See
204.
BERTRAND RUSSELL, UNPOPULAR ESSAYS 117 (1950). ("We are all, whatever part of the
world we come from, persuaded that our own nation is superior to all others."). Russell
may be overstating things a bit, but his general point is certainly applicable to Iraqis.
Jonathan Finer, Among Insurgents in Iraq, Few Foreigners Are Found,
205.
WASH. POST, Nov. 17, 2005, at Al.
In much of the country, including the north and center, commanders say, the
insurgency is led and populated almost entirely by Iraqis, many of them former
members of Saddam Hussein's Baath Party, who do not work closely with
Commanders there say Iraqi insurgents are largely
Zarqawis' group.
responsible for the roadside bombings, some involving armor-penetrating
weapons, that have been responsible for roughly half of the U.S. combat deaths
in recent months.
Id. ('Both Iraqis and coalition people often exaggerate the role of foreign
206.
fighters and downplay the role of Iraqi"' elements in the insurgency.); "U.S. military
officials said Iraqi officials tended to exaggerate the number of foreign fighters in Iraq
to obscure the fact that large numbers of their countrymen have taken up arms against
U.S. troops and the American-backed interim Iraqi government." Mark Mazzetti,
Insurgents Are Mostly Iraqis, U.S. Military Says, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 28, 2004, at A10; alTaiee & MacDonald, supra note 195, at 7 (the brother of one suicide bomber claimed
that only foreigners, and not Iraqis, are suicide bombers, even though all of the
evidence confirmed that his own brother was a suicide attacker); Jackie Spinner &
Omar Fekeiki, Defense Minister Exhorts Iraqis: 'Liberate This City, WASH. POST, Nov.
8, 2004, at 18 (noting that Iraqis blame foreigners for the insurgency); Dexter Filkins, 2
Car Bombings in Iraq Kill 41, Many Children, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 1, 2004, at Al ("One
woman named Addela Jasim, whose brother, Karim, was wounded in the attack,
blamed foreign militants for the violence, claiming that the crime was beyond the reach
of her countrymen. 'There is no way Iraqis can kill Iraqis,' she said.).
This belief that their countrymen could not be committing atrocities, might further
explain some of the CCCI judges' distrust of U.S. witnesses who testified to the
contrary. This fantasy, like most fantasies, has no grounding in reality and is
particularly unfounded considering that even the leader of their country, Saddam
Hussein, was a butcher, and his police squads, composed of Iraqis, frequently killed
and tortured their fellow Iraqis. The new Iraqi police force apparently also likes to use
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foreign terrorists for violent attacks on both U.S. soldiers and
Iraqis. 20 7 A few others were slightly more honest, admitting that
Iraqis might have committed some of the suicide attacks against U.S.
personnel but denying that Iraqis ever attack their fellow Iraqis. 208
Even these are underestimating, perhaps intentionally, the role of
Iraqis and the CCCI defendants in the attacks, as statistical,
anecdotal, and circumstantial evidence clearly demonstrates.
Consider, for example, the nationality of the majority of captured
insurgents. Of the 14,000 suspected insurgents detained by the
Coalition up to June 2005, only about three-hundred were non-Iraqi
nationals. 20 9 Of course, this still leaves "successful" suicide bombers,
who obviously are never captured after their attacks. Although it has
long been assumed that most of the suicide bombers are foreigners, 2 10

excessive force. So it's hard to understand why the concept of Iraqi-on-Iraqi violence is
inconceivable to so many Iraqis.
207.
Ellen Knickmeyer, GeneralDecries Call for Timetable in Iraq, WASH. POST,
Nov. 17, 2005, at A26 ("Many Iraqis insist that almost all suicide attacks are carried
out by foreigners, although authorities say Iraqis carried out last week's deadly
bombings in Jordan."); Sabrina Tavernise, Sunnis Wary As Turning-Point Vote Nears,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 8, 2005, at A8 ('Most insurgents are Sunni Arab Iraqis, a fact that
Sunnis are often loath to acknowledge, saying the fighters are mostly foreigners.").
One Iraqi soldier blames the insurgency on foreigners, rather than his fellow Iraqis,
and claims that he would kill foreign insurgents, but not Iraqi ones, because these are
his brothers. See Spinner & Fekeiki, supra note 205.
208.
al-Taiee & MacDonald, supra note 195 (noting that the mother of one
suicide bomber who killed two Iraqi civilians insisted "that he must have been carrying
explosives for use against American U.S. military convoys").
209.
Dexter Filkins, Foreign Fighters Captured in Iraq Come From 27 Mostly
Arab Lands, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 21, 2005, at A10 ("Non-Iraqis make up a small
percentage of the more than 10,000 suspected fighters currently detained in Iraq, and
are believed to comprise less than 5 percent of the fighters in the insurgency."); Rick
Jervis & Dave Moniz, Insurgents Are Making Road Bombs More Potent, USA TODAY,
June 17, 2005, at 10 (quoting Lt. Col. Steve Boylan noting that foreigners make up only
a small fraction of the terrorists in Iraq).
210.
Eric Schmitt, U.S. And Allies Capture More Foreign Fighters, N.Y. TIMES,
June 19, 2005, at A8 ("Senior military officials say the foreigners, while small in
number, play a disproportionately important role in the resistance, particularly in
carrying out suicide bombing ....); Rowan Scarborough, Terrorists Retool Carnage in
Iraq, WASH. TIMES, June 12, 2005, at Al (' The suicide car bombings are considered the
work of foreign jihadists ....");Barry R. Posen, Fighting Blind in Iraq, N.Y. TIMES,
June 7, 2005, at Al ("Many of the suicide bombers seem to be foreigners, particularly
Saudis."); Farnaz Fassihi, Iraq's Sunnis Remain Key Part of Insurgency, WALL ST. J.,
May 19, 2005, at A12 ("noting that foreign fighters continue to play a role in the suicide
bombings and unrest").
In fact, however, some suicide bombers are Iraqi. Knickmeyer, supra note 193
(noting that Iraqis carried out the November 2005 suicide bombing in Jordan); Finer,
supra note 204 (mentioning a mentally disabled Iraqi girl who served as a suicide
bomber in Iraq); al-Taiee & MacDonald, supra note 195 (discussing an Iraqi suicide
bomber in Jalawla, and relating the opinion of one U.S. officer that "a handful" of
suicide bombers were Iraqis); Edward Wong, Over 30 Reported Dead In Attacks Around
Iraq, N.Y. TIMES, June 12, 2005, at Al ("a former member of an elite Iraqi commando
unit called the Wolf Brigade entered the brigade headquarters in eastern Baghdad and
detonated explosives strapped to his body").
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this assumption has recently been called into question. 211 But even if
this assumption were correct, foreigners would comprise only a tiny
fraction of the terrorists hunting U.S. soldiers in Iraq, 212 and no more
than 10% of all terrorists operating in Iraq. 2 13 Furthermore, these
foreigners would be ineffective and nearly impotent without the
214
funding, assistance, and coordination provided by their Iraqi hosts.
Perhaps "Zarqawi's people supply the bombers," but "the Baathists
provide the money and strategy,"2 15 not to mention the training,
intelligence, weapons, and safe houses. 216 Furthermore, "innocent"
Iraqis not directly involved in the terrorist conspiracy frequently
refuse to lift a finger to prevent the attacks or identify the
perpetrators to do so, 2 1 7 despite their clear ability to do so. Instead

211.
Edward Wong, As Marine Sweeps Continue, Gunmen Kill Eight Iraqis,N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 1, 2005, at A22 ("Some American commanders have said recently that they
are beginning to doubt whether foreign fighters are really responsible for the vast
majority of the country's suicide bombings, as the military has been asserting since the
start of the insurgency."); Ghosh, supra note 44, at 44 (noting that "more and more
Iraqis are volunteering for suicide operations").
212.
John Diamond, Intel Chief: Iraqis In Insurgency More Elusive, USA TODAY,
Sept. 13, 2005, at A8 ("Though foreign fighters, mainly Sunni Muslim Arabs from Syria
and Saudi Arabia, have grabbed headlines with suicide bombings that have killed
hundreds of Iraqis, John Negroponte said Iraqis dominate the insurgency."); Fassihi,
supra note 209, at A12 ("Iraqis-particularly Sunni Arab extremists and members of
the former ruling Baathist party-account for the majority of the violence."). "Even
with the reported rise in foreign fighters, several senior officers said, the number
estimated to be coming into the country each month is still relatively small-in the
neighborhood of several score. In numerical terms, they said, the insurgency remains
essentially homegrown. Iraqi members of extremist Islamic factions, such as the Ansar
al Sunna Army, continue to account for many insurgent attacks." Graham, supra note
107, at Al, A19.
213.
Dan Murphy, Iraq's Foreign Fighters:Few But Deadly, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE
MONITOR, Sept. 27, 2005, at 1 ("Only 4 to 10 percent of [Iraq's] combatants are foreign
fighters, according to a report from the Center for Strategic and International
Studies ....).
214.
Fouad Ajami, Heart of Darkness, WALL ST. J., Sept. 28, 2005, at A16
(Foreign "jihadists have sown ruin in Iraq, but they are strangers to that country, and
they have needed the harbor given them in the Sunni triangle and the indulgence of
the old Baathists."); Joe Klein, Saddam's Revenge, TIME, Sept. 26, 2005, at 49 ('The
Baathists had helped move the [foreign] suicide bombers into the country, according to
the U.S. sources, and then provided shelter, support (including automobiles) and
coordination for the attacks.").
215.
Nordland, supra note 39.
216.
Ghosh, supra note 44 (discussing a former Iraqi Republican Guard officeroperating under the pseudonym Abu Qaqa al-Tamimi-who trains, houses, and
organizes suicide bombers for Zarqawi and other terrorists).
217.
Laqueur, supra note 106 ("Some of them know where the terrorists are
hiding but won't tell the authorities. Terrorists cannot exist in a vacuum; they need a
periphery of helpers."); Richard A. Oppel, Jr., U.S. and Iraqi Troops Capture a Top
Militant Leader in Mosul, N.Y. TIMES, June 17, 2005, at Al (discussing Mohammed
Sharkawa, an Iraqi insurgency leader who "was directly responsible for at least 50 car
bombings").
When the victims of attacks were primarily Americans, the Iraqis did not seem to
care that their fellow Iraqis would not inform on attackers. Now that Iraqis are also
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they sit by idly as U.S. soldiers and fellow Iraqis are murdered.
Thus, notwithstanding the efforts by Iraqi judges to shield CCCI
defendants, even attacks by "foreign terrorists" operating in Iraq
involve Iraqi culpability.
It is also worth noting that the nature of the foreign terrorists'
modus operandi-suicidal attacks-does not afford much opportunity
for mistaking foreigners for live, Iraqi defendants.2 1 8 That is, after
their attacks, the only thing left of foreign suicide bombers are their
scattered and charred body parts, which makes them less than ideal
candidates for identification, much less prosecution in the CCCI.
Similarly, prosecutors would have a hard time convincing the CCCI
that a live, Iraqi defendant was a "successful" suicide bomber. But
beyond "successful" suicide bombers-not one of whom has ever been
tried in the CCCI-the overwhelming evidence indicates that Iraqis
are the primary participants in the insurrection, 219 including former
Baathists and many petty criminals who are now part-time terroristsfor-hire.22 0
Beyond a few foreign notables like Zarqawi, the
insurgency is well stocked with native-born Iraqis who are ready,
willing, and able to slaughter both U.S. troops and their fellow
Iraqis. 22 1 But the Iraqi judges operate with such a pro-Iraqi bias that

targets of suicide bombers, the Iraqi government is considering laws to punish those
who aid attackers or who failed to report attackers to authorities. Jonathon Finer, Iraq
Plans to Pursue Insurgents' Allies, WASH. POST, May 18, 2005, at A1O ("The Iraqi
government said Tuesday that it would push for new laws to punish people who
provide logistical support for networks of insurgents, aiming to toughen its stance after
a surge of violence that has claimed 450 Iraqi lives in two weeks. The new laws would
also make it a crime not to share information about insurgent networks with the
government."). This, yet again, demonstrates the view of many Iraqis (including Iraqi
judges) that the lives of American, non-Moslems are worth less than Iraqi ones, and
therefore American lives warrant less protection under the law.
218.
Admittedly it is difficult to mistake dead Iraqi suicide bombers for dead
suicide bombers of other Middle Eastern countries, absent scientific tests based on the
individual's DNA. al-Taiee & MacDonald, supra note 195 ("little is known for certain
about the perpetrators of the 100 or so suicide bombings in Iraq during the past three
months.").
219.
Greg Miller & Tyler Marshall, More Iraqis Lured to Al Qaeda Group, L.A.
TIMES, Sept. 16, 2005, at Al ("[Olfficials said foreign fighters accounted for less than
10% of the insurgents in Iraq.").
220.
See Noah Feldman, The Sunni Angle, WALL ST. J., Nov. 16, 2004, at A24
('The U.S. is fighting not one but two distinct insurgencies. The more numerous is a
mobilized movement of Iraqi Sunnis, some of them former Baath party members, and
all beneficiaries of Saddam Hussein's pro-Sunni policies."); Hendren, supra note 57, at
1 ('The battle for the city of Fallujah is giving U.S. military commanders some insight
into this country's insurgency, painting a portrait of a home-grown uprising dominated
by Iraqis, not foreign fighters.").
221.
Take, for example, Mohammed Sharkawa, a Baathist and former member
of the Iraqi Republican Guard who allied himself with Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. See
Oppel, supra note 216, at Al ("Mr. Sharkaqa, a former Republican Guard member and
onetime cigarette smuggler, commanded a force of several hundred insurgents and was
directly responsible for at least 50 car bombings and 150 beheadings and
assassinations in recent months .... ).

20061

US. MILITARY COURTSAND THE WAR IN IRAQ

they cannot admit the culpability of Iraqis. This bias prevents them
from judging terrorism cases impartially, as they operate under the
assumption that most terrorists-even those who attack U.S.
soldiers-are not Iraqis. Thus, they reason, because the U.S. soldiers
arrest mostly Iraqis for these crimes, the U.S. soldiers must generally
be mistaken or are lying.
Claims of a foreigner-dominated insurgency make it easier for
anti-U.S. CCCI judges to hide the animus behind many of their
decisions with the most common tale told by Iraqi defendants, that an
unknown, foreign third-party-who inevitably always escaped-was
responsible for the attacks charged to the defendants, and that the
defendants were mistakenly arrested by ignorant U.S. soldiers who
222
could not distinguish an Iraqi from other Arab foreigners.
Nationalist impulses are also affecting judges who see the
insurgency as an act of nationalist pride or defense of the national
honor in the face of foreign invaders. Such attitudes could easily
justify acts of terror simply by labeling them acts of national selfdefense or efforts at liberation. 223 It is for reasons like these that
commentators argue against permitting indigenous courts from
adjudicating cases affecting the security of an occupying power.
[I]t is probably this element of necessity that explains and justifies, as a
right, the power of jurisdiction conceded within an occupied territory to
the tribunals of the occupant. Indeed, the occupying power could not
very well entrust the task of its protection to foreign authorities. They
would not provide adequate guaranties of impartiality. Therefore, it is
absolutely necessary that the occupant's own tribunals, exclusively,
shall assure the repression of acts tending to impair ... the security of
224
that Army and its individual members.

222.
Many non-Iraqi terrorists are not tried in the CCCI, denying the Iraqi
judges the opportunity to see that the United States prosecuted foreign terrorists when
they were responsible for atrocities, and they were not just picking on hapless Iraqis
who just happened to be at the wrong place at the wrong time.
223.
If Italian judges can whitewash terrorist acts by labeling them as part of
the struggle for independence, then Iraqi judges certainly can too, especially since Iraqi
judges may have greater affinity for the individual terrorists. Terror Charges Against
5 Dropped In Italy, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 26, 2005, at A9:
An Italian judge was sharply criticized Tuesday after she dismissed terrorism
charges against five North Africans accused of being Islamic militants. The
judge, Clementina Forleo, ruled Monday evening in Milan that the evidence
against three Tunisians and two Moroccans arrested on charges of recruiting
suicide bombers and supplying support to Islamic terror organizations for
operations in Iraq constituted wartime "guerrilla" activities, not terrorism.
"Historically, the activity of the cells in question coincided with the United
States attack on Iraq," said a statement explaining the decision. ...
Id.
224.
NOBLEMAN, supra note 74, at 10-11 (quoting RAYMOND ROBIN, DES
OCCUPATIONS MILITAIRES EN DEHORS DES OCCUPATIONS DE GUERRE 153-54 (1913)).
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Although the pro-Iraqi nationalism demonstrated by CCCI judges
may prove useful in cementing rival tribes and sects in a divisive
country already in the thrones of civil war, 225 it is counterproductive
to efforts at determining guilt or innocence and makes the
administration of criminal justice impossible. 226 So far, it has led to
acquittals in one-third to one-half of cases. 227 But this tells only part
of the dismal story:
the CCCI hands down extremely lenient
sentences to the one-half to two-thirds of defendants whom they do
convict. Worse still is the fact that legions of terrorists are never
even brought before the CCCI because U.S. prosecutors known they
don't stand a chance in hell of prevailing there. 228 A few examples
demonstrate the problem.
Take the case of Ziyad Hasson. On December 3, 2004, Hassan
detonated an IED under a U.S. Humvee, killing Army Staff Sergeant
Harry E. Irizarry, a father of four who originally hailed from the
Bronx. 229
Besides gruesomely murdering Irizarry, the attack
severely wounded three other soldiers:
The calm was broken by a thunderous crack that lifted the armored
vehicle off the ground. A rush of shrapnel and hot smoke came
shooting up through the floor and launched [Army medic John L.]
Cushman out onto the ground. With his jaw broken and his face

225.

Iraq's first king, Faisal I, described Iraqis this way: 'There is
still-and I say this with a heart full of sorrow-no Iraqi people,
but an unimaginable mass of human beings devoid of any patriotic
ideas, imbued with religious traditions and absurdities, prone to
anarchy and perpetually ready to rise against any government
whatsoever.'

Fred Barnes, The Bumpy Road to Democracy in Iraq, WEEKLY STANDARD, Apr. 5, 2004,
available at http://www.weeklystandard.com/Utilities/printerpreview.asp?idArticle=
3919&R=9DE816979. Evan Smith, The World According to Bob Inman, TEXAS
MONTHLY, Mar. 2004, at 144 ("I looked at Iraq as having a great potential for being like
Yugoslavia. You've got Sunnis, Kurds, and Shiites. It could easily break apart on
religious and ethnic grounds. It's going to take strong leadership from a strong central
government to keep that from occurring.").
226.
Judicial decisions motivated by loyalty to insurgents, on the other hand,
are beneficial to mediocre or incompetent defense attorneys, since their chances of
prevailing in the slanted proceedings of the CCCI are excellent, and legal acumen is by
no means a prerequisite for success.
227.
Grossman, supra note 16 ("Across Iraq, the central court has convicted just
over half of the 1,301 alleged insurgents tried since the tribunal's October 2003
inception, according to the coalition Web site."); Finer & Mosher, supra note 26 ("Of the
490 U.S.-held detainees brought before the court, roughly two-thirds have been
convicted, according to military data."). Multinational Force Iraq posts the number of
convictions on its website. It does not post the sentences handed down. See Multinational
Force-Iraq,
Central
Criminal
Court of Iraq,
http://www.mnfiraq.com/TF134/Trials.htm.
228.
Grossman, supra note 16 (noting that prosecutors sometimes do not even
initiate cases because they know they know that the CCCI will dismiss the cases or
acquit the defendants).
229.
Finer & Mosher, supra note 26; Weaver, supra note 136.
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Humvee. 'I looked in and saw SSG Irizarry's right arm mostly missing
and his legs dangling by skin from the knees down,' ...... Sgt. Adrian
Melendez, who was also riding in the vehicle, suffered two broken
vertebrae in the attack. Spec. Todd Reed, the Humvee driver, had
230
fractures in both legs.

The evidence showed that Hassan possessed and utilized a powerful
explosive device to commit a terroristic attack that resulted in the
murder of one soldier and the attempted murder and murder of three
others. Yet even after hearing this evidence and viewing pictures of
the destroyed Humvee and the lethal carnage it produce, the CCCI
convicted Hassan of murdering Irizarry but sentenced him to only
23 1
fifteen years of imprisonment.
In contrast, when the CCCI has been presented with defendants
accused of attacking Iraqi officials, the court has acted swiftly and
strongly, as noted above in the case involving three defendants
accused of murdering a senor intelligence official in the Iraqi interior
ministry. In that case, it took the CCCI judge just two hours to find
them guilty and sentence them to death by hanging. 232 The Iraqi
interim government promptly carried out the sentences. 23 3 This
disparate treatment of cases involving Iraqi victims unequivocally
demonstrates that CCCI decisions are in part influenced by
sentiments of nationalism and the judge's loyalty to their
countrymen. 234

230.
Finer & Mosher, supra note 27.
231.
Weaver, supra note 136 ("On May 25, [2005] Ziyad got 15 years by this new
justice system where U.S. military lawyers are working with Iraqi prosecutors and
judges to punish crimes against U.S. and other coalition forces.").
232.
Fleishman, supra note 130 (describing the CCCI's sentence of death by
hanging for three defendant accused of murdering an Iraqi official and a sentence of
ten years of imprisonment for an accomplice"); see also Glanz & Tavernise, supra note
130 ('Three men convicted of dozens of rapes, kidnappings and killings in the southern
city of Kut, in one case displaying the eyeballs of an Iraqi soldier to obtain payment for
his murder, will be put to death by hanging in the first execution by Iraq's civilian
courts .. "); MacDonald, supra note 130.
In May, amid a stepped up suicide bombing campaign, Iraqi criminal courts
passed death sentences on several Iraqis convicted of manufacturing bombs.
Mohamed Khalaf al-Jumayli, chief prosecutor at the Central Criminal Court,
confirmed that the men have exhausted all of their appeals in the court system.
All that remains is for President Jalal Talabani to sign their death warrants.
233.

Darangahi & Ahmed, supra note 162, at A3.

The transitional Iraqi government executed three convicted murders Thursday
morning [September 1, 2005] in the first application of the death penalty since
the fall of Saddam Hussein's regime. Bayan Ahmed Said, Uday Dawood
Salman and Dhahar Jasim Hasan were hanged at 10 a.m. in Baghdad .... The
men were found guilty of murder, rape and kidnapping in southeastern Iraq.
234.
Similarly, there has been on popular push by Iraqis to punish insurgents
who have attacked Americans, but as the number of Iraqi deaths has mounted, they
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Regardless of genesis and nature of each judge's biases, Iraqi
judges encounter accusations against their fellow countrymen with a
strong dose of skepticism, readily believing Arabic-speaking, Iraqi
defendants over English-speaking U.S. soldiers. 235
This radical
skepticism, based on irrational prejudices, sometimes cannot be
overcome even by overwhelming evidence 236 of the defendant's guilt,
which makes "trials" before such judges an exercise in futility.
Consistent with the prejudices of the CCCI judges, when the CCCI
announce one of its frequent acquittals of Iraqi terrorists, it is
common for the security personnel who haunt the spectators' gallery
to erupt in boisterous cheers of triumph, much to the chagrin of the
U.S. soldiers who had traversed the dangerous byways of Iraq to offer
their testimony against the now-acquitted insurgent. 237 At worst, the
deportment of the security personnel is further evidence that
insurgents have so thoroughly infiltrated the Iraqi security forces and
are so sure of their continued tenur--the CCCI judges often are
relatives or arranged for their hiring-that they are willing to flaunt
238
their anti-U.S. sympathies.

put forth proposals to use the death penalty to punish terrorists who attack Iraqis. See
Noam N. Leavey, Iraq may Expand Death Penalty, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 14, 2005, at A4
("Struggling to fight back against insurgents roiling the country, Iraqi lawmakers have
begun to debate sweeping anti-terrorism legislation that could significantly expand use
of the death penalty.").
235.
Certainly some difficulties in prosecuting Iraqis arose from the problems
associated with translating the testimony of U.S. witnesses into Arabic, and the judge's
questions into English.
236.
See Always Prickly, Sometimes Paranoid, Occasionally Pragmatic, THE
ECONOMIST, Aug. 7, 2004, at 47 ("Suspicion of America runs deep in the Arab world.").
237.
The Iraqi court security personnel, undoubtedly infiltrated by the
insurgency, posed a greater danger to U.S. forces when they would attempt to sneak
family members and friends of the insurgents into the prisoner holding area at the
CCCI courthouse, which was under the joint control of U.S. forces and the Iraqis.
238.
Mohamad Bazzi, Myth or Master Evader, NEWSDAY, Dec. 21, 2004, at A4
("[G]uerrillas have infiltrated nearly all branches of the Iraqi government"); Armaud de
Borchgrave, Iran on Points?, WASH. TIMES, Aug. 11, 2005, at A15 [hereinafter
Borchgrave, Iran] ("Saddam Hussein loyalists and jihadis from neighboring countries
have penetrated the new Iraqi military and intelligence service."); See Arnaud de
Borchgrave, Think Again ...Give Chaos a Chance, WASH. TIMES, Oct. 3, 2005, at A16
[hereinafter Borchgrave, Think Again] ("Iraq's National Security Advisor Mowaffak alRubaie told the BBC, 'Iraqi security forces in general, and the police in particular, in
many parts of Iraq, I have to admit, have been penetrated by some of the insurgents,
some of the terrorists as well."'); Editorial, Corruptionin Baghdad?, WALL ST. J., Jan.
25, 2005, at A16 ("[M]any of the security forces ... have proven to be ineffective at best,
and in some cases penetrated by enemy informers"); Yochi J. Dreazen, On Baghdad
Beat, Policeman Dodges Bombs, Turncoats, WALL ST. J. Aug. 26, 2005, at Al
(discussing an Iraqi police officer in Baghdad who was in a shootout with a 'turncoat
police officer' from the insurgency who was stealing weapons for the terrorists); Dexter
Filkins, Low Voting Rate Risks Isolation for Sunni Iraqis, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 3, 2005, at
Al ('[T]he Ministry of the Interior has been infiltrated by former Baathists."') (quoting
Mowaffak al-Rubiae, a member of the Shiite coalition); Donna Leinwand, Some Iraqi
Guards As Bad as Prisoners,MPs Say, USA TODAY, July 1, 2004, at A4 (discussing the
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Perhaps because they were students of European history and
saw firsthand the effects of nationalism and ethnic rivalries, the
Framers of the U.S. Constitution were well-aware of these
phenomena and the divisiveness they could engender. The took
preventive action, for example, in the Establishment and Free
Exercise Clauses of the First Amendment, by ensuring that the
national government would not align itself with any of the competing
religions that existed in the United States nor punish one set of
religious adherents for their beliefs. 239 Similarly, in Article III, the
Framers recognized that regional and state affinities could affect
judges and cause them to alter their decisions when litigants from the
judge's own state are pitted against those of another state or
country. 240
Thus, they sought to ameliorate the effect of this
partisanship by creating diversity jurisdiction to provide an
alternative and ostensibly neutral forum untainted by whatever
favoritism might exist in a state court. 24 1 Similarly, the Sixth
Amendment guarantees a criminal defendant the right to an
impartial jury, one not infected by hatred or prejudice. 24 2 Later, in

belief that Saddam loyalists have infiltrated the ranks of Iraqi prison guards and that
they are "very corrupt and are known former intelligence officers and Fedayeen
members"'); John J. Lumpkin, Poor Recruiting Plagues Police, WASH. TIMES, July 26,
2005, at A19 (noting that Iraq's police force has allowed insurgents to join);
MacDonald, supra note 130, at 6 (noting the fear that the Iraqi judiciary, including the
Iraqi Special Tribunal, may have links to the Baath party); Richard A. Oppel Jr. &
James Glanz, U.S. Officials Say Iraq's Forces Founder Under Rebel Assaults, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 30, 2004, at Al (noting that Iraqi security forces are "unreliable because of
corruption, desertion or infiltration"); Eric Schmitt, In Iraq, U.S. Officials Cite
Obstacles to Victory, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 30, 2004, at 1 (noting fears that Iraqi security
forces have been penetrated by spies for the insurgents); Doug Struck, 'My Hands Are
Not Stained With Blood,' WASH. POST, Feb. 3, 2005, at A21 ('We have information the
Baathists and some former members of the regime have returned to their jobs and are
leading the insurgency in the country. The security forces of the government are
infiltrated."') (quoting Jawad Maliki, Dawa party members and deputy president of the
Commission for De-Baathification).
Beyond their covert infiltration, Sunni clerics have openly issued a fatwa for
insurgents to further infiltrate Iraq's security services. See Yaroslav Trofimov, Iraqi
Lawmakers Spar Over Role of Ex-Baathists, WALL ST. J., Apr. 7, 2005, at A12 ("Shiite
suspicions were especially piqued by an unusual fatwa issued Friday by key members
of the Sunni Muslim Scholars Association, the influential clerical body that often
extends rhetorical and moral support to the insurgency. The fatwa urges the faithful
to join U.S.-trained Iraqi military and police forces while abstaining from aid to the
occupiers-a call many interpret as an order to take over the security forces from
within."); Oppel, Jr. & Glanz, supra.
239.
U.S. CONST. amend. I.
240.
Id. Art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
241.
The purpose of Article III's creation of diversity jurisdiction is "to provide a
federal forum for important disputes where state courts might favor, or be perceived as
favoring, home-state litigants." Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 125 S. Ct.
2611, 2618 (2005).
242.
U.S. CONST. amend. VI. See Connors v. United States, 158 U.S. 408, 413
(1895) (A defendant is "entitled to be tried by an impartial jury; that is, by jurors who
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the Equal Protection and Privileges and Immunities Clauses of the
Fourteenth Amendment, the Framers of that amendment required
the states to treat their citizens equal under the law, regardless of the
243
language they spoke, their race, ethnicity, or state of origin.
U.S. bureaucrats who elected to utilize Iraqi courts-staffed by
Iraqi judges applying Iraqi law-to prosecute Iraqi terrorists who
attack U.S. soldiers could have learned something from the Framers.
Unfortunately, they greatly underestimated the favoritism that Iraqi
judges would show to defendants who share the judges' tribal,
cultural, religious, linguistic, ethnic, and nationalistic identity. 244
B. BaathistAffinities
Like most insurgents, 245 almost all Iraqi judges were once cardcarrying members of the Baath party. 246 Membership in the party
was the only way to obtain coveted judicial positions in the former
regime, 247 and judicial experience was required for a judicial
appointment by the Coalition. As in Nazi Germany, many party
members sought admission to the organization primarily to secure
employment, advance their careers, or provide a better life for their
children. 248 Many Baathists were not true believers in Baathism any

had no bias or prejudice that would prevent them from returning a verdict according to
the law and evidence.").
243.
U.S. CONST.amend. XIV, § 1.
244.
O'Leary & Eklund, supra note 28, at 91-92 (noting the ethnic, tribal, and
linguistic affinities at play in Iraq).
245.
Thom Shanker & Eric Schmitt, The Insurgency: Falluja Data Said to
Pressure Guerrillas, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 3, 2004, at A12 ("Documents and computers
found in Falluja are providing clues to the identity of home-grown opponents of the new
Iraqi government, mostly former Baathists.").
246.
See MacDonald, supra note 130 (According to a U.S. official, "practically
every judge who served in the Iraqi judicial system under Hussein was a member of the
Baath party. You had to be, at least nominally...").
247.
According to Judge Ra'ad Juhi-an investigative judge of the CCCI and the
chief investigative judge of the Iraqi Special Tribunal-"to get into the Judiciary
Institute... you needed 'to be recommended by the Baath offices in the neighborhood
you lived in."' Caryle Murphy, Hussein Judge Steps Out of the Shadows, WASH. POST,
Mar. 22, 2005, at A12; see also John F. Burns, Hussein Tribunal Shaken by Chalabi's
Bid to Replace Staff, N.Y. TIMES, July 20, 2005, at A9 (noting that during Saddam's
reign, "all prosecutors, judges and senior court officials were required to join the Baath
Party"). The Chief Justice of Iraq's Federal Supreme Court, Madhat Mahmood,
observed that he served as a judge without being a member of the Baath Party, but
that his refusal to join the party doomed any chance of promotion. Rick Jervis, For
Iraq's Top Judge, Security Tops the Docket, USA TODAY, July 7, 2005, at A6 ("[Judge]
Mahmood started as a judicial investigator in 1960 and became a judge in 1967. But
when he refused to join the Baath Party, his promotions stopped, he said.").
248.
Gaiutra Bahadur, Biased Hiring Thwarts New Iraqi Graduates, PHILA.
INQUIRER, Apr. 25, 2005, at A3 ("Under Saddam Hussein's grip, the rules for young and
ambitious Iraqis were clear: Join the Baath Party if you want a future.").
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more than some opportunistic Nazis adhered to the Nazi creed.2 49 It
is not easy to separate the sheep from the goats, however.
After the demise of the Nazi and Baath parties, many who could
plausibly claim that they only sought membership for purposes of
economic advancement-and show that they were not dedicated
zealots-did so. 250 But it is hard to gauge the accuracy of these self25 1
serving claims, especially when they are made by Iraqi judges.
The Coalition required judges to abjure their Baath Party affiliation,
but judges' words do not always conform to their inner beliefs. To
paraphrase Shakespeare, oftentimes the false face doth hide what the
25 2
false heart doth know.
According to most reports, the primary leaders and the majority
of participants in the Iraqi insurgency are Baath party members and
loyalists, 253 many of whom seek the restoration of the former regime

249.
Murphy, supra note 246, at 12 ("But registering as a party member and
being an activist were not the same, [Judge Ra'ad] Juhi said, adding that many Iraqis
became nominal members to avoid the scrutiny and persecution that could make life
what he called 'a big hell."'); ROBERT PERITO, U.S. INST. OF PEACE SPECIAL REPORT 104,
ESTABLISHING THE RULE OF LAW IN IRAQ 8 (2003), available at http://www.usip.pubs/
specialreports/srl04.pdf (last visited March 2005) ('The Baath Party has a total
affiliation of 1 to 1.5 million, but only 50,000 are 'full members.' Most government
officials, military officers, and senior administrators are party members for
convenience rather than because of ideological commitment. Party membership is
required to hold office, for promotions, to obtain economic advantages, and to avoid
harassment.").
250.
See, e.g., Dreazen, supra note 237, at Al (discussing an Iraqi policeman
who claims he joined the Baath Party "solely to keep his job").
251.
For a slightly contrary view, see Williams, supra note 21, at 231 ("Under
Saddam, membership in the Ba'ath Party was a prerequisite for advancement in the
government. Nevertheless, it was possible to draw a distinction between those who
participated in the party solely to ensure a livelihood and those who were zealous
Ba'athists."). Williams argues that service in the judiciary was not an avenue for quick
advancement in the Baath Party; it required the investment of substantial time and
effort for which one could expect little power. Id. True Baathist zealots, argues
Williams, would have chosen a different career path. Id. This reasoning, while
enjoying some surface appeal and a minimum of validity, fails to take into
consideration that zealous Baathists might pursue a judicial career, for example,
because: (1) it was part of a family tradition or (2) it entailed the potential for
obtaining bribes from wealthy litigants, and thus in the long run greater wealth than,
say, military service would entail.
252.
WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, MACBETH act 1, sc. 7, 11. 81-82 (A.R. Braunmiller
ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1997).
253.
Khalid al-Ansary et al., Ex-Hussein Aides to Hear First Charges Next Week,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 15, 2004, at A18 (relating that a suicide car bomber possessed in his
vehicle "written materials praising Mr. Hussein and his rule"); John F. Burns, After
Falluja, U.S. Troops Fight A New Battle Just As Important, And Just as Tough, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 28, 2004, at 24 ("Marine intelligence officers say there are 400 to 500 'core
leaders' of the Sunni insurgency in the area, many of them former ranking members of
Mr. Hussein's Baath Party or senior officers in his military."); see Fassihi, supra note
209, at A12 ("Iraqis-particularly Sunni Arab extremists and members of the former
ruling Baathist party-account for the majority of the violence..."); Noah Feldman,
supra note 219 ("The U.S. is fighting not one but two distinct insurgencies. The more
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or at least instability sufficient to prevent effective control of former
Baathists. 254 To achieve this goal or simply to thwart the successor
government, the party and its leadership generously finances the
insurgency. 255 Despite the overwhelming poverty of their fellow
Iraqis, they seem to have no shortage of money. 256 They provide the

numerous is a mobilized movement of Iraqi Sunnis, some of them former Baath party
members, and all beneficiaries of Saddam Hussein's pro-Sunni policies."); Hendren,
supra note 57 ("'The overwhelming majority of insurgents, several senior commanders
said, are drawn from the tens of thousands of former government employees whose
sympathies lie with the toppled regime of Saddam Hussein .. "); Mazzetti, supranote
205 ("U.S. military officials said the core of the insurgency in Iraq was-and always
had been-Hussein's fiercest loyalists, who melted into Iraq's urban landscape when
the war began in March 2003."); Patrick J. McDonnell, Troops Shrink Insurgents' Turf,
L.A. TIMES, Nov. 13, 2004, at Al ("[M]ost of those who capitulate are Iraqis, said [Col.
Craig] Tucker ..
"); Richard A. Oppel, Jr., In Northern Iraq, The Insurgency Has Two
Faces, Secular and Jihad, But A Common Goal, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 19, 2004, § 1, at 30
(noting that the insurgency has vast amount of money at its disposal--"mostly cash
that is driven by car or truck into the country from Syria . . . where scores of Baath
Party officials and Saddam apparatchiks fled after the American invasion."); Thomas
E. Ricks, General: Iraqi Insurgents Directed From Syria, WASH. POST, Dec. 17, 2004, at
A29 [hereinafter Ricks, General] ("A top Army general said yesterday that the Iraqi
insurgency was being run in part by a former senior Iraqi Baath Party officials
operating in Syria..."); Thomas E. Ricks, Rebels Aided Allies in Syria, U.S. Says, WASH.
POST, Dec. 8, 2004 at Al [hereinafter Ricks, Rebels Aided] ("U.S. military intelligence
officials have concluded that the Iraqi insurgency is being directed to a greater degree
than previously recognized from Syria, where they said former Saddam Hussein
loyalist have found sanctuary and are channeling money and other support to those
fighting the established government."); Even the non-Baathist terrorist cells motivated
primarily by Islamic beliefs obtain succor and support from the Baathists, perhaps
based on the principle that "the enemy of my enemy is my friend." See Mohamad
Bazzi, supra note 237, at A4 (Islamic terrorist Abu Musab al-Zarqawi "is likely moving
around central and northern Iraq alone, finding shelter in Sunni Muslim areas
dominated by former members of Saddam Hussein's Baathist regime").
254.
There are many Baathists in the police and security services as well, and
apparently they still use the same old Baathists tactics. See Doug Struck, Torture in
Iraq Still Routine, Report Says, WASH. POST, Jan. 25, 2005, at A10 ("Iraqi police,
jailers, and intelligence agents, many of them holding the same jobs they had under
Hussein, are 'committing systematic torture and other abuses' of detainees ... ").
255.
See Douglas Jehl, U.S. Ties Funds for Insurgents to 4 Nephews of Hussein,
N.Y. TIMES, July 22, 2005, at A10 ("The Treasury Department identified four nephews
of Saddam Hussein on Thursday who it said had operated from Syria and played
significant roles in providing money, weapons, explosives and other support to the antiAmerican insurgency in Iraq.").
256.
John F. Burns, Marines' Raid Underline Push in Crucial Area, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 6, 2004, at 1 (noting that Mahmoud al-Janabi, a Baathist and strong supporter of
Saddam Hussein, has been "identified by the American forces as a financier of the
insurgency"); Bradley Graham & Walter Pincus, U.S. Hopes to Divide Insurgency,
WASH. POST, Oct. 31, 2004, at Al ("One senior defense official said more than a dozen
'financial people' from Hussein's government have been identified funneling money
from Syria to insurgents in Iraq."); Mazzetti, supra note 205 ("[T]he traffic from Syria
is largely Iraqi Baathists who escaped after the U.S.-led invasion and couriers brining
in money from former members of Hussein's government."); see Ricks, General, supra
note 252 (quoting General George W. Casey, Jr.'s assertion that Baathists and former
members of Saddam Hussein's government are funding the insurgency from Syria);
Ricks, Rebels Aided, supra note 252 ("Based on information gathered during the recent
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capital used to purchase the weapons, explosives, and foot soldiers
used to kill U.S. soldiers and members of the new Iraqi
government. 257 "All you need to make the insurgency go is money,"258
and there appears to be no shortage of currency to pay petty
criminals, to emplace improvised bombs, 2 59 or to bribe government
officials, including judges.
In light of the abundant financing
available to insurgents and their demonstrated infiltration of Iraqi
military, intelligence and security forces, it is almost a certainty that
the Baath party has bribed or infiltrated the Iraqi judiciary. This
includes the CCCI judiciary, which more than any other Iraqi judicial
260
body has the power to assist or thwart the insurgents.

fighting in Fallujah, Baghdad and elsewhere in the Sunni Triangle, the officials said
that a handful of senior Iraqi Baathists operating in Syria are collecting money from
private sources in Saudi Arabia and Europe and turning it over to the insurgency.");
Carla Ann Robbins & Greg Jaffe, U.S. Sees Effort By Syria to Control Border With Iraq,
WALL ST. J., Dec. 10, 2004, at A3 ("Damascus has provided haven for formers
supporters of Saddam Hussein, some of whom are believed to be financing and helping
direct the insurgency .... "); Alex Rodriguez, Fear, Violence Reign on Haifa Street,
CHICAGO TRIB., Nov. 7, 2004, at 1 (noting that the insurgency is composed of "Sunni
radicals, Syrian fighters and former regime henchmen"); Shanker & Schmitt, supra
note 244 ("The insurgency consists of as many as 50 militant cells that draw significant
money from an underground financial network run by former Baath Party leaders and
Saddam Hussein's relatives, the officials say."); The Iranian theocratic government also
funds and supports elements of the insurgency. See Ellen Knickmeyer & Salih Saif
Aldin, U.S. Raid Kills Family North of Baghdad, WASH. POST, Jan. 4, 2006, at A12
(noting the smuggling of weapons and guerillas into Iraq from Iran).
257.
Shanker & Schmitt, supra note 244.
258.
Lowry, supra note 55, at 30 (internal quotations omitted); see also Shaun
Waterman, Saddam's Cash May Fund Rebels, WASH. TIMES, Nov. 15, 2004, at 7 (noting
CIA official Charles Duelfer's plan to "testify about 'how Saddam Hussein manipulated
the [Oil-for-Food] program ... to generate billions of dollars of illicit funds, and procure
conventional weapons. ..

"').

259.
Burns, supra note 252 ("In many cases, American officers say, captured
men have told them that they were paid sums ranging from $20 to $200 to stage
ambushes or plant explosives that are detonated by 'part-time triggermen,' many of
them also paid."); Oppel, Jr., supra note 252 ("It used to cost just $50 to hire an Iraqi
youth to fire a rocket- propelled grenade at American troops; it now costs $100 to
$200 .. "); Rodriguez, supra note 253 ("Aware of the poverty burdening many Iraqis,
they enlist new recruits with the lure of hundreds or even thousands of dollars for the
placement of a roadside bomb or the killing of an American soldier."); see Richard
Whittle, Purpose of Iraqi Insurgency Questioned, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Dec. 20,
2004, at 2A ("You can hire somebody for a hundred bucks and say, 'Plant this IED."').
260.
Borchgrave, Iran, supra note 237 ("Saddam Hussein loyalists and jihadis
from neighboring countries have penetrated the new Iraqi military and intelligence
service."). There are allegations that the Baath Party has even infiltrated the Iraqi
Special Tribunal, some judges of which were members of the Baath Party under
Saddam's reign. See John F. Burns, Hussein Jousts with Iraqi Judge Over His Rights
In a Court Hearing,N.Y. TIMES, July 22, 2005, at A10 (discussing allegations "that the
tribunal has been infiltrated by former members of Mr. Hussein's ruling Baath Party,
and that they plan to spare the former Iraqi leaders, in party by delaying their trials");
see also Danny Hakim & Jeremy W. Peters, Praiseand Hard Questionsfor Iraqi Prime
Minister in Michigan, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 14, 2005, at A18 (Prime Minister Ibrahim alJaafa admits "that there were very likely [some] hostile elements even inside the
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Unfortunately, CCCI decisions usually assist the terrorists,
perhaps because of the orders or cash flowing from Baathist leaders
of the insurgency. Or perhaps it is simply a matter of loyalty to
Baathism, insofar as most Baathists do not consider violent
2 61
Rather, they view such
opposition to the Coalition a crime.
conduct as commendable acts of patriotism and therefore perceive the
insurgents as martyrs for the cause, much as the Leipzig judges
viewed their fellow Germans who fought against the Allies in World
War 1.262 In the words of one Iraqi police cadet: "Attacks on the
263
American Army are attacks of resistance" and not terrorism.
Under this worldview, violence constitutes terrorism only when Iraqi
civilians are targeted. 264 Expecting similar conduct of German judges
following World War II, Justice Robert Jackson ensured that only
265
non-Germans served as judicial officers in the war crimes trials.
Unfortunately there was no Justice Jackson around during the
liberation of Iraq.
The CCCI judges obviously retain at least some Baathist
leanings, 26 6 especially since the Baath party was and perhaps still is
"part of the fabric of Iraqi society, a complex, interrelated pyramid of
26 7
At best, some CCCI
economic, political, religious, and tribal links."
judges conduct themselves in a way that suggests they approve of the
Baathist-instigated insurgency. 268 At worst, some of their rulings
suggest that many of the judges are simply puppets of the remnants

different institutions within the government."); Ties to bin Laden Alleged, KANSAS CITY
STAR, Aug. 12, 2005, at A17 (noting that the Iraqi-born Tarik A. Hamdi, a U.S. citizen
with ties to Osama bin Laden, works for the Iraqi Foreign Ministry in Turkey).
Drew Brown, Iraq Poll: 47% Back Attacks On U.S. Troops, PHILA.
261.
INQUIRER, Jan. 31, 2006, at A2 ("A new poll found that nearly half of Iraqis approve of
attacks on U.S.-led forces .... Among Sunni Muslims, 88 percent said they approved
of the attacks. That approval was found among 41 percent of Shiite Muslims and 16
percent of Kurds.").
JOHN P. KENNY, MORAL ASPECTS OF NUREMBERG 5 (1949) ("They looked
262.
upon the accused as martyrs ....");Freeman, supra note 131 (discussing the loyalty
that the CCCI judges have to the insurgents).
Rana Sabbagh-Gargour & Stephen Farrell, Police Cadets Betray Torn
263.
Loyalty, LONDON TIMES, June 30, 2005, at 36.
Id.
264.
At Nuremberg, Justice Jackson recognized the stupidity of permitting
265.
German judges try the German war criminals. EUGENE C. GERHART, AMERICA'S
ADVOCATE:

ROBERT H. JACKSON 314 (1958) ("There was obviously no point in trying

the German leaders before a German court; the Leipzig trials in 1921 had proved the
folly of that course.").
Freeman, supra note 131 ("Some Shia judges have even complained
266.
privately that their Sunni colleagues are giving out light sentences to Sunni
defendants to show a degree of sympathy with the insurgents.").
John Lee Anderson, Out on the Street, NEW YORKER, Nov. 15, 2004, at 72.
267.
Id. at 74 (noting that Baathist recruiters "helped to build the insurgency");
268.
Mazzetti, supra note 205; see also Shanker & Schmitt, supra note 244 ("Documents and
computers found in Falluja are providing clues to the identity of home-grown
opponents of the new Iraqi government, mostly former Baathists.").
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of the Baath party, as in the days when the Baathists openly
26 9
controlled Iraq.
As discussed, attacks on U.S. forces are being funded and
coordinated by members of the party. 270 Indeed, cognizant that they
could never win a conventional war with the United States, plans for
the insurgency were probably hatched by Saddam and the Baathists
even before the invasion began. 27 1
Religious elements of the

269.
Judicial independence is a foreign concept to totalitarian philosophies.
Thus, it iscommon for leftist parties to dictate to the judiciary decisions in particular
cases, and the Baath party, though exceptionally ruthless, was no exception to this
rule. Philip P. Pan, In China, Turning the Law Into the People's Protector,WASH. POST,
Dec. 28, 2004, at Al (discussing Communist party control of Chinese courts); Mary
Anastasia O'Grady, Chavez's Tyranny Emboldens Nicaragua's Ortega, WALL ST. J.,
Dec. 24, 2004, at All (discussing the Sandinista party's control of the Nicaraguan
judiciary).
270.
The Iranian government is also responsible for some of the attacks:
[Tiop Iraqi police officials in the southern city of Basra said an Iranian citizen
was among three men detained in a raid Sunday that uncovered a large
amount of arms and explosives. One of the officials said some of the seized
ordnance had markings showing it had been made in Iran. ***
U.S. Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad recently warned Iran against sending
weapons into Iraq. A top U.S. military official, who spoke on condition that he
not be identified further, had said repeatedly that weapons and guerrillas were
entering Iraq from Iran.
Knickmeyer & Aldin, supra note 255. A destabilized Iraq is a boon for Iran insofar as
it: (1) precludes Iraq from posing a military threat to Iran; (2) ties up U.S. forces that
otherwise could be focused on Iran and its nuclear program; (3) increases the cost,
while decreasing the apparent benefits, of U.S. intervention in Iraq, thereby
discouraging U.S. support for future military action against Iran; (4) makes Iraq less
desirable as a staging area for any possible U.S. military strikes against Iran; (5)
permits Iranian government officials to appear benevolent as they offer aid, and the
entangling alliances that this aid entails, to the Iraqi government; (6) gives the Iranian
government bargaining power in any subsequent negotiations with Iraq; and (7)
appears to demonstrate U.S. ineffectiveness, particularly against terrorists purportedly
guided by Allah.
271.
John F. Burns, Iraq's Election, Its Outcome Murky, Is Seen as a 'Jungleof
Ambiguity,' N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 18, 2004, at A8 (U.S. officials believe that Saddam
Hussein "laid the groundwork for the insurgency before the March 2003 invasion by
ordering the preparation of underground cells, the stashing of large amounts of money
and the stocking of extensive weapons caches."); Editorial, The Enemy in Plain View,
WALL ST. J., Dec. 21, 2004, at A18 ("Saddam and his allies 'appear to have planned for
an insurgency before the beginning of Operation Iraqi Freedom."'); Graham & Pincus,
supra note 255.
The dominant element of the insurgency.., is a loose group referred to in U.S.
military documents as "Sunni Arab rejectionists," consisting largely of former
members of Hussein's government. These are onetime military officers and
intelligence agents who U.S. officials have come increasingly to believe had
some kind of plan to reorganize into cells and wage an insurgency if U.S. forces
invaded.
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insurgency-Moslems who see the United States as a Christian
nation and therefore the "Great Satan" who must be opposedsimilarly receive support from the deposed Baathists. 272 Because the
largest portion of the insurgency is composed of members of the
Baath party and its intelligence organizations, 273 and many of the
Baath party still have hopes of restoring a Baathist dictatorship and
the privileges it would entail for them, 274 it is a foregone conclusion
that the Baath party would infiltrate the CCCI judiciary. These
judges aid the insurgency by ensuring that insurgents who are
prosecuted in their courts receive lenient treatment, 275 if not solely
out of loyalty to the party, then perhaps out of mixed loyalty to
Baathist ideology and Baathist dinars. Ironically, the creation of the
CCCI was "an attempt to ensure that corrupt judges don't let
sympathizers of the former regime back on the streets. ' 276 In this
regard, the CCCI has proven to be a dismal failure.
C. Corruption
At least some of the problems with the CCCI may be due to the
corruption of Iraq's judicial system. 277 According to Chief Justice

See Sofaer, supra note 103 ("Saddam knew he would lose a conventional war, but
counted on eventual success through an insurgency inflicting sufficient casualties to
undermine international resolve.").
272.
Austin Bay, Thugs Are Fueled By Arrogance, Fear, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESSNEWS, Sept. 23, 2004 ("[The Baghdad rumor mill says Baath warlords pay bombers
anywhere from $1,000 to $3,000 per attack...'); Ghosh, supra note 44, at 44 (discussing
a former Iraqi Republican Guard officer who trains suicide bombers and who claims to
receive financial and moral support from former Baathists); Klein, supra note 213, at
49 ('The Baathists had helped move the suicide bombers into the country, according to
the U.S. sources, and then provided shelter, support (including automobiles) and
coordination for the attacks.").
273.
See Editorial, Kofi Does It Again, WALL ST. J., Nov. 8, 2004, at A14 (noting
that many members of the terrorist insurgency are "remnants of Saddam's regime who
are trying to restore their Baathist dictatorship.").
274.
Donald E. Walter, Taking Justice to Iraq, 9 NEXUS J. OP. 3, 5 (2004) ("The
many Baathists, who lived well under Saddam (mostly in the Sunni areas), are thugs
who still hope to return to power."); Hannah Allam, Two Hussein Aides Called To
Account, PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER, Dec. 19, 2004, at A2 (noting that Iraqi violence is
'financed and organized by Saddam's followers, who still believe he'll come back to
power someday"'); The Enemy in Plain View, supra note 270 (the insurgency is
composed of "members and allies of the old regime who want to restore Sunni Baathist
political domination. Or to put it more bluntly, we haven't yet defeated Saddam
Hussein's regime").
275.
'There are also concerns that former Baathists may be unwilling to stand
too strongly against insurgents." Edward Wong & Erik Eckholm, Allawi Presses Effort
to bring Back Baathists, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 13, 2004, at A12. "[F]ormer Baathist who are
readmitted to the government without enough precautions can aid the insurgency from
within." Id. It is worth noting that, despite lax security and its location outside the
'green zone," the courthouse of the CCCI has never been attacked by insurgents.
276.
David Luhnow, Overhauling Iraq's Courts, WALL ST. J., June 18, 2003, at
A14.
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Marshall, the greatest scourge ever inflicted on man is a corrupt
judiciary. 278 That is certainly the case in Iraq, especially with respect
to its criminal justice system.2 7 9 But the corruption of Iraq's judiciary
should come as no surprise to anyone familiar to Iraq's history and
culture,2 8 0 as Iraq has had a longstanding problem with malversation
in all spheres of its government,2 8 1 and continues to face this problem
28 2
to this very day throughout its many government ministries.

277.
Judge Zuhair A1-Maliky, former Chief Judge of the CCCI, stated that
corruption was deep-seated in Iraqi culture. See Scott Peterson, Demoted Iraqi Judge
Fears for his Country's Future, CHRISTIAN SC. MONITOR, Nov. 1, 2004, at 11 ("Maliky
acknowledges that imposing law and order has been an uphill battle, after decades of
corrupt rule and a deep-seated culture giving gifts for favors.").
278.
JOSEPH BORKIN, THE CORRUPT JUDGE 205 (1962) (quoting Chief Justice
John Marshall).
279.
Brian Knowlton, U.S.-Installed Government in Iraq is Cited by U.S. for
Rights Abuses, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 1, 2005, at Al ("[C]orruption was a problem at every
level of government."); U.S. Department of State, 2004 Country Report on Human
Rights
Practices: Iraq, available at http://www.state.gov/g/drllrlslhrrpt/2004/
412722.htm. (last visited Mar. 2, 2005) [hereinafter 2004 Report on Human Rights
Practices] ("Corruption remained a problem in the criminal justice system." For
example, one judge was accused of engaging in "professional misconduct, including
bribery.").
280.
Richard A. Oppel, Jr., CourtingSunnis, G.I.'s Hope for Relative Safety, N.Y.
TIMES, July 17, 2005, § 1, at 1 (discussing how bribery is part of the cultural norm in
Iraq).
281.
See PHILIP W. IRELAND, IRAQ: A STUDY IN POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT 79
(1970) (1937); see also Nicholas Riccardi, A Culture of Corruption, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 1,
2004, at Al:
Under Hussein, public employees were so poorly paid that they demanded
bribes from the public to feed their families. Because the totalitarian regime
sought total control of its citizens' lives, payoffs pervaded virtually every level
of society: Kickbacks were needed to get a passport for the hajj pilgrimage,
evade a police checkpoint, build a house or get out of the army. Top officials
plundered the treasury to the extent that even Hussein's personal poets were
recently arrested by Interpol on the suspicion of financial crimes.
And the corruption has continued since the regime's ouster.
Leinwand, supra note 237 (noting the corruption of Iraqi prison guards, some of whom
quit when U.S. military personnel prohibited them from seeking bribes from the
prisoners' family members); see also Frank J. McGovern, Rebuilding A Shattered
System, 25 PA. LAWYER 34, 35 (Oct. 2003) (discussing the corruption and bribery in
Iraqi courts); see also Peterson, supra note 276, at 11 (noting in Iraq there is a "deepseated culture of giving gifts for favors").
282.
Thanassis Cambanis, Corruption Pervades Government In Basra, BOSTON
GLOBE, Aug. 8, 2005, at Al (noting that the city of Basra is saturated with a
"pervasive, murderous, gangland-style corruption," where the dominant Islamic
religious parties "ran for office on a platform of using Islamic values to root out
corruption"); Antonio Castaneda, Smuggling Across Syria Border Seen Funding
Insurgency, WASH. TIMES, Aug. 11, 2005, at All (noting that some Iraqi border guards
are corrupt); Celia W. Dugger, Iraq Susceptible to Corruption, Survey Finds, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 21, 2004, at A8 (noting that a survey ranked Iraq "among the world's most
corrupt nations," and that according to an international watchdog group, corruption
will increase "unless the United States, Britain, and other powerful nations take
aggressive steps to combat battery and theft of public money."); James Glanz, Iraqis
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Much of the problem stems from the pervasive corruption that existed
in Saddam Hussein's government. Under Saddam, the Iraqi courts
"suffered from the corruption that has infected the rest of Iraq's
institutions." 28 3 Before the liberation of Iraq, "most judges earned
more money accepting bribes than meting out impartial justice.
'Lawyer' and 'fixer' came to be used interchangeably ....
Verdicts were "routinely influenced by payoffs" and most Iraqi judges
candidly admit that "widespread corruption characterized" the justice
system under Saddam Hussein. 28 5
Corruption-epitomized by
28 6
Saddam Hussein himself-was part of the Iraqi national character.
Indeed, the Coalition Provisional Authority was so concerned about
this corruption that it sought to create a purified judiciary, starting
with the CCCI.28 7 Sadly, these lofty goals have run up against the
impenetrable reality of Iraqi society.
The general consensus is that this corruption did not cease when
Saddam Hussein's tenure as leader of Iraq ended, but rather remains
an "essential" aspect of the Iraqi politico-social system. Bribery has
become such a normal part of life in Iraq that many officials are
unashamed to openly solicit kickbacks. Indeed, the main function of
many lawyers is to facilitate bribing the judiciary. 288 Government

Tallying Range of Graft in Rebuilding, N.Y. TIMES, June 24, 2005, at Al ("Allegations
of widespread corruption have dogged the Iraqi government since the invasion in
2003 .... "); Bassem Mroue, Iraqi Military InvestigatingBad Purchases, WASH. TIMES,
Aug. 10, 2005, at A12 ("Iraqi authorities have opened inquiries into several cases of
corruption at the Defense Ministry" concerning hundreds of millions of dollars "wasted
on unnecessary and overpriced equipment for Iraq's new army."); Dan Murphy, Iraqis
Thirst for Water and Power, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Aug. 11, 2005, at 1 (discussing
how officials of Iraq's Ministry of Public Works solicit bribes when electricity service is
interrupted); see Alex Rodriguez, Graft Holds Back Economy, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 25,
2005, at 3 (noting that almost $2 billion of Iraq's oil wealth is stolen annually, much of
it due to government corruption). Some Iraqi police officers have reportedly made false
arrests to extort bribes from detainees and their families. 2004 Report on Human
Rights Practices, supra note 278.
283.
PERITO, supra note 248, at 6 (Perito was speaking of the Iraqi judiciary
prior to the invasion, but his sentiments are also largely accurate post-invasion).
284.
JOSEPH BRAUDE, THE NEW IRAQ 175 (2003); Williams, supra note 21, at 231
(noting that the Iraqi Courts were rife with corruption).
285.
Trebilcock, supra note 185, at 48.
286.
See Talcott H. Russell, The National Idea, 7 YALE L.J. 346, 347 (1898)
("Every nation has its character which results from its history, the traits of its people
and the organization of its government.").
287.
Gregory H. Fox, The Occupation of Iraq, 36 GEO. J. INT'L L. 195, 214 (2005)
(noting that "the CPA viewed the Iraqi judiciary as having been widely politicized and
corrupted under the Ba'athist regime").
288.
McGovern, supra note 280, at 35:
One woman to whom we spoke in Najaf stated that no one worked according to
the law; rather, the legal system worked through personal relationships. The
lawyers would invite the judges and the police commissioner to a feast and they
would work things out regardless of the law. She stated that if she wanted to
win a criminal case, she had to have a sexual relationship with the policeman.
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jobs go to the highest bidder and those unable or unwilling to pay the
price are excluded from consideration. 289 Security forces complain
290
that their leaders pocket a portion of their underlings' salaries.
Furthermore, corruption is not just a characteristic of middle
managers. High-ranking officials from various departments of the
291
Iraqi government have raided the treasury for personal gain.
Corruption is such a part of Iraqi culture that even the former
interim Iraqi Prime Minster, Iyad Allawi, thought nothing of bribing
media personnel for favorable coverage during the 2005 Iraqi
' 293
elections. 292 He explained it as simply a form of Iraqi "hospitality."
Similarly, some Iraqi judges see nepotistic decisions merely as
294
manifestations of loyalty to one's tribe or love for one's family.
These cultural oddities might seem quaint in a Tammany Hall sort of
way until one considers that the CCCI judges are also part of this
culture of graft, 295 these judges decide the fate of dangerous terrorists
who have pledged their lives to killing Americans.
While a number of CCCI judges have demonstrated integrity and
a desire to put Iraq's interests before their own, it is not difficult to
conclude that corruption has infected some portions of the Iraqi
judiciary 296 and that some of the CCCI acquittals and mild

Demonstrating that some things never change, even in the 1800s the chief function of
Middle Eastern lawyers was to act as a conduit for bribes. See Oriental Laws and
Lawyers, 2 ALB. L.J. 42, 43 (1870) ("In giving counsel to a client it is not in reference to
the points of law to be established, or any specific declarations which are to be
sustained by evidence. On the contrary the lawyers endeavor to explain the surest and
most economical method of bribing the kadi.").
289.
Bahadur, supra note 247 (Those who seek government employment
"complain that they have lost out in the competition for government positions because
they haven't paid bribes ....
").
290.
Oppel, Jr. & Glanz, supra note 237 (discussing the corruption of Iraqi
military and security forces).
291.
Paul Martin, Iraq Accuses 23, Cites Graft In Defense Deals, WASH. TIMES,
Oct. 12, 2005, at Al ("Iraq's government has issued arrest warrants against a former
defense minister and 22 other current and former officials, accusing them in
involvement in the misappropriation of hundreds of millions of dollars ....).
292.
See London Daily Telegraph, Allawi Aides Call $100 Gifts to Reporters
"JustHospitality,"WASH. TIMES, Jan. 13, 2005, at A13.
293.
Id.
294.

See MALISE RUTHVEN, ISLAM IN THE WORLD 170-71 (2d ed. 2000). This is

consistent with the general Iraqi culture, where tribal or familial nepotism is perceived
as a commendable act of loyalty. See David Axe, Tribe, Family Take Priority Over the
Law, WASH. TIMES, July 27, 2005, at Al (noting that Iraqis maintain strong ties to
their families and tribes, and that Iraqi government officials distribute benefits
according to these loyalties.). For example, a former official hired three-hundred new
policemen, many of whom were from his tribe, despite their illiteracy. Id.
295.
See Bruce Fein, Exit Strategy, WASH. TIMES, Nov. 29, 2005, at A19 (opining
that the Iraqi judiciary and the Interior Ministry combine "incompetence with
corruption").
296.
Former CCCI Chief Judge Zuhair A1-Maliky hinted as much. See Peterson,
supra note 276. To add insult to injury, Judge A1-Maliky was assigned to a post in
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punishments have been the result of bribery. It has been reported
that Osama bin Laden purchased his freedom with bribes paid to
Afghan officials who were directed by the United States to capture
him.2 97 There are substantial parallels with the CCCI's treatment of
Iraqi insurgents. As in Afghanistan, Iraqi officials are notoriously
corrupt. Like Afghan officials, CCCI judges have little affinity for or
loyalty to the United States, and derive little direct benefit from
advancing U.S. interests. 298 Like bin Laden, the Baath Party has
substantial wealth at its disposal and can easily afford a few wellplaced bribes. Thus, it is easy to understand how CCCI officials
might enrich themselves at the expense of U.S. interests.
In a few CCCI cases, some involving wealthy defendants or
defendants with wealthy backers, 29 9 the CCCI judges seemed to take
on a friendlier tone toward the defendant and an unreasonably
skeptical view of the evidence, which resulted in defendant-friendly
acquittals and sentences. 30 0 Such results necessarily give rise to
suspicions of corruption, especially since Iraq is rife with corruption.
Of course, corruption is a necessary result of a concentration of
power.30 1 Corruption thrives under totalitarian systems and during
periods of martial law, 30 2 since greater restrictions and government

Sadr city, a particularly violent slum in Baghdad in which A1-Maliky's life would be in
particular danger.
297.
Richard Bernstein, Bin Laden Bribed Afghan Militias For His Freedom,
German Says, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 13, 2005, at A12 ("The head of the German intelligence
agency, in an interview published here Tuesday, said Osama bin Laden had been able
to elude capture after the American invasion of Afghanistan by paying bribes to the
Afghan militias delegated the task of finding him.").
298.
The United States has consistently used military commissions to adjudicate
cases that affect its interests, a practice sanctioned by the law. A. Wigfall Green, The
Military Commission, 42 AM. J. INT'L L. 832, 842 (1948) ("Military government courts,
including military commissions, legally may assume jurisdiction over all criminal
offense committed in occupied territory and over civil cases affecting the military
government.").
299.
Baathist money continues to make its way into Iraq, fueling the insurgency
and perhaps verdicts of acquittal. See Graham & Pincus, supra note 255 ("One senior
defense official said more than a dozen 'financial people' from Hussein's government
have been identified funneling money from Syria to insurgents in Iraq."); see also
Mazzetti, supra note 205 ("[Tlhe traffic from Syria is largely Iraqi Baathists who
escaped after the U.S.-led invasion and couriers bringing in money from former
members of Hussein's government.").
300.
Ambassador Bremer established a Judicial Review Committee to
investigate possible corruption and bias. See ESTABLISHMENT OF THE JUDIcIAL REVIEW
COMMITTEE, COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY ORDER NO. 15 (2003), available at

http://www.iraqcoalition.org/regulations/20030623_CPAORD-15-Establishmentofthe
_JudicialReveiwCommittee.pdf. It has not seemed to help much.
301.
Clarence Manion, Cause of Corrupt Government, (1952), in 2 ESSAYS ON
LIBERTY (1954), available at http://www.fff.org/freedom0501F.asp (last visited May 1,
2005) ("Governmental corruption is a necessary consequence of the unreasonable,
unconstitutional, and scandalous concentration of power .. ").
302.
"[Allthough corruption is a ...pervasive phenomenon and occurs in all
systems, a recent correlation running the Transparency International Corruption
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control give corrupt bureaucrats opportunities to release from the
generally-applicable strictures those wealthy or desperate enough to
pay bribes. 30 3 Unfortunately, corrupt officials also present a golden
opportunity for terrorists because by greasing the palms of corrupt
officials, terrorists can multiply the effects of their terrorist acts. The
Russians learned this at Beslan, where armed terrorists paid corrupt
guards to let them pass checkpoints unmolested, resulting in the
deadly kidnapping and siege that took the lives of 339 Russians,
mostly women and children. 30 4
Monied terrorists and greedy
bureaucrats form a deadly combination, as the United States is
learning in Iraq. By feeding insurgency cases to the CCCI, the
United States further encourages corruption and the insurgency that
benefits from the dishonesty that plagues all spheres of the Iraqi
government.
D. Religious Bias
Religious bias also plays a role in the pro-insurgency decisions of
the CCCI. Although ostensibly secular, both the Iraqi judicial system
and penal law are based in part on Islamic law insofar as Islamic law
is a source of law for judges to apply.30 5 Thus, Islamic law influences

Perceptions Index against levels of economic freedom shows a strong positive skew
toward increased corruption as societies become less free." See John Norton Moore,
Beyond the Democratic Peace: Solving the War Puzzle, 44 VA. J. INT'L L. 341, 350
(2004); see also Edward Cody, Hundreds are Reproved by China for Corruption, WASH.
POST, Dec. 17, 2004, at A25 (discussing the extent of corruption in China and the fact
that "corruption among government and party officials has been cited as a major
reason for dissatisfaction among China's 1.3 billion people").
303.
Many insurgents are well financed, making it easy for them to raise the
capital necessary to bribe judges. See Ann Scott Tyson, U.S. Faces Gap in "Intelligence
War" In Iraq, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Nov. 5, 2004, at 2 ("Iraq's growing insurgency
has no shortage of funds .... "); Graham & Pincus, supra note 255 (Islamic elements of
insurgency contains "'facilitators' operating inside and outside of Iraqi and having
access to substantial sums of money").
304.
See Marion Baillot, Bribery Greases Terrorists Path, WASH. TIMES, Dec. 5,
2004, at A6.
In Russia, bribe-taking police and crooked officials have become the terrorists'
friends ....
Law enforcement corruption is suspected to have played a major
role in recent terrorist attacks, including the Sept. 1 school seizure in Beslan.
Hostages who survived the massacre at the school in southern Russia said the
terrorists told them they had easily reached the school by bribing police along
the way."
See also Kim Murphy, Russia May Pay for Bribes in Lives, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 8, 2004, at
Al (same).
305.
AMIN, supra note 22, at 222 (noting that the 1951 Civil Code of Iraq
"instructed judges to fill any gap in the secular law by reference to the principles of
traditional Islamic law" and that Islamic law is considered a "formal source of law" in
Iraq); EZZELDIN FODA, THE PROJECTED ARAB COURT OF JUSTICE 126-27 (1957) (noting
that the Egyptian code, which Iraq subsequently adopted, wove together European and

720

VANDERBIL TJOURNAL OF TRANSNA TIONAL LA W

[VOL. 39:645

306
the Iraqi judiciary and the Iraqi customary law in various ways.
Indeed, in light of the pervasively Moslem culture in Iraq, it could
hardly be otherwise, for government institutions "are ultimately
determined by the natures of the citizens living under them," ' 30 7 and
Iraq is a pervasively Moslem country.
Since the 2003 invasion, Iraq has become increasingly
Islamicized, in part because Moslem clerics were the only authority
figures to successfully traverse the chasm between Saddam's Iraq and
a liberated Mesopotamia; thus, the Iraqi people look to them, and
Islam, for guidance. 30 8 Moslem clerics-some steeped in anti-U.S.
sentiment from their training in Iran-hold enormous power over the
people of Iraq. 30 9 Unfortunately, many of these clerics-of both the
Sunni and Shiite variety-preach an Islam inextricably tied to hatred
of the United States, and their teachings have slipped into the
mainstream culture of Iraq.
Furthermore, Islam necessarily affects Iraqi law because Islam
cannot be divorced from its legalistic foundations. The law of Islam is
part of its essence, and indeed, most Moslems see Islam as the
supreme law which no secular law can contradict. Thus, according to
one Iraqi insurgent, the 'Koran is a constitution, a law to govern the

Islamic law); SMITH ET AL., supra note 171, at 181 ("The judicial system is based partly
on the French model as first introduced during Ottoman rule and modified since then
and based partly on religious traditions, Islamic and others."); Wael B. Hallaq,
"Muslim Rage" and Islamic Law, 54 HASTINGS L.J. 1705, 1713 (2003) (The Ottoman
Penal Code of 1858 was "closely modeled after the French Penal Code of 1810."); A.
Kevin Reinhart & Gilbert S. Merritt, Reconstructionand ConstitutionBuilding in Iraq,
Addresses at Vanderbilt University Law School (Jan. 23, 2004), in 37 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 765, 781 (2004) (Iraqi law "is a civil law system which came through
Egypt because Egypt, during the time of Napoleon's campaign, adopted a kind of
Napoleonic code system with Islamic elements in it that was later passed along to
Iraq.").
306.
This is consistent with many other courts in the Islamic Middle East.
DWYER, supra note 81, at 3. For example, the CCCI is free to look to religious texts and
standards in determining the weight of evidence in criminal cases. Grossman, supra
note 16 ("Judges in Iraq are given enormous latitude in determining cases based on
'the weight of the evidence,' and may choose to implement standards laid out in any of
three, often conflicting sources-the 1971 Iraqi Law on Criminal Proceedings, religious
texts or precedents established by prior cases.").
307.
Herbert Spencer, Anglo-American Philosophiesof Penal Law, 1 J. AM. INST.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 862, 862 (1911).

308.
Farnaz Fassihi, Clerics Hold Sway as Iraqis Ponder New Constitution,
WALL ST. J., Oct. 13, 2005, at Al:
Religion's role in Iraqi political life has ratcheted steadily higher since U.S.-led
forces overthrew Mr. Hussein in 2003. In the post-invasion chaos, mosques
were the only authority left in many communities, and clerics helped organize
everything from security patrols to trash removal. Outlawed Islamist political
parties ... emerged from exile or the underground as instant political forces.
309.
Many Iraqis openly stated that in national elections, they vote according to
the orders of their clerics. See Jonathan Finer & Naseer Nouri, Loyalties Lie With
Clerics, Not With Politicians,In Najaf,WASH. POST, Oct. 17, 2005, at All.
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world.' ' 310 This key tenet of Islam is widely accepted among the
311
faithful in Iraq and has been incorporated into the criminal law.
The Iraqi judiciary also seems to ascribe to this view, and for
CCCI judges, this means that their decisions must conform to the
dictates of the Islamic holy book, regardless of whether they comport
with Western notions of fairness and justice and regardless of
whether they result in legions of guilty terrorists escaping justice. In
the words of one Islamic academician: "Islam is a religion of law, and
this is a fact of crucial importance. Islam means nothing if religious
law were to be extracted from it. '3 12 Thus, the idea of a completely
secular law, or court decisions uninfluenced by Islamic beliefs, is
nonsensical to Moslems.
Islamic law constitutes a key element of Islamic identity. 313 This
fact has substantial ramifications for Iraqi government, particularly
Iraqi courts, which apparently have chosen to apply an Islamic
jurisprudence that favors Moslems when their legal interests conflict
with those of non-Moslems, such as the U.S. soldiers attacked by
Moslem insurgents. Indeed, from its founding, Islam has called for
the discrimination in favor of Moslems and against Christians and
Jews. 3 14 Thus, even "moderate" Iraqi clerics like the Ayatollah
Sistani have made legal rulings that Christians and Jews are

310.
Ghaith Abdul-Ahad, Outside Iraq But Deep in the Fight, WASH. POST, June
8, 2005, at Al (quoting Abu Ibrahim, a Syrian insurgent); Peter J. Hamilton, Germanic
and Moorish Elements of the Spanish Civil Law, 30 HARV. L. REv. 303, 311 (1917)
("Mohammedan law is founded upon the Koran, the decisions of the prophet .... ). For
Moslems, the Koran is a collection of God's revelations to Mohammed, including legal
rules: "The Prophet [Mohammed] was the Messenger of God, and to him He revealed
in His own words, His wishes and commands through the medium of the angel Gabriel.
The collection of these revelations is called the Qur'an, but its text which existed from
eternity was communicated from time to time in pieces called Ayahs, or verses. The
verses that lay down rules of law were mostly revealed when cases actually arose
requiring decision according to the principles of Islam." Rahim, supra note 85, at 186.
311.
Allen, Jr., supra note 93, at 20 ('The Quran is a total religious law, which
regulates the whole of political and social life and insists that the whole order of life be
Islamic....") (quoting Cardinal Joseph Ratzinger); Dan Murphy, Iraqi Women Urge
Limited Sharia in New Constitution, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Aug. 9, 2005, at 11
(noting that the debate in Iraqi government concerns the extent to which Islamic law
will control Iraq; it is recognized by everyone that shariawill have a vital role in Iraqi
government, and nobody argues that it should have no influence on the country).
312.
Hallaq, supra note 304, at 1715.
313.
Mark A. Drumbl, Rights, Culture, and Crime: The Role of Rule of Law for
the Women of Afghanistan, 42 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 349, 365 (2004).
314.
THOMAS SOWELL, MIGRATIONS AND CULTURES: A WORLD VIEW 238 (1996)
("Throughout the Islamic world, a non-Moslem dared not strike a Moslem, even in selfdefense, and merely verbal retaliation was dangerous."). Modern apologists for Islam
quote excerpts from the Koran that all people are equal, but the facts are crystal clear
that non-Moslems are treated as second-class in Moslem countries.
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"unclean" and therefore may face discriminatory treatment at the
3 15
hands of Iraqi government officials.
The influence of Islamic law and Islamic clerics in Iraq is vast.
After all, Islam was once Iraq's official sate religion and even now it
essentially enjoys official status. 316 In non-Islamic countries, judges
grow up exposed to the predominant religion, manners, and mores of
their respective societies, and it would take an extremely thick
exoskeleton to prevent society's influence from penetrating the
outlook of these judges. These influences later come to affect judicial
decisions, even though some judges are not consciously aware of this.
In the words of Justice Cardozo: "Manners and custom (if we may not
label them as law itself) are at least a source of law. The judge, so far
as freedom of choice is given to him, tends to a result that attaches
legal obligation to the folkways, the norms or stands of behavior
exemplified in the life about him. '317
As products of Islamic
culture, 3 18 it would be foolish to think that the religious tenets of
Islam have not entered the hearts, minds, and chambers of the CCCI
319
judges, even if they were not themselves Moslem.
But indeed, the CCCI is further steeped in Islam because all of
its judges are Moslem. Moslems control the CCCI and other courts in
part because they are the majority in Iraq and, because of persecution

315.
Hannibal Travis, Freedom or Theocracy?: ConstitutionalismIn Afghanistan
and Iraq, 3 NORTHWESTERN UNIV. J. OF INT'L HUMAN RIGHTS 4, 118 (2005).
316.
Id.
317.
CARDOZO, supra note 18, at 15. Chief Justice John G. Roberts, however,
claimed that religion will have no effect on his decisions. Amy Goldstein & Charles
Babington, Roberts Avoids Specifics On Abortion Issue, WASH. POST, Sept. 14, 2005
("[M]y faith and my religious beliefs do not play a role in judging. When it comes to
judging, I look to the law books and always have. I don't look to the Bible or another
other source."') (quoting then-Judge John G. Roberts, testifying at his confirmation
hearing). But the fact that Chief Justice Roberts does not consult religious sources
when making his judicial decisions is beside Justice Cardozo's point. Under Justice
Cardozo's understanding, judges are unconsciously influenced by their religious beliefs,
societal customs, and moral values when deciding difficult cases in which legal
materials do not obviously dictate the "correct" decision. Likewise, Iraqi judges may
not be consulting the Koran every time they hear a witness testify in a case, but they
may, without even realizing it, be influenced by Islamic legal doctrines like the
discounting of testimony from infidels and women, especially when it is directed
against a Moslem defendant.
318.
Iraqi culture is becoming extremely Islamic, to the point that the police
assault those who fail to comply with Islam's stricture: "Physicians have been beaten
for treating female patients. Liquor salesmen have been killed. Even barbers have
faced threats for giving haircuts judged too short or too fashionable. Religion rules the
streets of this once cosmopolitan city [Basra], where women no longer dare go out
uncovered." Louise Roug, Islamic Law Controls the Streets of Basra, L.A. TIMES, June
27, 2005, availableat 2005 WLNR 10123509.
319.
Judges who were educated at madrassahs-someof which have been called
"jihad factories" for teaching a virulent hatred of non-Moslems-are particularly
susceptible to an Islamic jurisprudence that favors Moslem litigants over non-Moslem
ones. Abigail Cutler & Saleem Ali, MadrassahReform is Key to Terror War, CHRISTIAN
SCIENCE MONITOR, June 27, 2005, at 9.
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from Islamic terrorists, the population of non-Moslems is ever
declining. 320 But their dominance of the judiciary is also due to
discrimination against-not to mention murder of 32 1-Christians who
would like to pursue careers in the law. 322 Any chance of recruiting
them for judicial posts is rapidly dwindling as many are fleeing Iraq
for safer havens. 323 Iraqi Jews also probably would have chosen the
legal profession, but most have long since fled Iraq in an effort to
preserve their lives, 324 and anyway it is unlikely they would have
fared any better than the Christians. 325 Thus, the CCCI has only
Moslem judges in part because of the pervasiveness of discrimination
against non-Moslems in Iraqi society.
This discrimination which causes Islamic dominance of the
judiciary is, in turn, sometimes justified by the same Islamic tenets
that influence the decisions of the CCCI. Under many brands of
Islamic law, Christians are considered inferior to Moslems. Under
this view, it is natural that Christians are prohibited from serving as

320.
2004 Report on Human Rights Practices, supra note 278. Of course, there
are so few Christians in Iraq in part because some Moslems have a tendency to kill
non-Moslems-now mostly Christians, because the majority of Iraq's Jewish population
fled the violence decades ago. This further encourages the surviving Christians to flee
elsewhere, so they do not encounter the same fate. Arnold Beichman, The Other Iraq
War, WASH. TIMES, Mar. 29, 2005, at 15 ("Though Iraqi Christians are a minuscule
minority, they suffer unrelenting Muslim persecution. The Iraqi Christian population,
once was more than 15 percent, decreases daily due to emigration to the safety in
Western countries.").
321.
Scheherezade Faramarzi, ChristiansFleeing For Their Lives, WASH. TIMES,
Feb. 9, 2005 (noting that Christians are being systematically murdered in Iraq by
Moslems and that many Christians are seeking to flee Iraq); Jack Fairweather,
Christians Flee Genocide as Fear Sweeping Iraq, LONDON DAILY TELEGRAPH, Jan. 8,
2005 (estimating that one quarter of Iraq's Christians have fled Iraq to escape murder
by Moslems, which the author calls "genocide").
322.
2004 Report on Human Rights Practices, supra note 278 ("Some Christian
professionals complained that corruption in the Government excludes them from jobs
for which they are qualified."); Beichman, supra note 319, at 15 (noting discrimination
against Christians both at Iraqi universities and in public sector hiring, and noting
that many Christian students have stopped attending universities for fear that they
will be murdered). There also was once a thriving Jewish community in Iraq,
particularly Baghdad, which has now been decimated.
323.
Thomas Harding, Baghdad Elite Flees Iraq and the Daily Threat of Death,
LONDON DAILY TELEGRAPH, Aug. 10, 2005 ("Quietly, in their ones and twos, the
professional classes of Baghdad are slipping out of the country to avoid becoming
another fatal statistic."). This flight of the professionals is occurring across sectarian
lines and is not limited solely to Christians.
324.
Dana Ledger, Note, Remembrance of Things Past: The Iraqi Jewish
Archive and the Legacy of The Iraqi Jewish Community, 37 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REV.
795, 814-15 (2005) (recounting the history of the Jews in Iraq and noting that only a
few Jews remain in Iraq).
325.
Cal Thomas, Islam Has Double Standard on Tolerance, AUGUSTA CHRON.,
June 6, 2005, at A4 ("But the denigration of Jews and Christians throughout the
Islamic world is theological and political business as usual. Jews are regularly referred
to as 'apes and pigs,' mostly because that is what the Koran calls them.").
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judges of Moslem litigants. 3 26 Probably because it is forbidden by
Islamic law3 27 and tribal traditions, there are no women judges on the
CCCI (there are a handful elsewhere in Iraq, but only since the 2003
invasion). Thus, the CCCI has a distinct Islamic flavor to the extent
that it is an appendage of these discriminatory notions and an active
agent in their perpetuation. Because of their Moslem heritage and
the pervasive Moslem influence in Iraq, even if judges did not
consciously permit Islamic law to influence their decisions, it is likely
that when these judges exercise discretion-as judges on the CCCI
must do at some point-they will inevitably turn to their religious
328
doctrine for guidance.
Islamic law inherently makes non-Moslems second-class citizens
by, among other things, prohibiting them from testifying against
Moslem criminals.3 29 Indeed, pursuant to Islamic law, before the

326.

LIPPMAN ET AL., supra note 84, at 123-24:

Dhimmis, of course, also receive unequal treatment, since they are not of the
umma. While enjoying freedom of religious belief and practice, in several
countries they are subject to a head-tax [hopefully while their head is still
attached] (Jizya) they often are disqualified from judicial and political office;
they are not permitted to testify against Muslims; they customarily must yield
the way to Muslims and may not bear arms; traditionally they are required to
wear distinctive clothing; and their houses must not be built higher than those
of Muslims and must be marked with identifiable symbols. They also have
limited legal rights in relation to Muslims; for instance, they cannot serve as a
guardian of a Muslim child or marry a Muslim woman.
Id. Of course, in some Middle Eastern countries merely being a Christian is a crime.
See Ali A1-Ahmed, Hypocrisy Most Holy, WALL ST. J., May 20, 2005, at A14.
The Bible in Saudi Arabia may get a person killed, arrested, or deported. In
*September 1993, Sadeq Mallallah, 23, was beheaded in Qateef on a charge of
apostasy for owning a Bible. The State Department's annual human rights
reports detail the arrest and deportation of many Christian worshipers every
year.
Some elements of Iraqi society are similarly intolerant. Are these the people America
should be entrusting with the responsibility of punishing insurgents, some of whom
attack American forces because they see them as Christian Crusaders?
327.
McGovern, supra note 280, at 38 ("As to whether women can be judges, we
received a variety of responses. A majority said that women could become judges under
Iraqi law. Another groups said that women were completely barred from serving as
judges because of Muslim law and culture."). Of course, there are probably some
Moslem scholars who would argue that women can serve as judges. But they must be
an extreme minority, and regardless, their views do not yet have much influence in
Iraq. Although there are some female attorneys and judges, women are generally
treated as second-class citizens in Iraq. See, e.g., Fassihi, supra note 307, at A8 (noting
that Judge Zakia Haaki, an ethnic Kurd, is Iraq's first female judge").
328.
See POSNER, supra note 91, at 197 ("But a judge's philosophical or religious
or economic or political views are bound to shape his response to specific cases in the
open area where the judicial decision-making is discretionary.").
329.
June Starr, Islam and the Struggle Over State Law in Turkey, in LAW AND
ISLAM IN THE MIDDLE EAST 78 (Daisy Hilse Dwyer ed., 1990) ('The admissibility of
Christian testimony against Muslims represented another breakthrough .... "); Ann
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1800s, the testimony of Christians and Jews was prohibited in
330
Ottoman courts, including those operating in present-day Iraq.
(There was similar discrimination against female witnesses, who
share this Islam-induced disability, regardless of their religious
views. 331) Pursuant to this view, it is a common practice of CCCI
judges to inquire into the religious beliefs of witnesses and
complainants 332 thereby facilitating discrimination by judges who are

Elizabeth Mayer, Reinstating Islamic Criminal Law in Libya, in LAW AND ISLAM IN
THE MIDDLE EAST 106 (under Islamic law, male "witnesses may testify only if they are
Muslims"); LIPPMAN ET AL., supra note 84, at 60 ("Non-Muslims may testify against

other non-Muslims, but they cannot testify against a Muslim."); Id. at 89 (the primary
requisite for a witness is that he should be a Muslim male of good character). This
makes sense in the Moslem world view, as Christians (and especially U.S. Christians,
not to mention Jews) are distrusted and seen as the cause of the world's evils, including
natural disasters like Tsunamis, which are punishments from Allah:
[T]he Egyptian nationalist weekly Al Usbu published a piece speculating that
Indian-Israeli-American nuclear testing caused the tsunami. These countries
had acted "together to test a way to liquidate humanity." (Perhaps the
newspaper thought they intended to "liquefy" humanity but the nuance was
lost in translation.) A Friday sermon aired on Palestinian Authority TV dwelt
on Thai corruption in the form of "tourist paradise" beaches where "Zionist and
American investments" triggered divine wrath. An advisor to the Saudi
minister of justice claimed on Saudi TV that the people who suffered did so for
lying, sinning and being infidels. Another Saudi cleric felt the tsunami's timing
was significant: "It happened at Christmas when fornicators from around the
world come to commit fornication and sexual perversion. That's when this
tragedy took place striking them all."
Melik Kaylan, They're Paranoid,We're Blas , WALL ST. J., Jan. 28, 2005, at A8.
330.
Daisy Hilse Dwyer, Introduction, in LAW AND ISLAM IN THE MIDDLE EAST
3. This is akin to some southern states in the United States, which prohibited black
men and women from testifying against white defendants, since they were viewed as
second-class citizens and inferior to whites.
331.
Fortunately, the U.S. prosecutors in the CCCI never had to rely on the
testimony of women, which also is excluded under Islamic law, though ostensibly
permissible under Iraqi law. Mayer, supra note 328 ("The testimony of women is
absolutely excluded."); LIPPMAN ET AL., supra note 84, at 61 ("Women have an inferior
status. They are prohibited from serving as witnesses, although in certain cases two
female witnesses may substitute for a man.").
Witnesses must be male Muslims, although certain jurists, in isolated
instances (for example, involving property or employment), permit the
testimony of two female witnesses to substitute for that of a single male
witness. Women are disqualified in the generality of cases because they are
viewed as having "weakness of understanding want of memory and incapacity
of governing".
Id. at 69.
332.
This is done ostensibly to determine which oath to administer to the
individual. The practice, however, may have a more malevolent design and certainly
facilitates discrimination against non-Moslems, a practice which Islamic law
countenances in numerous ways. See e.g., Amir Taheri, Exhibition Killing, WALL ST.
J., Sept. 30, 2004:
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inclined to discount the testimony of non-Moslems. Of course, the
vast majority of witnesses in CCCI terrorism cases are U.S. soldiers,
and most of these are at least nominally Christian and generally are
not followers of Mohammed. 333 True, the court is not so saturated
with Islam that it manifestly prohibits the testimony of U.S.
Christians, perhaps because the judges know that such a policy would
absolutely preclude the United States from utilizing the court to try
terrorism cases. But if the judges are sufficiently imbued with the
notion that Christians cannot give credible testimony against
Moslems, or that Christian testimony is entitled to less weight when
it inculpates a Moslem defendant, there is no chance of U.S. victims
obtaining justice in such a court. Since it is obvious that the CCCI
judges regularly discount the testimony of U.S. soldiers, it is at least
possible-some would say probable-that this practice is attributable
to Islamic influences and the pervasive Islamic culture of the
CCCI. 3 3 4

The Islamic influence extends beyond these procedural and
evidentiary biases.
A number of the CCCI judges' substantive
decisions also could be interpreted as acts of jihad against non-

In the Arabia of the seventh century, where Islam was born, seizing hostages
was practiced by rival tribes, and 'exhibition killing' was a weapon of
psychological war. The Prophet codified these practices, ending freelance
kidnappings and head chopping. One principle of the new code was that
Muslims could not be held hostage by Muslims.
Nor could Muslims be
subjected to 'exhibition killing.' Such methods were to be used solely against
non-Muslims, and then only in the context of armed conflict.
Seized in combat, a non-Muslim would be treated as a war prisoner, and
could win freedom by converting to Islam. He could also be ransomed or
exchanged against a Muslim prisoner of war. Non-Muslim women and children
captured in war would become the property of their Muslim captors. Female
captives could be taken as concubines that is, raped or given as gifts to
Muslims.
Id. (emphasis added). Notice that under this system Moslems enjoy more rights and
privileges than non-Moslems.
333.
Like most generalizations, there are a few exceptions. James Barron &
Kirk Semple, Soldiers, Friends from Queens, Die on a "Routine" Patrol in Iraq, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 5, 2004, at B1 (noting that one of the fallen soldiers was Moslem and the
other was a Buddhist). The vast majority of the approximately 1.5 million members of
the U.S. Armed Forces identify themselves as belonging to a Christian denomination of
some sort. But 4,371 identify themselves as Buddhist; there are 4,332 atheists; 3,990
are Jewish; 3,729 are Moslem; and 1,803 claim to be Wiccan. Alan Cooperman,
Military Wrestles with Disharmony Among Chaplains, WASH. POST, Aug. 30, 2005, at
Al, A4.
334.
Chibli Mallat, From Islamic to Middle Eastern Law A Restatement of the
Field, 51 AM. J. COMP. L. 699, 700 (2003) (The "common law of the Middle East, in so
far as it can be discerned, is Islamic. If there is one shared, dominant, and distinctive
historical background to Middle Eastern legal systems, it would vest in the special
historical role taken by Islam in the development of the law. Islamic law-the
shari'a--constitutes the prevailing common historical legal tradition in the region.").
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Moslem victims, or acts of religious loyalty to Islamic insurgents
whom some of the judges perceive as Islamic brothers waging a
33 5
religious struggling against the "Great Satan," the United States.
Accordingly, there is a religious basis for these jurists to act leniently
with their comrade-defendants. 336
Some judges have gone even
further, by acting in accordance with the sentiments of Islamic
clerics, 337 particularly Sunni clerics, who have glorified the
338
insurgency; still others have called for the murder of Americans,
339
and have commanded lenient treatment for captured terrorists.
Indeed, in most Sunni mosques-when they are not serving as
arsenals for the terrorists 34 0-"the insurgency is celebrated as an act

335.
Of course, religious discrimination, along with discriminating on the basis
of race or ethnicity (but not sex) is contrary to the CPA Order establishing the CCCI.
See COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY ORDER No. 13 (Revised), The Central Criminal
Court of Iraq § 6(2) (Apr. 2004), available at http://www.iraqcoalition.org/regulations/
(last visited Nov. 8, 2004).
336.
LIPPMAN ET AL., supra note 84, at 61 ('Aicha, the wife of the Prophet,
reportedly admonished Muslims 'to avoid condemning the Muslim to Hudud whenever
you can, and when you can find a way out for the Muslim then release him for it."').
337.
See Anderson, supra note 267, at 78 ("In Baghdad, I had attended a Friday
prayer session at a mosque led by Imam Abdul Salaam Daud al-Qubeisi, a prominent
Sunni cleric. He sermonized against the American 'occupiers' while lauding 'heroic
resistance fighters' in Falluja and Ramadi.").
338.
Borzou Daragahi, Rising Call by Clerics for Jihad, S.F. CHRONICLE, Sept.
22, 2005, at Al (discussing the Moslem clerics calling for violence against Americans).
339.
See Borzouu Daragahi, Sunni Clerics Back Insurgents' Efforts, WASH.
TIMES, Sept. 28, 2004, at 15 ("on the streets, the clerical calls for holy war are reaching
the mainstream, seeping into a popular culture liberated by the same occupation
they're opposing."); Ian Fisher & Somini Sengupta, Iraq to Offer Amnesty, But No
Killers Need Apply, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 4, 2004, at 1 (As soon as the idea of offering
amnesty to insurgents "was announced, leaders from Shiite and Sunni quarters
soundly declared their opposition. They insist that those who resist the American
occupation are patriots and have no need for official pardon.").
340.
al-Taiee & MacDonald, supra note 196, at 7 (noting that a suicide bomber
retrieved his explosive vest from a Sunni mosque in Jalawla); Mariam Fam, Iraqi
Terrorists Rallies Troops as U.S. Soldiers Raid Mosul, CHIC. SUN-TIMES, Jan. 21, 2005,
at 32 (discussing a January 2005 raid on a mosque in Mosul found to contain a cache of
weapons); Tini Tran, Sunnis in Iraq Request Delay in January Vote, CHIC. SUN-TIMEs,
Nov. 26, 2004, at 36 (discussing the largest weapons cache found in Fallujah "was
discovered Wednesday in the Saad Bin Abi Wagas Mosque"); Dexter Filkins & James
Glanz, In City's Ruins, Military Faces New Mission: Building Trust, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
16, 2005, at A12 (describing a battle around a mosque which "the insurgents have
surrounded with ramparts and firing positions, and where they have placed weapons
caches"); Edward Harris, Rebels Try to Break Out of Fallujah, CHIC. SUN-TIMES, Nov.
12, 2004, at 6 (Major General Richard Natonski, commander of the 1st Marine
Division, said that his troops had found arms caches in "almost every single mosque in
Fallujah."); Edward Harris, Military Tightens Grip on City As Insurgents Launch
Strikes in Mosul, GRAND RAPIDS PRESS, Nov. 12, 2004, at A3 ("In Baghdad today, Iraqi
security forces, backed by U.S. troops, arrested a hardline Sunni cleric and about two
dozen others after a raid of his Baghdad mosque uncovered weapons caches along with
photographs of recent attacks on American troops ....
"). This use of mosques as
arsenals, storage depots, and command centers invites the Coalition to attack them, as
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of resistance against a faithless and deceitful American occupier. '3 4 1
Of course, this is consistent with the shrill exhortations of some
Moslem clerics who espouse the killing of all non-Moslems. 3 4 2 They
apparently base their cries for death on the Koran's exhortation:
"When you encounter those [infidels] who deny [the truth of Islam],
then strike their necks. '3 43 Take for example, one Iraqi scholar who
proclaims: "If you read the Koran, you see that Allah gave us the
right to terrorize the enemy. '3 44 With this attitude pervading the

they are serving a military purpose. The use of religious buildings for military
purposes violates both international law and, arguably, Islamic law.
[A] fight must be carried out in certain recognized places or war should not be
conducted where it is prohibited. This very important and significant principle
is stated by the words, 'but fight them not at the Inviolable Place of Worship
unless they attack you in it.' A broader and proper modern interpretation of
this principle is that one should not attack civilians, civilian installations,
hospitals, agricultural fields, schools, churches, mosques or any other places
which are not traditionally and conventionally recognized as places of war. All
civilian needs must be recognized as inviolable and places of worship must be
provided for by both conflicting parties. Attacks should only be carried out
against military installations and military activities.
FARHAD MALEKIAN, THE CONCEPT OF ISLAMIC INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW: A
COMPARATIVE STUDY 60 (1994).
341.
Anthony Shadid, In Iraq: One Religion, Two Realities, WASH. POST, Dec.
20, 2004, at 1. Even Shiite clerics, though they gained much from the liberation,
including the opportunity to ensure a Shia-dominated government, sometimes rail
against Americans. Id. And a substantial minority of Moslems throughout the world
approve of the terrorists attacks on U.S. troops in Iraq. Robin Wright, Support ForBin
Laden Down Among Muslims, WASH. POST, July 15, 2005 ("Roughly half of Muslims in
Lebanon, Jordan and Morocco said that" attacks on United States personnel in Iraq
"are justifiable.").
342.
See Steve Coll & Susan B. Glasser, In London, Islamic Radicals Found A
Haven, WASH. POST, July 10, 2005 (discussing Abu Hamz Masri, a Moslem cleric
indicted for "incitement to murder for speeches that allegedly promoted mass violence
against non-Muslims. In one speech cited in a British documentary film, Masri urged
followers to get an infidel 'and crush his head in your arms, so you can wring his
throat. Forget wasting a bullet, cut them in half!"').
343.
Koran, sura 47, verse 4. Apparently this doctrine provided the late al
Qaeda leader Abu Musab Zarqawi a religious justification for his terrorism:
Iraq's al Qaeda leader Abu Musab Zarqawi said militants were justified under
Islam in killing civilians as long as they are infidels, according to a new
audiotape attributed to him yesterday. "Islam does not differentiate between
civilians and military, but rather distinguishes between Muslims and infidels,"
said the man on the tape posted on the Internet, who sounded like Zarqawi.
'cMuslim blood must be spared . . . but it is permissible to spill infidel blood,"
said the speaker.
Reuters, Zarqawi JustifiesKilling of Civilians, WASH. TIMES, Oct. 8, 2005, at Al.
344.
James Brandon & John Thorne, The Sidewalks Where Terror Breeds,
CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, July 22, 2005 (quoting an unnamed Iraqi living in
England). These sentiments are preached on the sidewalks of London; they give a
glimpse at what is standard fare on Iraqi sidewalks and mosques. See also Ion, supra
note 91, at 207 ("According to the Islamic doctrine, as the 'faithful' carry on war in all
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Iraqi bench, bar, and mosque, it is not surprising that mosques have
become arsenals and recruiting grounds for terrorists. 34 5 One Sunni
Cleric, Sheik Harith Al-Dari-leader of the Muslim Scholars
Association which claims the support of three thousand Iraqi
mosques-is a regular exponent of anti-U.S. and pro-insurgency
propaganda. 346 Notably, Dari has substantial influence in Sunni
Iraqi legal circles, and previously taught Islamic law at the
University of Baghdad Law School, where many of the CCCI judges
obtained their law degrees. 347 Judges infected with the viewpoints
spouted by radical law professors like Dari undoubtedly will act upon
them-if only incrementally-to the detriment of U.S. victims of the
insurgency.348
There is also some evidence indicating that the CCCI's proterrorist decisions are not motivated solely by an Islamic antiChristian animus. 34 9 These decisions may have more to do with their
loyalty to fellow Sunnis or Shiites, respectively, rather than just
loyalty to Moslems generally. For example, a Shia CCCI judge
recently blamed the court's lenient treatment of insurgents on his
Sunni colleagues. In his words: 'Mvany of the judges are Sunnis from
the old Saddam regime and, even though the insurgents are trying to

parts of the world, for the sole object of propagating the Mussulman faith, they believe
that it is the duty of all people either to embrace the religion of Mohammed or to
submit to the dominion of the Mohammedans, and that until the 'infidels' accept either
of these alternatives they are to be considered enemies." ).
Monte Morin, In Iraq, To Be a Hairstylistis to Risk Death, L.A. TIMES, Feb.
345.
22, 2005, at 1 ("But as the insurgency continues, religious fundamentalism has become
entwined with opposition to the U.S. presence. Mosques have become gathering places,
weapons-storage depots and recruiting grounds for guerrillas."); Bruce Finley,
Dispatches from Iraq, DENVER POST, May 15, 2005, at A29 ("Around June 203, Sunni
Iraqis who run the Al-Farouk mosque began recruiting jobless young men to attack
Americans"); Forces Hit Ramadi Mosques, GRAND RAPIDS PRESS, Oct. 12, 2004, at A2
( The seven mosques in Ramadi are suspected of harboring terrorists, storing weapons
caches, promoting violence and encouraging insurgent recruitment, the U.S. command
said.").
346.
Robert F. Worth, Sunni Leader Vows Support for Insurgents, N.Y. TIMES,
March 29, 2005, at 1.
Id.
347.
348.
CARDOZO, supra note 18, at 17-18:
The state in commissioning its judges has commanded them to judge, but
neither in constitution nor in statute has it formulated a code to define the
manner of their judging. The pressure of society invests new forms of conduct
in the minds of the multitude with the sanction of moral obligation, and the
same pressure working upon the mind of the judge invests them finally
through his action with the sanction of law.
349.
Freeman, supra note 131, at 29 ("Some Shia judges have even complained
privately that their Sunni colleagues are giving out light sentences to Sunni
defendants to show a degree of sympathy with the insurgents.").
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kill them now, they don't like sentencing their Sunni brothers to long
'350
stints in jail.
Regardless of whether Sunnis or Shiites are responsible for this
judicial activism, arguably the Iraqi positive law supports this
religious discrimination in favor of Islamic insurgents. For example,
Iraq's transitional Constitution ordained Islam as the official religion
of Iraq, making Islam the supreme law which all judges must
follow. 351 Absent U.S. advisors who advocated a "secular" state, the
transitional Constitution would have been considerably more-explicit
352
in mandating the use of Islamic law in the government.
Furthermore, Iraq's "permanent" Constitution-its eighth-orders
that "Islam is the official religion of the state and is a basic source of
legislation: (a) No law can be passed that contradicts the undisputed
rules of Islam .... ,,353 This is completely in accordance with Iraqi

350.
Freeman, supra note 131, at 29.
351.
See 2004 Report on Human Rights Practices, supra note 278 ("Islam is the
official religion of the State"); Law of Administration for the State of Iraq for the
Transitional Period, Art. 7(A) (March 8, 2004), http://www.cpa-iraq.org/government/
TAL.html (last visited July 1, 2004) ("Islam is the official religion of the State and is to
be considered a source of legislation. No law that contradicts the universally agreed
tenets of Islam . . . may be enacted during the transitional period."). This language
apparently was acceptable to Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani, who seems to have had veto
power over legislation. See David Ignatius, Turning a Political Corner, WASH. POST,
Feb. 17, 2005, at A25 ("The transitional law approved a year ago by Sistani provides
that Islam will be Iraq's state religion and a source for legislation ....
"). This
language is similar to that of Sudan's 1973 Constitution which provided that "Islamic
law and custom shall be the main source of legislation." See LIPPMAN ET AL., supra
note 84, at 105. Of course, Sudan's government, and its genocide, is hardly a suitable
model for ostensibly civilized countries to emulate.
Despite concerted efforts to make Iraqi law consistent with Islamic law, Osama bin
Laden has called the transitional Iraqi law "man-made, pagan,' not based on Islamic
sharia law and therefore 'one of the infidels."' Walter Pincus, Iraqis Urged to Boycott
Jan 30 National Elections, WASH. POST, Dec. 28, 2004, at A16 (quoting Osama bin
Laden). This just demonstrates how ultra-extreme bin Laden is, as opposed to the
normal extremism that flourishes in the Middle East.
352.
One Draft of Iraq's Constitution Makes Islam Main Source of Legislation,
USA TODAY, July 27, 2005, at 6.
During the U.S.-run occupation, which ended June 28, 2004, key Shiite and
some Sunni politicians sought to have Islam designated as the main source of
legislation in the interim Constitution, which went into effect in March 2004.
However, U.S. Administrator Paul Bremer blocked the move. He said that
Islam would be considered 'a source'-but not the only one.
Edward Wong, Leading Shiite Clerics Pushing Islamic Constitution in Iraq, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 6, 2005, at Al ("The Americans also persuaded the authors to designate
Islam as just 'a source' of legislation. That irked senior Shiite clerics here, who,
confident they now have a popular mandate from the elections, are advocating Islam to
be acknowledged as the underpinning of the government.").
353.
CONSTITUTION OF IRAQ, Art. 2 (2005); see Iraq's Constitution: Democracy or
Division, WALL ST. J., Oct. 15, 2005; One Draft of Iraq's Constitution Makes Islam Main
Source of Legislation, USA TODAY, July 27, 2005, at 6 ("Framers of Iraq's new
constitution are considering designating Islam as the main source of legislation in the
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Iraq's 1958 provisional Constitution and its 1964
tradition:
"permanent" Constitution plainly stated that Islam is the basis of all
law and is the state religion. 354 In full accordance with this outlook,
numerous Iraqi politicians have struggled to have Islam again
recognized as Iraq's official state religion, 355 along with the legal and
policy ramifications that this entails. 356 "Moderates and radicals
alike see the un-Islamic nature of their societies, as epitomized by
Western-inspired legal codes, and clamor for implementation of
Islamic law." 357 Through Iraq's Constitution the "foundations for a
future theocratic state are being rolled into place." 358 According to
one U.S. official, Iraq is becoming "some form of an Islamic
3 59
republic."
Many Middle Eastern states have already enacted Constitutions
that give Islam preeminence in government affairs. For example,
Egypt's Constitution contains an Islam primacy provision similar to
the one found in Iraq's interim Constitution. It states: "Islam is the
religion of the state . . . and the principal source of legislation is
This provision has been
Islamic jurisprudence (Shari'a). '360
interpreted to mean at least that judges and government officials
adhere to Islamic law, 361 presumably including provisions that
preclude the testimony of non-Moslems in criminal cases involving

country ....");Wong, supra note 351; see also Edward Wong, Iraqi Constitution Draft
Includes Curbs to Women's Rights, N.Y. TIMES, July 20, 2005, at Al ("A working draft
); Ellen
...
of Iraq's new constitution would cede a strong role to Islamic law.
Knickmeyer & Omar Fekeiki, Iraqi Charter To Give Religion A Big Role, WASH. POST,
July 28, 2005, at A18 ("Iraq's constitution will enshrine 'a significant role for religion in
the state,' the Shiite Muslim Arab who is leading the drafting of the charter said
Wednesday, in one of the strongest statements yet that the new Iraq will follow the
religious will of its Muslim majority."); Alissa J. Rubin, U.S. Voices Concern On
Direction of Iraq Charter, L.A. TIMES, July 27, 2005, at Al (A draft of Iraq's
Constitution states that "Islam is the official religion of the state. It is the basic source
for legislation. It is forbidden to pass a law that contradicts its fixed rulings."). The
draft Constitution "proposes an explicitly Islamic state." Id. It simply makes explicit
the reality that already exists in Iraq, or at least in the Iraqi courts.
354.
SMITH ETAL., supra note 171, at 177, 179.
355.
Harold Meyerson, Fighting for Islamic Law, WASH. POST, Feb. 9, 2005, at
A23 ("some Shiite clerics can't stop talking about codifying Koranic law in the new
constitution").
356.
Dan Murphy, View Emerging of Shiite-Ruled Iraq, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE
MONITOR, Feb. 7, 2005, at 1 ('We shouldn't have anything that conflicts with Islam.
Islam is the religion of the majority, so it should be the official religion of the state."')
(quoting Ibrahim Jaafari, head of the Iraqi Dawa Party).
ESPOSITO, supra note 91, at 202.
357.
358.
Borchgrave, Iran, supra note 237.
359.
Robin Wright & Ellen Knickmeyer, U.S. Lowers Sights on What Can Be
Achieved In Iraq, WASH. POST, Aug. 14, 2005, at Al (quoting an unnamed U.S. official).
360.
EGYPT CONST. Art. 2, quoted in Ibrahim Saleh, The Writing of the 1971
Egyptian Constitution, in CONSTITUTION MAKERS ON CONSTITUTION MAKING 288, 325
(Robert A. Goldwin & Art Kaufman eds., 1988).
361.
Saleh, supra note 357, at 327.
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Moslem defendants. At least according to some Moslem scholars,
Islamic law requires this discrimination against non-Moslem
accusers,3 62 although it is claimed that Mohammed did not teach
discrimination against "people of the book" (i.e., Christians and Jews).
The problems this discriminatory approach would engender are
manifold and obvious. Despite rhetoric about equality for all, such
discriminatory treatment of non-Moslem defendants makes Moslems
"more equal," to paraphrase George Orwell, than those who do not
share this faith.3 63 Exemption from the strictures of the criminal law
for members of one religious group at the expense of those who
adhere to some other creed is not justice, at least not as the term is
understood in the modern Judeo-Christian world.3 64 But this seems
to be the approach taken by CCCI judges, and Islam seems to be the
3 65
impetus behind their discriminatory decisions.
Even if there were no explicit statement of the influence Islam
has over the Iraqi judiciary, Islamic law "remains central to Islamic
identity and is an ideal to which Moslem societies aspire; '36 6 this
includes Iraqi society. In these Moslem societies a "governmental or
judicial decision must be consistent with the Shari'a,otherwise it is a

362.
MUHAMMAD ASAD, THE PRINCIPLES OF STATE AND GOVERNMENT IN ISLAM
31 (1980) (internal quotations and citation omitted).
363.
GEORGE ORWELL, ANIMAL FARM (1946).
364.
This favoritism is similar to that which existed in the German courts under
the Nazis:
If a party member commenced a proceeding or was a complainant against a
non-party member, the party member usually prevailed. Conversely, if a nonparty member commenced a proceeding or lodged a complaint against a party
member, the party member usually prevailed, regardless of the merits of the
controversy.... Equality before the law was a forgotten concept in Germany
under Nazi government. The group to which a person belonged determined his
status before law and public authority.
NOBLEMAN, supra note 74, at 69.
365.
Even when the practice of discriminating against Christians and Jews is
not explicitly mandated by law, the greater the "Islamicization" of a country, especially
the law, the greater the degree of discrimination against adherents of other religions.
Consider, for example, Iran and Afghanistan, and now Iraq. ESPOSITO, supra note 91,
at 209:
The revivalist mood and orientation of resurgent Islam has also affected the
status and rights of non-Muslims. In recent years, tensions and clashes
between Muslims and non-Muslim communities have increased: the Copts in
Egypt, Bahai in Iran, Chinese in Malaysia, and Christians in the Sudan,
Pakistan, and Nigeria.
The creation of more Islamic-oriented societies,
especially the introduction of Islamic laws, has resulted in vary degrees of
tension, conflict, violence, and killing in the name of religion.
This correlation between Islamic law and violence against non-Moslems raises the
question why U.S. officials elected to adjudicate insurgency cases in a court like the
CCCI, where the judges are infected with this discriminatory legal mindset.
366.
LIPPMAN ET AL., supra note 84, at 3.
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nullity. '367 "The Islamic legal system is rooted in divinity; its sources
are divine and thus cannot be altered. Moslems seek to conform to
the dictates of their legal system in an effort to fulfill their religious
duties. '3 68 In this spirit, some Iraqi judges openly invoke sharia in
the courts, while others do so surreptitiously. 369 Both approaches
have the same effect, and it is likely that those judges who implement
sharia on the sly will become emboldened and eventually make the
basis of their rulings explicit, encouraging other jurists to follow suit.
Christianity and Islam have more similarities than either
Christians or Moslems are likely to admit, but there are also key
differences. Unlike Christianity or even Judaism, 370 Islam does not
lend itself to a separation of mosque and state. 37 1 Indeed, the concept
372
of separating church and state is completely foreign to Islam.
Islam started out as a political force and central to its foundation is a

367.
Id. at 60. The "permanent" Iraqi Constitution is thus projected to include
an explicit statement of this view. Wong, supra note 351 ("The clerics generally agree
that the constitution must ensure that no laws passed by the state contradict a basic
understanding of Sharia as laid out in the Koran.").
368.
Umar F. Moghul, Approximating Certainty in Ratiocination,4 J. ISLAMIC L.
125, 130 (1999).
369.
Wong, supra note 351 ("Conservative judges are invoking Sharia in some
courts.").
Spector, supra note 85, at 317 ('There is no army of police to compel
370.
obedience to a Jewish Law or 'Judge's' decision and no person to incarcerate the
insolent for Contempt of Court. But Jewish Law, Civil as well as Ecclesiastical enjoys
the homage of the bulk of the Jewish race.").
371.
"'Islamic law is so broad, and Shiite Islamic law has so many branches.
There is an answer from Islam for everything in society."' Wong, supra note 351
One criticism of Islamic law, however, is its
(quoting Sheik Ali Smesim).
imperviousness to change. Much of sharia seems stuck in the milieu of its origin,
unable to apply its core principles to changes in technology and international relations.
See ESPOSITO, supra note 91, at 84 ("Jurists were no longer to seek new solutions or
produce new regulations and law books but instead study the established legal
manuals and write their commentaries. Islamic law, the product of an essentially
dynamic and creative process, now tended to become fixed and institutionalized.").
Thus, the common law system stands in stark contrast to sharia. ROSCOE POUND, THE
SPIRIT OF THE COMMON LAW 182 (1921):

The chief cause of the success of our common-law doctrine of precedents as a
form of law is that it combines certainty and power of growth as no other
doctrine has been able to do. . . . Growth is insured in that the limits of the
principle are not fixed authoritatively once for all but are discovered gradually
by a process of inclusion and exclusion as cases arise which bring out its
practical workings and prove how far it may be made to do justice in its actual
operation.
SMITH ET AL., supra note 171, at 150 ("In the history of Islam there has
372.
never been a separation of church and state."); M.H.A. Reisman, Comment, Some
Reflections on Human Rights and Clerical Claim to PoliticalPower, 19 YALE J. INT'L L.
509, 511 (1994) (Islam "recognized no divisions among the spiritual, social, economic,
and political sectors of life. . . . Islam thus cannot leave outside its domain the affairs
of the state and the exercise of official power."); Hamilton, supra note 309, at 311
(noting that in Islam, the "state and church were never separated").
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belief that political power, including the judiciary, 373 should be used
to promote Islam and eradicate conflicting belief systems, including
individuals who hold these "errant" beliefs:
In contrast to Christianity, which in its earliest form was
nongovernmental and which, by and large, has returned to a
nonpolitical, nonstate form, Islam was in its origins and constantly
strains to become again a church militant and powerful. Muhammad
was a social critic who attained political power and used the military
power and the apparatus of government to promote religion. The link
between Islam and temporal rule is emphasized by the dating of the
Islamic calendar from the Hijra, the initial step in the founding of an
Islamic community, rather than from the date of Muhammad's birth or
374
revelation.

Islam "simply does not have the separation of the political and the
religious sphere, which Christianity had had from the beginning. The
Quran is a total religious law, which regulates the whole of political
375
and social life and insists that the whole order of life be Islamic."
Furthermore, "Mohammedans consider the Koran the principal
source of their jurisprudence; '3 76 thus, judges steeped in Islam and
the Koran are essential to "sound" judicial decision-making according
to the ideals of Moslem jurisprudential system. Under Islam, the
connection between religion and state "is indeed so intimate that it
has been hitherto deemed necessary that in order to master the
principles of Jurisprudence one must possess a considerable
' 37 7
acquaintance with the doctrines of Mohammedan theology.
Attempts to separate Islam from the government, particularly
378
the judiciary, have met with strong resistance in the Islamic world.

373.

Mohammedan jurisprudence is purely the outcome of theocracy, or at
least, it is supposed to be so. It is God, according to the Mussulman
belief, that gave them their laws, through Mohammed the "Prophet;'
consequently, it was to the 'Holy Book,' i.e., the Koran, that the faithful
had to look for guidance and inspiration in all their affairs, be they
temporal or spiritual.

Ion, supra note 91, at 45.
In the countries professing the faith of Mohammed, theology and jurisprudence
were firmly linked together. The Arabs, who were the first converts to that
religion, accepted the "divine messages," not only as a new faith, prescribing
their duties to God, but also a law enjoining upon them adherence to certain
rules in their relations to man.
Id. at 44.
374.
LIPPMAN ET AL., supra note 84, at 118.
375.
Cardinal Joseph Ratzinger, quoted in John L. Allen, Jr., Pope Benedict on
Islam, NAT'L CATH. REP., Aug. 12, 2005, at 20. Cardinal Ratzinger is now Pope
Benedict XVI.
376.
Ion, supra note 91, at 45.
377.
Rahim, supranote 85, at 101.
378.
F.R.A. Williams, The Making of the Nigerian Constitution, in
CONSTITUTION MAKERS ON CONSTITUTION MAKING 397, 412 (Robert A. Goldwin & Art
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Most Moslems consider the concept of separation of religion and
state-particularly the laws of the state-an absurdity:

379

Law, as is well-known, has never been separated in the Mohammedan
system from the domain of religion, and in theory at all events no line
of demarcation can be drawn between civil law and canon law. Both are
of the same divine origin. The notion of legal rights and legal wrongs
are generally speaking dominated by considerations of spiritual merit
380
or demerit.

"It is laid down that a magistrate should seek his law first in the text
of the Qur'an and then in the precepts and usages of the Prophet
himself, and if both of these sources fail him, he must rely upon his
38
judgment." '
Some Iraqi judges who ascribe to this understanding of Islam
and Islamic law consider it an outrage that an infidel nation like the
United States is exercising governmental power in Iraq. Mere U.S.
presence in Iraq is absolutely contrary to such extremists' version of
Islam. The "followers of Mohammed divide the human race into that
of the 'faithful' on one side and that of the 'infidels' on the other
side;" 38 2 and infidels are not permitted to exercise power over the
Jihad against infidel-U.S. usurpers is the only
faithful. 38 3
permissible response to this foreign domination of Iraq. 38 4 In the
words of an Egyptian attorney and Islamic legal expert who traveled
to Iraq to fight against the U.S. military forces: "Islamic teachings
''38 5
say that if Moslem lands are occupied, you must perform jihad.
That is, you must kill the U.S. occupiers of Iraq, even though they

Kaufman, eds., 1988) ("The close connection between religion and law among Moslems
posed very serious and delicate problems for those on the Constitution Drafting
Committee .... " Non-Moslems "saw no need to set up a federal court to administer
Islamic law.").
379.
And their idea of a religious state is frightening: According to one Moslem
convert in England: The idea of the Islamic state is terror against anyone who doesn't
support Islamic ideology." Brandon & Thorne, supra note 343.
Rahim, supra note 85, at 101. Thus, for example, if a judge believed that
380.
an Islamic terrorist was committing a spiritually meritorious act by killing U.S.
infidels, he would be obliged by his religion not to punish the terrorist. Recall that
many imams have announced that attacking U.S. soldiers in Iraq is not only
permissible under Islam, but is required.
381.
Id. at 190.
382.
Ion, supra note 91, at 206.
383.
According to some Moslems, Jews and Christians are not "infidels" per se,
insofar as they believe in one God (although the Christian doctrine of the trinity is a
sticking point for some Moslems), and consider only atheists, Buddhists, Hindus, and
others to be infidels. But still other Moslems consider Christians to be infidels, in part
because of the doctrine of the trinity.
384.
It is worth noting that "[a]nti-Americanism is deeper and broader than at
any time in modern history," and it "is most acute in the Muslim world," a fact
confirmed by the Moslem clerics in Iraq. Lionel Barber, America's Soft Power Needs
Hard Work, LONDON FINANCIAL TIMES, July 22, 2005.
385.
Daniel Williams, Cairo Woman Attacked by Mob Says Fight Isn't Finished,
WASH. POST, May 27, 2005, at A17 (quoting Rabaa Fahmy).
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freed you from slavery at the hands of a putative Moslem dictator,
Saddam Hussein. Apparently it is better to be enslaved by a fellow
Moslem than to be gradually set free by infidels.
In accordance with these views, Islamic law arguably compels
the CCCI judges to do their best to assist the jihadist-insurgents in
their struggle against the non-Moslem, U.S. occupiers of Iraq,386 so
that a fully-Islamic government (or more likely, Islamic anarchy) can
be created. 387 Some judges see Islam as requiring them to participate
in minor acts of resistance, perhaps by punishing terrorists leniently
or not at all; under this view, such acts of leniency demonstrate their
own morality and loyalty to Islam. 38 8 When many Moslems consider
it their religious duty to murder any Moslem who converts to

386.
Shadid, supra note 340, at 1 ("In Sunni mosques such as Um al-Qura, there
is no hesitation about the insurgency that rages in Baghdad and Sunni areas to the
north and west. The insurgents are fighting for God, and the occupiers are infidels.");
Daragahi, supra note 337, at 15 ("among the Sunni 'ulema'-the clerical leaders who
guide the Sunni masses-the calls are increasingly strident for armed opposition to the
United States, no matter the cost.").
Sadly, intolerance and the preaching of hatred of non-Moslems is not isolated to
Iraq or even the Middle East. In Germany, England, and France, Moslems are taught
to hate non-Moslems and support jihad against Western civilization. See Don Van
Natta, Jr. & Lowell Bergman, Militant Imams Under Scrutiny Across Europe, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 25, 2005, at A9 (noting that Sheik Omar Bakri Muhammad of London
broadcasts nightly sermons on the internet calling for "young Muslim men all over the
world to support the Iraq insurgency on the front line of 'the global jihad"'); David
Crawford, West's Relations With Saudis Face Growing Strains, WALL ST. J., Dec. 7,
2004, at A12 (At one Islamic school in Bonn, two-thirds of the textbooks "teach
students to hate non-Muslims, while one in five praise martyrdom, urge violence
against non-Muslims or threaten hell for infractions against Muslim ritual.").
Even the United States is not immune: "Mosques across the U.S. continue to carry
books and pamphlets describing non-Moslems as 'infidels' and promoting intolerance
against Western society .... ." David S. Cloud, Some American Mosques Carry
Extremist Tracts, Study Says, WALL ST. J., Jan. 28, 2005, at B5; see Arnaud De
Borchgrave, Message in the Mosques, WASH. TIMES, Feb. 8, 2005, at A14 (noting that
hate-mongering pamphlets were collected from mosques and Islamic centers in Los
Angeles, Oakland, Dallas, Houston, Chicago, New York City, and Washington, D.C.);
Katherine Clad, Group Cites Saudi 'Hate' Tracts, WASH. TIMES, Jan. 29, 2005 (noting
the presence of "hate propaganda" in religious tracts sent to mosques throughout the
United States, telling Moslems to hate Christians and Jews and to kill any Muslim
who converts to another religion," and instructing Muslims living in the United States
to "behave as if on a mission behind enemy lines,"). So it is not difficult to surmise that
a number of Iraqi judges-who live in a culture that is much more pervasively Islamic
than the United States-subscribe to these hate-infested views.
387.
According to one Moslem cleric, Moslems should even strive to conquer "the
land of the infidels." See Dorothy Rabinowitz, The Other War, WALL ST. J., Aug. 11,
2005, at A12 ("We conquer the land of the infidels, and we spread Islam by calling the
infidels to Allah."') (quoting Sheikh Omar Abdul Rahman).
388.
Cf. Daisy Hilse Dwyer, Introduction, in LAW AND ISLAM IN THE MIDDLE
EAST 11 (Daisy Hilse Dwyer, ed.) (1990) ("a substantial number of political leaders in
the Middle East testify to their personal allegiance to Islamic law as proof of their
political worth").
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Christianity 389-based on Mohammed's command: "Whoever changes
his Islamic religion, then kill him" 39 0-it is not difficult to imagine
that some of the CCCI's Moslem judges feel a religious duty to aid
their fellow Moslem terrorists in killing U.S. soldiers. Sadly, the idea
that helping insurgents is a religious duty for all Moslems is also in
accordance with other more "moderate" clerics who, although they do
not openly advocate attacks on U.S. civilians, argue that U.S. soldiers
are themselves to blame for terrorist attacks because they are
occupying Iraq. 39 1 Consequently, according to this reasoning, U.S.
soldiers deserve the death and suffering they encounter at the hands
of the terrorists, 392 and the CCCI judges are simply performing their

389.
Beichman, supra note 319, at 15 ("It is considered justifiable homicide to
kill a Muslim convert to Christianity."). Consider the case of Abdul Rahman, a
Christian convert who was tried for apostasy in Afghanistan. See Nina Shea, Sharia
Calling, NAT'L REV. ONLINE, Mar. 24, 2006, available at http://www.nationalreview.
com/comment/shea2006O3240704.asp. Christians had a similar practice with Jews who
proselytized Christians, but that was in the Middle Ages. See SOWELL, supra note 313,
at 245 ("The death penalty was decreed for Jews who proselytized Christians, and Jews
were ordered expelled from government posts where they exercised power over
Christians."). As Justice Black observed: "People with a consuming belief that their
religious convictions must be forced on others rarely ever believe that the unorthodox
have any rights which should or can be rightfully respected." Adamson v. California,
332 U.S. 46, 88 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting). This helps explain why Christians fare
so poorly in the CCCI, a court composed of judges with this "consuming belief."
390.
Julia Duin, Indonesian Women On Trial for Offering Youths Sunday
School, WASH. TIMES, Aug. 29, 2005, at Al (quoting Mohammed); Elizabeth Peiffer,
The Death Penalty in TraditionalIslamic Law and as Interpreted in Saudi Arabia and
Nigeria, 11 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 507, 511 (2005) ("the Sunnah later provided
that an apostate is subject to the death penalty, based on the statement of Muhammad,
'Whoever changed his Islamic religion, kill him."'); see also Shima BaradarannRobison, et al., Religious Monopolies and the Commodification of Religion, 32 PEPP. L.
REV. 885, 908 (2005) ("In many modern-day Islamic countries, such as Iran, and other
areas, such as Nepal and some provinces in India, it is crime to convert from the
dominant faith. In the case of Sudan, Pakistan, and Iran, apostasy from Islam is
punishable by death.").
Some "moderate" Moslems have elected to forego killing converts to Christianity.
Instead they beat converts, throw them in prison, kidnap their children, confiscate
their homes, or torture family members. Julia Duin, Indonesian Women On Trial for
Offering Youths Sunday School, WASH. TIMES, Aug. 29, 2005, at Al ("Enforcement of
this rule varies widely. A few Islamic societies merely shun the convert; others remove
all civil liberties from the apostates; their children are taken away, their marriages are
dissolved, their family inheritance is lost and their right to burial in a Muslim
graveyard removed."). If this is moderation, imagine the form extremism must take.
391.
It is a "common Islamic sentiment that Muslims should help expel U.S.
,occupation' forces from Iraq." Bill Powell, A War Without Borders, TIME, Nov. 21,
2005; Matza, supra note 190, at Al ("Iraqis' resistance to occupation is often viewed as
an act of Arab dignity and patriotism."); Hussein Dakroub, Muslim Scholars Support
Attacks Against U.S. Forces in Iraq, AP ONLINE, Nov. 20, 2004, at 15:20:55 ("A group of
Sunni and Shiite Muslim clerics expressed support for attacks on the U.S.-led
multinational force in Iraq, saying Saturday that to fight the occupation is 'a religious
duty."').
392.
Thomas Wagner, Muslim Scholars Condemn London Attack, but Say Some
Suicide Bombings are OK, Assoc. PRESS, July 17, 2005 ("the 22 imams and scholars
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duty as Moslems in protecting these terrorists from justice.
Furthermore, since Islam counsels its adherents to perform
spiritually meritorious acts-and because for some Moslems killing
U.S. soldiers constitutes such an act-Iraqi judges uphold their duty
to Islam by ensuring that their fellow Moslems are not punished, or
3 93
receive only minimal punishment, for attacking U.S. infidels.
Although these religio-political ideas are not universally held by all
Moslems, CCCI judges, steeped in a pervasive Moslem culture, might
find it difficult or impossible to cast aside Islamic principles and
clerical influences in judging Moslem insurgents whose only accusers
394
are non-Moslems.
Even if the foregoing analysis is completely incorrect and there is
no overt discrimination against non-Moslem witnesses or victims (or
women), the mere intrusion of Islamic rules of evidence into the trial
process creates almost insurmountable hurdles to fair proceedings,
395
thereby permitting dangerous criminal to escape justice.
These rules, set forth in the Koran, differ strikingly from the rules in
modern codes of evidence and have the effect of reducing the chances of
conviction.
For example, the testimony of women is absolutely
excluded. So, too, is the testimony of a victim of brigandage unless he
is giving testimony regarding the charges as they affect other parties.
Male witnesses may only testify if they are Muslims and possess the
technical standard of moral rectitude, meaning that they have
committed no major sins and few minor ones. For conviction there
must be at least two such eyewitnesses to the crime, unless the accused

stopped short of condemning all suicide bombings, saying those that target occupying
forces in countries such as Israel and Iraq are sometimes justified"); Lee Keath, Some
Say Arab Voices Must Stop Using "Buts," THE STAR LEDGER, July 9, 2005, at 6
("Islamic leaders insisted the United States and Britain, with their wars in Iraq and
Afghanistan, are ultimately to blame for fueling militant violence."). One big debate
among the "moderate" Moslems in Basra is whether all Iraqis should be forced to
comply with Islamic law or should merely be "persuaded" to do so. Cambanis, supra
note 281, at 1.
393. In the words of one Islamic scholar: "[I]f anyone removes a calamity from
another Muslim, God will remove from his some of the calamities of the day of
Resurrection; and if anyone shields another Muslim from disgrace, God will shield him
from disgrace on the Day of Resurrection." ASAD, supra note 361, at 31. (internal
quotations and citation omitted). Notice that the benefit inures only for assisting other
Moslems, not for helping Christians, Jews, or men and women generally.
394.
Iraq was once one of the most secular countries in the Middle East, but
"secular" is a relative term, particularly in the Middle East, which is chock full of
religious zealots. It is now know "that Iraq is a deeply Islamic country." Murphy,
supra note 310, at 11.
395.
Sharia "makes the prosecution of criminal cases difficult, if not impossible,
in practice." THE NEW ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ISLAM 419 (Cyril Glasse ed., 2001); Michael
M.J. Fischer, Legal Postulates In Flux: Justice, Wit, And Hierarchy in Iran, in LAW
AND ISLAM IN THE MIDDLE EAST 117 (noting that Islamic provides "considerable
protection for the accused," to put it mildly); Ferris K. Nesheiwat, Honor Crimes In
Jordan: Their Treatment Under Islamic and JordanianCriminal Laws, 23 PENN. ST.
INT'L L. REV. 251, 266 (2004) (noting that under Islamic criminal law a "conviction can
only be attained by evidence of a high degree of reliability").
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396
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Thus, it is often the case that Islamic evidentiary rules "are a
practically insurmountable barrier to any conviction ....,,397 In light
of these rules of evidence and the probability that they are
influencing at least some of the judges, it makes little sense to waste
the U.S. taxpayer's money trying to prosecute insurgents before a
foreign court tainted with religious hatred and encumbered by
anachronistic evidentiary rules.
E. Fearand Apprehension
Finally, there may be nothing more sinister motivating some
CCCI judges than fear and a desire for self-preservation-an
intuition that helps to keep human alive in a world lurking with

396.
Ann Elizabeth Mayer, Reinstating Islamic Criminal Law in Libya, in LAW
AND ISLAM IN THE MIDDLE EAST, supra note 328, at 107; LIPPMAN ET AL., supra note
84, at 45 n.* ("Witnesses must be adult male Muslims of pious character.").
In many respects these extensive restrictions concerning the suitability of
witnesses are similar to those found in Jewish law, from which this aspect of Islamic
law was probably derived:
The qualifications of witnesses were most exacting and high. The following
persons were incompetent to be witnesses: women, slaves, minors, demented
persons, deaf and mute, blind men, persons convicted of irreligion, or
immorality, or strongly suspected thereof, gamblers, usurers, and farmers, or
collectors of imposts, illiterate or immodest persons, relatives by consanguinity
or affinity and persons directly interested in the case ....
Spector, supra note 85, at 319. It is unclear why farmers are excluded. These
restrictions are likewise similar to those criteria for witnesses used in the English
chancery courts:
The criteria for this determination were designed to exclude those who would
be most likely to commit perjury for various reasons .... [T]he judge was to
allow a witness to testify only if he was satisfied that he would not perjure
himself. The most important, certainly the most emphasized, criterion was
integrity and good reputation; truthfulness in the past should be a fair
indication of veracity in the future. Also the social status or rank of the
proposed witness should be considered; the upper classes would be better
educated and more conscious of the duty to testify truthfully. The wealthy
witness was to be preferred over the poor one since the temptation to swear
falsely for money would be less. Friendship, moreover, with one of the parties
was to be noted, as was enmity towards the opposite party.
William Hamilton Bryson, Note, Witnesses: A Canonist's View, 13 AM. J. LEGAL HIST.
57, 59 (1969). Fortunately law has progressed beyond these restrictions. U.S. law has
abandoned these qualifications. See Benson v. United States, 146 U.S. 325, 337 (1892)
("the merely technical barriers which excluded witnesses from the stand have been
removed").
397.
See Hossein Esmaeili & Jeremy Gans, Islamic Law Across Cultural
Borders: The Involvement of Western Nationals in Saudi Murder Trials, 28 DENV. J.
INT'L L. & POLY 145, 155 (2000).
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dangers.3 9 8 Although a judge motivated by terror is not considered to
be as culpable as one given to venality, when a judicial officer makes
a decision based on fear, he has abandoned his charge to administer
justice impartially just as much as the judge who tailors his decisions
according to the bribes he receives.3 99 Fear is just as much a
corrupting influence as prejudice or cupidity for it also prevents the
judicial mind from making impartial decisions based solely on the law
40 0
and the facts of a particular case.
Because of the precarious situation in Iraq, many Iraqi officials
live in apprehension of the terrorists 40 1; the Iraqi terrorists' program
of intimidation has been extremely successful. Many government
officials, including several CCCI judges, have been targeted by
assassins. 40 2 Assassinations have felled many high-ranking Iraqi
officials, 403 including over twenty-six judges, 40 4 at least one of whom
had served on the CCCI.405 In particular, former Baathists who have

398.
Ryan J. Liebl, Rule of Law in Postwar Iraq: From Saddam Hussein to the
American Soldiers Involved in the Abu Ghraib Prison Scandal, What Law Governs
Those Actions?, 28 HAMLINE L. REV. 91, 104 (2005) (noting that CCCI judges have been
the target of death threats).
399.
A Few Words On JudicialIntegrity, 6 ALB. L.J. 265, 265 (1872):
Fear is another form of corruption not less injurious, and not a whit more
respectable than partiality or prejudice. Upon any just gauge and measure of
the three, fear should be accounted the basest and meanest of all. To be afraid
is the miserable condition of a coward. To do wrong, or omit to do right from
fear, is to superadd delinquency to cowardice.
400.
Id. ("It seems to be supposed in some quarters that the only forms of
corruption are venality and partiality. But there are two others quite as bad, if not
worse than partiality, and they are prejudice and fear.").
401.
Lowry, supra note 56, at 31 (discussing Iraqi police officers who refused to
be seen with U.S. soldiers out of fear of ostracism or retaliation from insurgents).
402.
For example, Judge Raid Juhi, an investigative judge with the CCCI and
the chief investigative judge for the Iraqi Special Tribunal was targeted by terrorists
loyal to Saddam Hussein for his role in Hussein's case. See John F. Burns, Tribunal
Leader in Hussein's Case Is Target of Plot, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 28, 2005, at Al; Liebl,
supra note 397, at 104 (discussing some assassinations of Iraqi judges).
403.
See Jackie Spinner & Bassam Sebti, Suicide Blast At Baghdad Bus Depot
Kills 7, WASH. POST, Sept. 24, 2005, at A17 (discussing the assassination of Ali Abdul
Ridha, a member of the Iraqi de-Baathification committee); Robert F. Worth, Gunmen
Kill a Lawmaker in an Attack Near Baghdad, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 19, 2005, at A14
(discussing a terrorist attack that resulted in the wounding of Iraqi National Assembly
member Haydar Qasim Shanoun and the murder of Assembly member Faris Nasir
Hussein); Sabrina Tavernise, 25 are Killed as Insurgents Press Attacks on Shiites, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 17, 2005, at A6 (noting an insurgent attack on a town official Amer alKhafagi and the fact that insurgents "consider any Iraqi cooperation with the
American effort a traitor"); Karl Vick, Baghdad Governor Slain by Insurgents, WASH.
POST, Jan. 5, 2005, at Al (discussing a terrorist attack that resulted in the death of a
provincial governor).
404.
Fleishman, supranote 130, at 1.
405.
Sebti & Spinner, supra note 402, at A12 ("[U]nknown gunman shot and
killed Judge Munquith Faroun and two of his bodyguards in the Ameriya neighborhood
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cooperated with the United States have been targeted for murder by
the insurgents. 40 6 Even the police refuse to arrest criminals for fear
that they or their families will be slain in retaliation. 40 7 Whole
military units have refused to attend military training run by the
United States because they "feared reprisals from locals if they were
seen to have cooperated with the Americans." In the words of Iraq's
Chief Justice of the Federal Supreme Court, Madhat Mahmood:
'Judges are human. The fear factor applies to him the same as it
40 8
applies to any other human.'
Perhaps some of the CCCI judges, in the throes of fear, believe
that rather than continually risking death, they would be better off
cooperating with the insurgency by treating terrorists with kid gloves
when they appear in the CCCI. Close encounters with death may
have intimidated some judges, and their anti-U.S. decisions may
simply be an attempt to appease the terrorists. 40 9 Fear is a powerful
weapon, and if the Iraqis succumbed to it they are no worse than
Spanish leaders, who withdrew their troops from Iraq out of fear of
further terrorist attacks. 410 But they will also be no better off, and
will face the same fate as the Spanish: an increase in bullying by
terrorists. 4 11
The fact that throughout history such appeasement
always fails perhaps has not yet registered with the CCCI judges.
But the terrorists are receiving the message sent back by the judges

of western Baghdad . . . . Faroun was on his way to work at the Central Criminal
Court of Iraq when he was attacked around 8 a.m.").
406.
Anderson, supra note 266 ("an assassination campaign had begun against
former Baathists who were cooperating with the occupation").
407.
Rasan & Negus, supra note 199, at 8.
408.
Jervis, supra note 246.
409.
Recall that the CCCI was founded in part so that crimes committed against
U.S. soldiers could be tried in a neutral forum, not one steeped with anti-U.S. animus.
Doug Simpson, Louisiana-TrainedLawyers Become a Legal Force in Iraqi Courtrooms,
ASSOCIATED PRESS, July 16, 2005 ("The court was created ... to prosecute insurgent

fighters because the military was concerned that Iraq's provincial courts would be
influenced by anti-Americanism and be more likely to acquit those guilty of attacks.").
Obviously this goal is not being realized in the CCCI.
410.
Editorial, Europe Wakes Up, WALL ST. J., Feb. 1, 2005, at A12 ("Consider
Spain, where the government thought that withdrawing its troops from Iraq after last
year's Madrid train bombings would take it off the terrorist target list. No such luck.
Security services have since foiled Islamist attacks against such targets as the main
criminal court and Madrid's soccer stadium.").
411.
See Oliver Roy, Commentary, Why Do They Hate Us? Not Because of Iraq,
N.Y. TIMES, July 22, 2005, at A19 ("Even their calls for the withdrawal of European
troops from Iraq ring false. After all, the Spanish police have foiled terrorist attempts
in Madrid even since the government withdrew its forces" from Iraq.); Elaine Sciolino,
Spain Continues to Uncover TerroristPlots, Officials Say, N.Y.TIMES, Mar. 13, 2005, at
1.17 ("Despite sweeping measures to improve their ability to investigate

potential

terrorist threats since the March 11, 2004 bomb attacks that left 191 people dead, the
officials estimate that there are hundreds of people scattered in cells around the
country committed to attacking centers of power in Spain.").
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loud and clear: keep up the attacks because they are spreading the
4 12
fear that continues to paralyze Iraq.

III. U.S. MILITARY TRIBUNALS
Regardless of the precise motivations behind the CCCI's proterrorism decisions, it is obvious from the foregoing discussion that
the CCCI judges are not well-situated to make fair and unbiased
decisions in cases involving Iraqi terrorists. The judges are subject to
substantial external influences that could easily lead the most
stalwart judge to decide cases on factors other than their merits.
Whether they decide cases out of fear of the insurgents, spite for the
United States, or love for Islam, the CCCI judges assist the Iraqi
terrorists by their decisions. Every time they order the release of
guilty insurgents-regardless of whether the U.S. military effectuates
these releases-the CCCI judges hand the insurgents at least a moral
413
victory.

412.
In the words of Lieutenant General Lance Smith of U.S. Central Command:
"the intimidation campaign that is ongoing is very effective. We see it permeate many
levels of the Iraqi government and the Iraqi security forces." Rowan Scarborough, Al
Qaeda Ties to Zarqawi Stronger, WASH. TIMES, Nov. 20, 2004, at Al.
413.
Under Iraqi Law, a defendant is usually released upon acquittal. IRAQI
LAW ON CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS

182(E) (1971)

("A detainee is released when a

verdict of not guilty ...is issued, as long as there is no other legal reason for his
detention.").
Many, though not all, of the defendants acquitted by the CCCI are retained in
custody by the United States as security detainees, because they continue to pose a
threat to Coalition Forces. Because Insurgents may lawfully be held as security
detainees, U.S. retention of acquitted insurgents violates neither international nor
Iraqi law. Indeed, this practice is consistent with the Geneva Conventions and
common sense. See Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 465 (2004) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) ("Executive detention of subversive citizens, like detention of enemy
soldiers to keep them off the battlefield, may sometimes be justified to prevent persons
from launching or becoming missiles of destruction.").
Although their continued detention is lawful and necessary to prevent insurgents
from rejoining the battle, the United States' act of flouting CCCI orders of release has
created ill feelings and suggests to the Iraqis that U.S. individuals do not respect their
judicial orders. This was yet another predicament created by the U.S. decision to
adjudicate insurgency cases in the CCCI. As a general matter, an occupying power
should make reasonable efforts to minimize this type of friction with the citizens of the
occupied country.
HUNT, supra note 98, at 218 ("A military occupation which
accomplished its purpose with the least possible friction with the inhabitants, is, in the
end, the most successful."). Thus, in the long run, it would have been better to
completely bypass the Iraqi courts, and permit U.S. officers to adjudicate these cases.
Because of the threat that the Supreme Court will grant detainees in Iraq the right
to litigate claims in U.S. courts and the deleterious effects on the military that this
would entail, the U.S. military may feel pressure to transfer custody to the Iraqis, as it
has done with detainees at Guantanamo Bay. See Robin Wright & Josh White, U.S.
Holding Talks on Return of Detainees, WASH. POST, Aug. 9, 2005, at A13 ("The Bush
administration is nearing agreements with 10 Muslim governments to return their
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The United States learned early in its history that if it wants
justice done right, it had better bear that burden itself, particularly
during war or when acting as an occupying power. 4 14 Occupying
powers are entrusted, by default, with plenary executive, legislative,
and judicial authority in the occupied territory. 415 The occupier is
free to delegate this authority to natives of the occupied land and this
is frequently done with respect to certain executive and judicial
matters that have little or no bearing on the occupation itself. Thus,
oftentimes an occupying force will permit local courts staffed by local
judges to adjudicate criminal and civil cases in which all of the

detainees held at Guantanamo Bay ....
); Josh White & Robin Wright, Afghanistan
Agrees to Accept Detainees, WASH. POST, Aug. 5, 2005, at Al (noting that the United
States intends to transfer custody of detainees held at Guantanamo Bay to countries
such as Afghanistan, Yemen, and Saudi Arabia, which would largely foreclose
litigation in U.S. courts). This has already proven disastrous in Iraq, where detainees
released to Iraqis are promptly freed to commit new attacks. See Victor Davis Hanson,
Western World Shows too Much Softness in Different Kind of War, CHICAGO TRIB., Sept.
2, 2005, at C25 ("It turns out that the terrorist had been captured earlier in December
2004, on suspicion of being involved in a deadly suicide attack on an American base.
Then he was turned over to the Iraqis, sent to the notorious Abu Ghraib jail and
released. Once free, he returned to his job of killing Americans .... ").
414.
The United States, therefore, created three types of military courts in postWorld War II Germany, where the amount of due process was commensurate with the
severity of the crime committed and the potential penalty that the courts could impose:
Military Government Ordinance No. 2 established three types of courtssummary, intermediate and general. The basic differences between these
courts lay in their powers of sentence and their composition. General courts
were empowered to impose any lawful sentence including death; intermediate
courts were authorized to impose any lawful sentence except death,
imprisonment in excess of ten years and/or fines in excess of $10,000; and
summary courts were limited to the imposition of prison sentences of one year
and/or fines not exceeding $1,000.
General courts were required to be
composed of not less than three members.
NOBLEMAN, supra note 74, at 52-53.
415. In the event of a military occupation the authority of the regular
Government is supplanted by that of the invading army. The rule
imposed by the invader is the law of war. It is not the law of the invading
state nor the law of the invaded territory. It may in its character be
either civil or military, or partly one and partly the other. In every case
the source from which it derives its authority is the same, namely the
customs of war, and not any municipal law; and the General enforcing
the rule is responsible only to his own Government and not to the invaded
people.
MAINE, supra note 5, at 179.

There is a slight qualification to the rule announced by Sir Henry Maine:
whenever practicable, the occupying power should endeavor to keep the local criminal
law in place and should not supplant it with a foreign law unless absolutely necessary.
GENEVA CONVENTION RELATIVE TO THE PROTECTION OF CIVILIAN PERSONS IN TIME OF
WAR, Art. 64 (1949) ('The penal laws of the occupied territory shall remain in force,
with the exception that they may be repealed or suspended by the Occupying power in
cases where they constitute a threat to security .... ").
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concerned parties are natives of the occupied country. 416 In contrast,
judicial matters that could impinge upon the occupation force and a
successful occupation are carefully kept within the confines of the
occupation army. Similarly, there is a need to exercise tighter control
in areas plagued by ongoing hostilities or terrorist attacks. 417 This
includes the prosecution in special military courts of terrorists or
insurgents who have attacked the occupying forces. 4 18 Were such
cases left to the local tribunals, even if the local judiciary were
ostensibly loyal to the United States, there is no guarantee of zealous
prosecution and little opportunity for oversight consistent with the
rule of law. As explained by Dr. Fraenkel:
The Judicial process is essentially different from other forms of
administration, for it is subject to no orders from superiors.
Administrative agencies of the executive branch of government can be
subjected to outside supervision and control without changing their
basic structure, because in any case they function on the principal of
hierarchical authority. The activities of courts, however, can only be
accepted or rejected; if the independence of the judiciary is to be
respected at all, the courts cannot be subjected to interference. For this
reason an occupation regime must create its own courts for all litigation
that it is not willing to entrust to the free functioning of the courts of
419
the occupied country.

So the U.S. military has frequently created tribunals run by U.S.
military officers to try offenses committed against the peace and U.S.
forces. 4 20 In various theatres of war, these tribunals proved to be a
resounding success, and not only as a tool for punishing offenders.
They also prevented or inhibited insurrections and served as a means
of inculcating democratic values and respect for the rule of law. For
example, between 1944 and 1948, U.S. military tribunals in post-war
421
Germany tried over 400,000 cases with an 85% conviction rate.

416.
MAINE, supra note 5, at 180 ("As a general rule, military occupation
extends only to such matters as concern the safety of the army, the invader usually
permitting the ordinary civil tribunals of the country to deal with ordinary crimes
committed by the inhabitants. The course, however, to be adopted in such a case is at
the discretion of the invader.").
417.
"Greater severity may be exercised in places or regions where actual
hostilities exist, or are expected and must be prepared for." MAINE, supra note 5, at
181 (1888) (quoting the U.S. rules for the government of armies in the field).
418.
Id. ("The special tribunals created by an invader for carrying into effect the
rule of military occupation in the case of individual offenders are usually military
courts, framed on the model and carrying on their proceedings after the manner of
courts-martial .. ").
419.
FRAENKEL, supra note 138, at 21-22.
420.
ZINK, supra note 98, at 108-09.
421.
NOBLEMAN, supra note 74, at 137.
American military government courts in Germany functioned from September
1944 until August 1948, when they were succeeded by an integrated system of
civilian courts, modeled after the American judicial system. During the four
years of their operation, as an integral part of the United States Army, these
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The courts were universally respected for their fairness and integrity,
and German defendants were often surprised, and thankful, that they
were given a right to state their case before such tribunals. The
acquittal rate demonstrated that the results were not fixed and that
the United States practiced the rule of law that it preached
throughout Germany. A similar system of military tribunals could
have been successfully implemented in Iraq (where the Iraqi judges
422
had an anemic 61% conviction rate and mete out paltry sentences)
and could have produced similarly positive results.
International law has long recognized the right and duty of an
occupying power to create military tribunals; this right and duty
arises out of the need to provide a safe environment for the occupying
Furthermore, military
troops as well as the local populace. 423
commissions have a long history in the United States, 424 and the
executive, legislative, 42 5 and judicial branches have all repeatedly
approved of the use of military commissions.

courts tried nearly 400,000 cases, approximately 85 percent of which resulted
in conviction.
When German courts began to function again, the United States still retained the
authority to try in U.S. courts any cases "affecting the security, interest, or prestige of
the Government of the United States, or any case in which it was felt that for any
reason whatever, a proper trial would not be afforded the accused in the" German
courts. Id. at 141 n.425.
Zoroya & Jervis, supranote 21.
422.
423.
NOBLEMAN, supra note 74, at 2.
The right of an occupying power, either flagrante or cessante bello, to establish
its own tribunals and, in some degree, the laws applicable thereto, is well
established in international law. It arises out of the necessity for the occupant
to provide for the security of his army and to contribute to the success of his
military operation, as well as the obligation imposed upon him by international
law to maintain and restore law and order in the occupied area.
Madsen v. Kinsella, 343 U.S. 341, 346-47 (1952) ("Since our nation's
424.
earliest days, such commissions have been constitutionally recognized agencies for
meeting many urgent governmental responsibilities related to war.").
425.
It has been argued that "the legal basis for military commissions derives
from the constitutional provisions conferring the power to wage war on Congress,"
although "it has historically left the establishment of such tribunals to the executive
branch." Daryl A. Mundis, The Use of Military Commissions to Prosecute Individuals
Accused of Terrorists Acts, 96 AM. J. INT'L L. 320, 321 (2002). In light of the
Constitutional provisions conferring on the President specific war powers, and the
concomitant duty of the President to protect the troops under his command, it is likely
that the President has concurrent power to establish military tribunals, particularly
when they are deemed necessary to punish those who have attacked U.S. soldiers. Brig
Amy Warwick, 67 U.S. (2 Black.) 635, 668 (1862) ("If a war be made by invasion of a
foreign nation, the President is not only authorized but bound to resist force by force.
He . . . is bound to accept the challenge without waiting for any special legislative
authority."). "As commander-in-chief, he [the President] is authorized to direct the
movements of the naval and military forces placed by law at his command, and to
employ them in the manner he may deem most effectual to harass and conquer and
He may invade the hostile country, and subject it to the
subdue the enemy.
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Besides the trial of British Major John Andre during the U.S.
Revolutionary War, the United States used military commissions in a
succession of "major" foreign occupations: in Spanish Florida during
the First Seminole War; in Mexico, including California and New
Mexico during and after the Mexican American War; in the
Confederate States during and after the Civil War; in Cuba, Puerto
Rico, and the Philippines after the Spanish American War; in the
Rhineland after World War I; and in Japan, China, Austria, Italy,
and Germany during and after World War 11.426 The United States
was also prepared to use military tribunals in Korea had the events of
the Korean War turned out differently.
In each instance, the
occupying forces of the United States protected their security and
maintained law and order in the areas under their control by means
of military courts. '427 Not surprisingly, this practice was endorsed by
some of the greatest minds of the U.S. government.
Military
commissions were created, authorized, or approved by a veritable
who's who of U.S. history: then-General George Washington, Thomas
Jefferson, then-General Andrew Jackson, James Monroe, thenPresident James K. Polk, then-General Zachary Taylor, 428 General

sovereignty and authority of the United States." Fleming v. Page, 50 U.S. 603, 615
(1850). Presumably, then, the President has the authority to direct military forces to
utilize military commissions to punish war criminals, especially since part of subjecting
a nation to the sovereignty of the United States might entail subjecting its malefactors
to trials for any unlawful attacks against the United States. See, e.g., Jordan J. Paust,
Antiterrorism Military Commissions: Courting Illegality, 23 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1, 5
(2001) ("The President's Commander-in-Chief power to set up military commissions
applies . . . during actual war within a war zone or relevant occupied territory .... ").
Regardless of where this power resides, Congressional approval of various military
tribunals can be inferred from its silence on the matter and its decision repeatedly to
fund military tribunals with full knowledge of the commission's duties, functions, and
accomplishments.
426.
NOBLEMAN, supra note 74, at 14 ("During the past 130 years, the United
States Government has engaged in 13 major occupations: Florida; Mexico (twice); the
Confederate States; Cuba; Puerto Rico; the Philippines; the Rhineland; Japan; Korea;
Austria; Italy; and Germany. In every instance, the occupying forces of the United
States have protected their security and maintained law and order in the arena under
their control by means of military courts."); Green, supra note 297, at 833 ("During the
past seven years, the military commission has operated with quiet efficiency in the
United States, France, Germany, Austria, Italy, Japan, and Korea in bringing to trial
individuals and organizations engaging in terrorism, subversive activity, and violation
of the laws of war.").
427.
NOBLEMAN, supra note 74, at 14; see also LEVIE, supra note 141, at 13
("Violations of the law of war committed in Mexico against troops of the United
States ... during the 1848 war between those two countries, caused the American
commander, General Winfield Scott, to establish 'Councils of War' and 'military
commissions' for the trials of such offenses."); Id. at 16 (In the Spanish-American war
"a number of Filipino guerillas were tried by American military courts").
428.
K. JACK BAUER, ZACHARY TAYLOR: SOLDIER, PLANTER, STATESMAN OF THE
OLD SOUTHWEST 212 (1985) ("As part of his effort to retard hostilities between the
occupiers and the occupied, Taylor in late September authorized this trial of Mexicans

2006J

US MILITARYCOURTSAND THE WAR IN IRAO

Winfield Scott, Abraham Lincoln, Ulysses S. Grant (while a General
429
Associate
and again when he was President), Andrew Johnson,
Justice Edwin Stanton (while serving as Secretary of War), William
McKinley, Theodore Roosevelt, 430 President and Chief Justice
William H. Taft (then serving as Civil Governor of the Philippines
and Secretary of War),4 31 General John Pershing, Woodrow Wilson,
Warren G. Harding, then-General Dwight D. Eisenhower, Franklin
D. Roosevelt; 432 Harry S. Truman, and General Douglas
MacArthur. 4 33 It is worth noting that these leaders found military
courts to be useful in a variety of political settings during and
following a wide variety of wars and conflicts. This is a testament to
the versatility of military law and the adaptability of military courts.
A. JudicialPrecedentfor UtilizingMilitary
Tribunals Duringan Occupation
The U.S. Supreme Court has also repeatedly recognized the right
of the United States-especially when acting as an occupying power
of foreign lands-to create and utilize military commissions for the
adjudication of criminal cases and civil disputes. 434 For example:

accused of murder and other major offenses against Americans before military
commissions.").
It should be noted that although Johnson supported the use of military
429.
commission in certain circumstances, he also opposed their widespread use in the
occupation of the former Confederacy.
Theodore Roosevelt expressed approval of trying Kaiser Wilhelm before a
430.
military tribunal following World War I. JAMES F. WILLIS, PROLOGUE TO NUREMBERG:
THE POLITICS AND DIPLOMACY OF PUNISHING WAR CRIMINALS OF THE FIRST WORLD
WAR (1982)

Americans were reminded that a principal precedent for such proceedings had
been established when the government of the United States had hanged a
Confederate officer, Captain Henry Wirz, following the end of the Civil War, for
having murdered Union soldiers at the infamous prisoner of war camp at
Andersonville, Georgia. Privately, Theodore Roosevelt and his former secretary
of war and state, Elihu Root, expressed approval of such measures.
431.
JAMES FORD RHODES, HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES Vol. IX, 201-02
(1929). Taft was appointed Civil Governor of the Philippines on July 4, 1901. Id. at
202.

432.

See, e.g., Appointment of a Military Commission, 7 Fed. Reg. 5103 (July 2,

1942).

433.
NOBLEMAN, supra note 74, at 13; Bork, supra note 37 ("In the
Revolutionary War, before there was a Constitution, George Washington employed
such tribunals freely, as did Abraham Lincoln in the Civil War, and Franklin Roosevelt
in Word War II.").
JAMES H. BLOUNT, AMERICAN OCCUPATION OF THE
434.
See generally
PHILIPPINES (1912). A number of U.S. courts have expressed their disapproval of
trying U.S. citizens in military courts, particularly for conduct committed in the United
States in an area where the civil courts are operational. See, e.g., In re Egan, 8 F. Cas.
367 (N.D.N.Y. 1866) (holding that the United States military lacked jurisdiction to try
a South Carolinian man for the September 24, 1865 murder of a black child committed
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(1)

In 1819, Justice Story writing for a unanimous Court,
held that when the British occupied Castine Harbor,
Maine during the War of 1812, as an occupying power,
the English commander had the right to exercise full
civil authority over the occupied territory and its
residents. 435 "By the conquest and military occupation
of Castine, the enemy acquired that firm possession
which enabled him to exercise the fullest rights of
' 436
sovereignty over that place.

(2)

In 1853, the Supreme Court implicitly held that the
creation of a U.S. military government after the
conquest of California, which at that time was Mexican
territory, was a lawful exercise of President Polk's
military power:
"California, or the port of San
Francisco, had been conquered by the United States as
early as 1846. Shortly afterward the United States had
military possession of all of Upper California. Early in
1847 the President, as constitutional commander-inchief of the army and navy, authorized the military and
naval commander of our forces in California to exercise
the belligerent rights of a conqueror, and to form a civil
government for the conquered country ....
No one can
doubt that these orders of the President, and the action
of our army and navy commander in California, in
conformity with them was according to the law of arms
and the right of conquest. .... -437
In 1857, in Leitensdorfer v. Webb, the Court approvingly
noted the creation of U.S. military courts in New Mexico
in 1846 after the Mexican-American War and held that
this creation was a legitimate exercise of military power
"during which time the territory was held by the United
'438
States as an occupying conqueror.

(3)

(4)

In 1869, in The Grapeshot, the Court held that the
commander-in-chief has the military duty to ensure
4 39
that justice is administered in occupied territories.

in Union-occupied South Carolina after the end of the Civil War). But the reasoning
behind these decisions is inapplicable to the Iraqi theatre, where the United States is
operating in a hostile, foreign land in which the no U.S. court operates and where the
defendants are not U.S. citizens.
435.
United States v. Rice, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 246, 254 (1819).
436.
Id.
437.
Cross v. Harrison, 57 U.S. (16 How.) 164, 190 (1853).
438.
Leitensdorfer v. Webb, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 176, 177-78 (1857).
439.
The Grapeshot, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 129, 132-33 (1869). Similarly, Justice
Swayne, writing for the Court, noted that the war "power is not limited to victories in
the field and the dispersion of the insurgent forces. It carries with it inherently the
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(6)

In 1874, in New Orleans v. The Steamship Company,
the Court made clear the great breadth of the United
States' power when creating an occupation government:
"Although the City of New Orleans was conquered and
taken possession of in a civil war waged on the part of
the United States to put down an insurrection and
restore the supremacy of the National government in
the Confederate States, that government had the same
power and rights in territory held by conquest as if the
territory had belonged to a foreign country and had
been subjugated in a foreign war. In such cases the
conquering power has a right to displace the preexisting authority, and to assume to such extent as it
may deem proper the exercise by itself of all the powers
and functions of government. It may appoint all the
necessary officers and clothe them with designated
powers, larger or smaller, according to its pleasure. It
may prescribe the revenues to be paid, and apply them
to its own use or otherwise.
It may do anything
necessary to strengthen itself and weaken the enemy.
There is no limit to the powers that may be exerted in
such cases, save those which are found in the laws and
4 40
usages of war.

(7)

In 1878, the Court noted in Coleman v. Tennessee that
"[t]he right to govern the territory of the enemy during
its military occupation is one of the incidents of war,
being a consequence of its acquisition ....

(8)

In 1901, the Supreme Court decided Neely v. Henkel,
and in doing so discussed the plenary power enjoyed by
the United States when it occupied Cuba. The Court
stated: "It cannot be doubted that when the United
States enforced the relinquishment by Spain of her
sovereignty in Cuba and determined to occupy and
control that island . . . it succeeded to the authority of
the displaced government," 442 which included the power
to create criminal courts.

power to guard against the immediate renewal of the conflict, and to remedy the evils
which have arisen from its rise and progress." Stewart v. Kahn, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 493,
507 (1870). The war power entails the power to punish war criminals and terrorists for
crimes committed during military actions.
440.
New Orleans v. The Steamship Co., 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 387, 393-94 (1874)
(footnote omitted). Justice Swayne wrote the opinion for the court. Id. at 392.
441.
Coleman v. Tennessee, 97 U.S. 509, 517 (1878) (citations omitted).
442.
Neely v. Henkel, 180 U.S. 109, 121 (1901).

750

VANDERBIL TIOURNAL OF TRANSNA TIONAL LAW

(9)

[VOL. 39-645

Similarly, in Dooley v. United States, also decided in
1901, the Court stated that a conquering power clearly
has the right to erect a military government in the
443
occupied territory.

(10) In 1909, in Santiago v. Nogueras, the Court held that
U.S. military authority during the U.S. occupation of
Puerto Rico must have included "the authority to
establish courts of justice, which are so essential a part
444
of any government.
(11) In 1913, in discussing the occupation of the Philippines
during and after the Spanish American War, Justice
Day wrote for the unanimous Court: "The right to thus
occupy an enemy's country and temporarily provide for
its government has been recognized by previous action
of the executive authority and sanctioned by frequent
decisions of this court. The local government being
destroyed, the conqueror may set up its own authority
and make rules and regulations for the conduct of
temporary government. .... ,,445
(12) In 1946, in In re Yamashita, the Supreme Court plainly
stated the authority of an occupying power to try enemy
combatants for war crimes. The Court stated: "An
important incident to the conduct of war is the adoption
of measures . . . to seize and subject to disciplinary
measures those enemies who, in their attempt to thwart
or impede our military effort, have violated the law of
war. The trial and punishment of enemy combatants
who have committed violations of the law of war is thus
not only a part of the conduct of war operations as a
preventive measure against such violations, but is an
exercise of the authority sanctioned by Congress to
administer the system of military justice recognized by
'446
the law of war.
(13) In 1952, in Madsen v. Kinsella, the Supreme Court held
that the President may "establish and prescribe the
jurisdiction and procedures of military commissions,
and of tribunals in the nature of such commissions, in
territory occupied by Armed Forces of the United
States. His authority to do this sometimes survives
cessation of hostilities. The President has the urgent

443.
444.
445.
446.

Dooley v. United States, 182 U.S. 222, 230 (1901).
Santiago v. Nogueras, 214 U.S. 260, 266 (1909).
Macleod v. United States, 229 U.S. 416, 425 (1913).
In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 11 (1946) (citations omitted).
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and infinite responsibility not only of combating the
occupied by the
enemy but of governing any territory
447
United States by force of arms.
(14) In 2006, in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, despite invalidating
the particular military commissions at issue in the case,
the Supreme Court recognized yet again that: "Military
Commissions have been established to try civilians 'as
part of a temporary military government over occupied
enemy territory or territory regained from an enemy
where civilian government cannot and does not
448
function."'
Despite this precedent, the authority for creating military tribunals,
the United States' past success with military commissions, when the
United States announced that it intended to use military tribunals to
try al Qaeda terrorists, it was immediately met with harsh criticism
4 49
from elements of the U.S. bar and members of legal academia.
Eventually the tribunals resulted in a blizzard of lawsuits-including
the lawfare discussed in the opening of this Article. The constant
criticism eventually had its desired effect. Under this pressure and in
attempt to avoid becoming embroiled in a similar debate concerning
military commission in Iraq, 450 the U.S. government capitulated to its
critics and abandoned any thought of using U.S. military courts in
occupied Iraq.45 1 The government announced that instead of using

447.
Madsen v. Kinsella, 343 U.S. 341, 348 (1952) (footnotes omitted).
448.
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2776 (2006) (plurality opinion)
(quoting Duncan v. Kahanamoku, 327 U.S. 304, 66 S. Ct. 606, 90 L. Ed. 688 (1946)).
See Anderson, infra note 523, at 592 (the order creating military
449.
commissions "has provoked a storm of protest from various civil libertarians, civil and
human rights organizations, newspaper editorialists, academics, members of Congress,
and sundry others, mostly on the political left").
The Supreme Court eventually held that that the United States could not
450.
utilize one particular form of military commissions to prosecute combatants captured
in Afghanistan and later detained at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld,
126 S. Ct. 2749 (2006). This decision was issued long after the United States elected to
utilize the CCCI to prosecute insurgents in Iraq, but it was the fear of this type of
decision that prompted the United States to utilize the CCCI as opposed to military
commissions. These fears may have been misplaced, however. Even the Hamdan
plurality recognized that military tribunals have long been used by the United States
when operating as an occupying power. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2776
(2006) (plurality opinion) ("Military Commissions have been established to try civilians
'as part of a temporary military government over occupied enemy territory or territory
regained from an enemy where civilian government cannot and does not function."')
(quoting Duncan v. Kahanamoku, 327 U.S. 304 (1946)). So the Hamdan opinion does
not speak to the propriety of using military commission in Iraq and certainly does not
prohibit the United States from using military courts in an occupation setting so long
as the defendants are afforded fundamental rights.
451.
By now it is well known that the United States was not adequately
prepared for the expansive insurgency in Iraq, as opposed to World War II, where U.S.
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military commissions, it would let Iraqi judges adjudicate cases
against Iraqi terrorists. 4 52 Of course, this decision completely ignores
the fact that the primary victims of the Iraqi insurgents are U.S.
soldiers 45 3-not Iraqis 454-and
the goal of the insurgency is to

troops expected a widespread insurgency that never materialized. ZINK, supra note 98,
at 243.
it was generally anticipated that the Germans would present so many dangers
to the occupying forces that the most careful steps would be required to
maintain anything like adequate security. The Nazis were reported to have
dug themselves in various redoubts; and extensive underground movement was
predicted; werewolves aimed at decimating Allied forces were supposedly
lurking in every nook and corner.
Perhaps if the Pentagon had been a little less optimistic it would also have laid the
groundwork for a system of military courts prior to the invasion of Iraq. See Heather
Mac Donald, How to Interrogate Terrorists, CITY JOURNAL, Winter 2005,
http://www.city-journal.org/html/15l1terrorists.html, visited Feb. 24, 2005 (the
Pentagon failed "to plan for any outcome of the Iraq invasion except the most rosy
scenario").
452.
There are now also plans to let Afghan judges get in on the act with respect
to Afghan terrorists. See Amy Waldman, Afghans Courts to Try Locals Held by
Americans, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 26, 2004, at A12 ("Afghans now being held in American
detention centers in Afghanistan will be tried and sentenced by the Afghan
government ....
But because Afghanistan barely has a functioning judicial and prison
system, the detainees will remain in American custody indefinitely.") One can only
guess what the Afghan courts will look like, so it is impossible at this time to determine
whether they will offer defendants more rights than they would enjoy under a system
of military commissions. It is also uncertain whether these Afghan courts will have the
courage to dispense justice and thus hopefully deter similar attacks on U.S. forces in
Afghanistan. But at least one Afghani judge has already been arrested for aiding the
guerillas, mirroring a problem with the Iraqi judiciary. See Associated Press, supra
note 180, at 24 ("Afghan authorities have arrested a judge for allegedly harboring the
organizers of two bombings last year that killed about 12 people, including four
Americans .
They believe the ringleaders took their orders from an Iraqi member of
al Qaeda .. ").
453.
Iraqi defense attorneys recognize this fact. Ironically, they have argued
that the CCCI cases have been investigated and assembled by the victims of attacks,
U.S. soldiers, and because of the bias engendered by being a victim, the cases are
suspect. Zoroya & Jervis, supra note 21, at 1 ("Some Iraqi defense attorneys question
whether the victims of a crime can fairly investigate it."). This argument, however,
makes little sense. If anything, the victims will ensure that they convict the right
individual, as opposed to some bureaucrat prosecutor, who lacks a personal stake in
the case and thus might be happy with obtaining a conviction regardless of whether the
defendant is guilty. Also, in light of the sad state of the Iraqi government, if U.S.
victims did not investigate the crimes perpetrated against them, nobody else would.
They take on this role of investigator by default.
454.
True, some insurgents have increasingly targeted vulnerable Iraqis, but
that is largely due to the fact that Iraqis are easier targets, and the insurgents can
therefore inflict higher casualty rates on Iraqis because: (1) there are more Iraqis than
U.S. soldiers in Iraq; (2) the U.S. soldiers are better protected than the Iraqis (they
have better body armor, armored vehicles, air mobility, and medical services); (3) U.S.
soldiers are always armed, whereas Iraqi civilians on the streets generally are not; and
(4) even as compared to armed Iraqi forces, engaging U.S. forces in battle entails for
terrorists a greater magnitude of peril, not similarly found in engagements with either
Iraqi citizens or the Iraqi armed forces. See Scarborough, supranote 209, at Al.
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frustrate the U.S. occupation at every turn. Despite efforts to weed
out bad apples, Iraqi judges favor their countrymen over U.S.
soldiers. The discussion above demonstrates how these factors should
have received greater consideration and that if they had, the CCCI
would not be in the business of trying terrorism cases.
The United States sacrificed its prestige to placate a minority of
vocal critics, and it is now paying the price. As discussed above,
although a significant number of CCCI cases end in conviction, the
CCCI judges convict terrorists only of petty crimes and sentence them
as though their misdeeds were no worse than jay-walking. It is now
obvious that due to judicial biases and various anomalies of Iraqi law
and the CCCI, the United States cannot obtain justice in the CCCI,
and the use of U.S. military courts would have been the better
455
approach.
B. The Wisdom of Using U.S. Military Courts to Try Iraqi Terrorists
The debate about the use of U.S. military courts to try members
of the Taliban and al Qaeda has been extensive and there is

With American soldiers exercising better force protection, thanks to improved
armor and training, the insurgents have shifted their attacks to more
vulnerable Iraqi troops and civilians. 'Terrorists always look for the weakest
point," said Dick Bridges, spokesman for the Pentagon's IED task force [on
IEDs]. "We are no longer the weakest point."
Jill Carroll, Evolution in Iraq's Insurgency, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, Apr. 7, 2005,
at 6 (noting that Iraqi soldiers discovered a "fatwa issued by a radical cleric during a
raid in Samarra. It ordered jihad on Iraqi forces instead of American troops because
the Iraqis are easier to attack.").
It is simple economics: insurgents want to produce the greatest damage for the
least cost, and U.S. forces frequently compel the terrorists to pay a steep price for
attacks, while Iraqi victims do not. CLAUSEWITZ, supra note 8, at 96 (a key to military
success is to raise "the price of success" for the enemy).
Thus, it is still accurate to say that U.S. soldiers are the primary targets of
belligerents, and were it not for these four factors, the militants would almost
exclusively attack U.S. soldiers. Louise Roug & Patrick J. McDonnell, 8 U.S. Troops
Killed in Iraq, L.A. TIMES, May 9, 2005, at Al (noting that insurgents have shifted
"their sights from U.S. forces to Iraqi police and troops, who are perceived as easier
targets than better-armed U.S. forces"); Jaffe & Trofimov, supra note 120, at A8 (noting
an Army report that attacks "have shifted away from U.S. troops to more vulnerable
Iraqis"); Austin Bay, Al Qaeda's Worst Nightmare, WASH. TIMES, Apr. 15, 2005, at A21
("U.S. forces, however, are 'hard targets'-unlike civilians standing in line to vote, U.S.
troops shoot back.").
455.
In endorsing military commissions, the author has in mind a system
similar to that used in the Uniform Code of Military Justice, with some modifications of
the evidentiary rules (such as a more liberal use of hearsay evidence) as the situation
in Iraq necessitates. As Defense Secretary Rumsfeld has indicated, the relaxation of
hearsay rules may be necessary in wartime situations where it is not always possible to
locate or transport witnesses. See Sally Buzbee, Pentagon Says Tribunal Rules Protect
Terror Suspects-But Limited Right to Appeal and Looser Evidence Standards Draw
Criticism, NEWARK STAR-LEDGER, Mar. 22, 2002, at 5.
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insufficient space to do justice to that debate here. But in many
respects that debate is different than one concerning the wisdom of
using military courts in the setting of a U.S. occupation, namely Iraq.
Suffice it to say that the use of military commissions to try Iraqi
terrorists would entail advantages that cannot be achieved either by
continuing to try them in the CCCI or by using other means, such as
international tribunals or U.S. civilian courts. Below is a discussion
of a few of these advantages.
1. Trials by Fair and Impartial Judges
Initially, U.S. military courts would obviate the problems
engendered by submitting cases to biased and corrupt Iraqi judges.
Cases would no longer be decided by judges who sympathize with the
insurgency or who are of the same nationality, religion, political
party, or tribe as the defendants in the dock.45 6 Instead, United
States military judges, judges from the militaries of Coalition nations,
or even U.S. civilian lawyers or judges, would be utilized to perform
the judicial function. 45 7 Military judges in particular, who have spent
most of their careers in the military, and who have demonstrated a
capacity for impartiality in countless criminal cases, would prove a
source of experience upon which to build a sound system for trying
458
Iraqi terrorists.
Although some critics would object that U.S. military judges
would simply rubber stamp the prosecution's case, 459 there is little

456.
True, the officers would have a natural affinity for the soldiers who fell
victim to the insurgents, but that should not prevent them from judging the case
dispassionately, as they must often do in military courts where the defendants, and
sometimes the victims, are soldiers.
457.
Since it might be difficult to find enough military judges to try all of the
insurgency cases, the military might need to appoint some judge advocates to serve in a
solely judicial capacity, or, as in post-World War II Germany, use U.S. civilian judges
or lawyers. NOBLEMAN, supra note 74, at 54 ("by an amendment to Ordinance No. 2,
'civilian military government officials of United States citizenship were also authorized
as members"). And there is no need to waste judicial resources on petty cases. In the
German occupation after World War II, petty crimes were handled by tribunals
composed of officers who were not lawyers, but felonies were always adjudicated before
a military judge. ZINK, supra note 98, at 109. Eventually the reconstituted German
courts were utilized to try petty offenses, but the military courts retained jurisdiction
over more serious crimes, as they should in Iraq. Id. at 109, 125.
458.
See United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 18 (1955) ("It is true
that military personnel because of their training and experience may be especially
competent to try soldiers" or insurgents.).
459.
In civilian courts, judicial bias is a denial of due process. Concrete Pipe &
Products of Cal., Inc. v. Construction Laborers Pension Trust for S. Cal., 508 U.S. 602,
617 (1993) ("due process requires a 'neutral and detached judge in the first instance");
Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 523 (1927):
[Ilt certainly violates the Fourteenth Amendment, and deprives a defendant in
a criminal case of due process of law, to subject his liberty or property to the
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evidence to support such a view. Indeed, the military attorneys for
the Guantanamo detainees are presumably patriotic individuals, yet
this has not prevented them from zealously advocating freedom for
their clients. Like these lawyers, military judges have demonstrated
time and again that they can remain neutral in adjudicating criminal
cases, and they frequently have had experience setting aside their
personal opinions and retaining an objective viewpoint. 4 60
Their
impartiality has been demonstrated repeatedly. For example, after
World War I, U.S. military judges in the Rhineland regularly
acquitted German defendants accused of committing crimes against
U.S. soldiers, much to the surprise of the defendants and their
461
attorneys, who expected to encounter kangaroo courts.
It should also be remembered that the CCCI judges currently
adjudicating the insurgency cases are not exactly operating at the
pinnacle of impartiality. Rather, they continue to exhibit extreme
bias as they regularly acquit obviously-guilty insurgents of serious
offences, and instead convict them for inanely minor crime or
sentence them to a few months in prison. So even assuming for the
sake of the argument that U.S. military judges could not be objective,
partial military judges would prove no worse than partial Iraqi
judges. Nearly anything would be an improvement over the status
quo.
Furthermore, under the judicial rule of necessity, U.S. judges are
qualified to hear cases against insurgents even though they may have
an interest in seeing insurgents punished for their misdeeds.4 62 This
principle of jurisprudence-having currency since at least 1430 when
it was invoked by the Chancellor of Oxford 4 6 3-holds that where all

judgment of a court the judge of which has a direct, personal, substantial,
pecuniary interest in reaching a conclusion against him in his case.
460.

In the words of Judge Bork:

I sat on the [military] court, and never saw an innocent man convicted but did
see a guilty man acquitted ....
Even then, before the widespread reform of the
military justice system, military courts manned by officers, in my opinion and
that of many others, were superior to the run of civilian courts, more
scrupulous in examining the evidence and following the plain import of the law.
Bork, supra note 38.
461.
FRAENKEL, supra note 139, at 164.
462.
See Will v. United States, 499 U.S. 200, 214 (1980).
463.
See id. at 213-14 ("The rule of necessity had its genesis at least five and a
half centuries ago. Its earliest recorded invocation was in 1430, when it was held that
the Chancellor of Oxford could act as judge of a case in which he was a party when
there was no provision for appointment of another judge."); Evans v. Gore, 253 U.S.
245, 247-48 (1920) (holding that the Court had jurisdiction to hear a case challenging
the federal government's imposition of a tax that affected the entire federal judiciary
because "there was no other appellate tribunal to which under the law" appeal could be
made, and "precedents reaching back many years" supported the exercise of
jurisdiction in the case).
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qualified judicial officers have a personal interest in a case and none
can be found lacking such an interest, by necessity, the lot must fall
to the existing judiciary to render a decision in the case. 464 This
doctrine has been held to be applicable in the United States when
federal judges were called upon to adjudicate a claim by federal
judges concerning an alleged reduction in pay and their interests
under the Tenure and Salary Clause of Article III of the
Constitution. 465 Because every federal judge would be affected by the
decision, all judges had an interest in the case. Nevertheless, under
the rule of necessity, the courts considered themselves fit to hear the
case. 46 6 Likewise, since both U.S. and Iraqi judges ostensibly have an
interest in the outcome of terrorism cases, and somebody must decide
these cases, there is nothing improper about a U.S. judge taking on
this role. Furthermore, even if some impartial judges could be found
from other nations-ostensibly negating the necessity of using U.S.
judges--only the United States enjoys a special moral right to try the
terrorists who have killed U.S. soldiers. In short, the United States
owes a duty to its soldiers, both living and dead, to have U.S. jurists
try the terrorist who have murdered or attacked U.S. soldiers. 46 7 The
"United States as a democratic polity owes its citizens, its people, and
particularly those who died and lost loved ones, justice according to
United States traditions. It owes our people our justice and should
see that our justice is done to those who have attacked us. 468

464.
Will, 449 U.S. at 213 ("although a judge had better not, if it can be avoided,
take part in the decision of a case in which he has any personal interest, yet he not only
may but must do so if the case cannot be heard otherwise") (quoting F. POLLACK, A
FIRST BOOK OF JURISPRUDENCE 270 (6th ed. 1929)).

465.
Id.
466.
Id.
467.
Military tribunals could also be an effective tool in teaching Iraqi judges
how cases should be adjudicated. Iraqi judges could observe first-hand how to
administer justice fairly, something they had little experience with under Hussein's
regime. Military judges could prove to be effective tutors for any Iraqi judge interested
in learning about the rule of law as it exists in criminal proceedings.
468.
See Anderson, infra note 523, at 597 (emphasis in original).
Anderson was speaking about the September 11 terrorists and their supporters,
but his analysis also holds true with respect to Iraq. Although it is true that even
when U.S. troops are attacked in Iraq this is also an attack on the Iraqi people,
Americans are the primary victims and the primary targets. And because such conduct
violates two sets of laws, American and Iraqi, if the Iraqis are serious about
prosecuting such terrorists, under a theory of dual sovereignty they should be free to do
so, after the insurgents have finished sentences imposed by the U.S. courts. See Heath
v. Alabama, 474 U.S. 82, 88 (1985) (noting that when "a defendant in a single act
violates the 'peace and dignity' of two sovereigns by breaking the law of each, he has
committed two distinct 'offenses"' and can be held criminally liable for both).
Similarly, under international law, when one sovereign inadequately punishes its
own citizens for war crimes, the offended sovereign may itself punish the criminals for
their misdeeds. FRAENKEL, supra note 139, at 66 (quoting ALFRED VON VERDROSS, DIE
VOLKERRECHTSWIDRIGE KRIEGSHANDLUNG UND DER STRAFANSPRUCH DER STAATEN 25

(1923)) ('There is nothing in international law that would oblige any state to refrain
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2. The Protection of Witnesses
Trials before U.S.-run occupation courts would also permit Iraqi
witnesses to testify with a diminished fear of reprisal. As it stands
now, almost no Iraqis ever testify in the CCCI for the United States,
despite the fact that almost all attacks that lead to criminal
prosecution are witnessed by numerous Iraqi citizens. Besides the
loyalty to terrorists that some Iraqis feel, the reason for this dearth of
testimony is obvious. In Iraq, "assassins mix with ordinary people
and any man who squeals to authorities is all but guaranteed a quick
death for himself, and probably his wife and children as well."469 The
halls of the CCCI courthouse are a regular haunt of those loyal to the
insurgency (including the guards assigned to defend the courthouse),
and only Iraqis with suicidal ideations would agree to testify there.
Moving trials to a U.S. military courtroom would ensure a level of
safety for Iraqis that they do not currently enjoy.
Of course, the only practicable way to ensure the safety of Iraqi
witnesses is to permit them to testify as they do before the Iraqi
Special Tribunal, from behind a screen and with their voices distorted
to protect their identities.
The alternative to such modifications are: (1) holding no trials of
insurgents and either: (a) detaining them indefinitely; or (b) releasing
them (a bad idea, since it allows them to continue fighting for the
insurgency); (2) holding trials in which Iraqi witnesses are
unprotected (another bad idea, since they would promptly be killed
and cooperation would soon dry up faster than a raindrop in an Iraqi
dessert); (3) holding trials in which there are no Iraqi witnesses (this
only works if there are other witnesses to satisfy the prosecution's
burden of proof); or (4) providing round-the-clock protection to
witnesses and their families indefinitely, for any Iraqi who testifies
(not practicable insofar as it would take a brigade or two to
accomplish this task-recall that many Iraqi men have multiple
wives and numerous children-and even then insurgents could strike
relatives of the witnesses or assassinate them after U.S. forces have
left Iraq).
So anonymous testimony seems to be a reasonable
accommodation of the rights of witnesses and the rights of
defendants.
Such practices obviously are not ideal and do not comport with
an original understanding of the Confrontation Clause of the U.S.
Constitution. For these reasons they should never become the
common practice in Iraq. But the situation in Iraq-a war-is hardly

from prosecuting those violators of law who would otherwise be inadequately punished
or not punished at all: if violators of the rules of warfare are not punished by their own
state 'a concurrent criminal jurisdiction of the violated state seems to be justified."').
469.
Borzou Daragahi, Insurgent Suspects Spurn "Peace Day," WASH. TIMES,
Jan. 19, 2005, at A13.
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the ideal one, and reasonableness dictates some compromises in the
pursuit of justice.
3.

A Reasonable Accommodation of the Rights of Accused Terrorists
and the Responsibility for Waging War Effectively

Undoubtedly alien enemy combatants-usually Iraqis-captured
while attempting to murder U.S. soldiers are entitled to some rights
and protections.
They are not, however, entitled to all the
constitutional rights that U.S. citizens enjoy. Furthermore, although
they are entitled to some process to safeguard their rights, the
exigencies of combat, and the fact that Iraqi terrorists do not comply
with the Geneva Conventions, means that they are entitle to less
process than would otherwise be due. 470 It is important to remember
that the "U.S. Constitution is not a document for the entire world. It
is not a pact with the world, or a pact among people generally in the
world. It is a document among the members of a particular political
community, and its burdens and benefits accrue to them."'471 Were
this not the case, any alien terrorists operating in Iraq would be fully
entitled to the same rights as U.S. citizens.
Courts would be
compelled to exclude evidence whenever insurgents were not given
Miranda warnings or because they confessed during custodial
interrogation after they had requested an attorney. 472
Soon
interrogators would be compelled to give Miranda warnings and
sources of actionable intelligence would quickly dry up. Soldiers
would also be required to obtain search or arrest warrants, or
demonstrate probable cause before detaining terrorists. They would
have to risk their lives to ensure prompt arraignment after arrest.
Many U.S. soldiers would quickly conclude that the risks to their
473
lives that these rules impose is not worth the potential benefit.

470.
Cf. Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 522 (2003) ("Congress may make rules as
to aliens that would be unacceptable if applied to citizens."); Landon v. Plasencia, 459
U.S. 21, 34 (1982) ('The constitutional sufficiency of procedures provided in any
situation . . .varies with the circumstances."); In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 17 (1946)
(holding that a military tribunal defendant is not entitled to all of the protections
afforded defendants in an U.S. criminal court); Anderson, infra note 525, at 612 ("The
case for full U.S. constitutional protection is strongest when dealing with U.S. citizen
on the territory of the United States . . .while the weakest case is a non-U.S. citizens
on foreign territory").
471.
Anderson, supranote 524, at 611-12.
472.
Bruce Fein, War is Not a Criminal Trial, WASH. TIMES, Feb. 8, 2005, at A14
('The Supreme Court has never even hinted that the exclusionary rule should be
employed to free a known enemy.").
473.
U.S. soldiers in Iraq, in response to the CCCI's bizarre rules, are already
asking why they should risk their lives to capture terrorists alive when the result is
merely acquittals and inadequate sentences.
In the words of one soldier. "I'm
constantly asking myself, 'Why should I risk my life and the lives of my soldiers to
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They would simply choose not to arrest the terrorists, particularly
since even an innocent or unwitting failure to comply with the letter
of these rules would result in suppression of the arrest or the
474
evidence.
Of course, treating unlawful foreign combatants as U.S. criminal
defendants would also entail the necessity of training soldiers on the
finer points of constitutional law, which itself would require
significant time and valuable resources that otherwise could be
utilized to defeat the enemy. 475 Rights entail a cost, and the cost of
giving terrorists the full panoply of constitutional rights would be
paid with U.S. blood. In the end, such a policy would prove suicidal.
Many lives, both Iraqi and U.S., would be sacrificed on the altar of
distorted due process simply to satisfy the concerns of the overly
scrupulous. 4 76 "Due process" is necessarily "flexible and calls for such
'477
procedural protections as the particular situation demands.
"[W]hat is due process of law depends on circumstances. It varies
'478
with the subject-matter and the necessities of the situation.
Frequently, "military exigency renders resort to the traditional
criminal process impracticable. '4 79 Fair trials conducted in light of
the totality of wartime circumstances-not perfect trials according to
civilian due process standards 48 0 -are all that law, morality, and
48
common sense require for captured terrorists. '

detain someone who will only be put back on the streets in a matter of months?"'
Grossman, supra note 16.
474.
Daniel Philpott, Commentary, Along With Trials, Iraq Needs Truth,
BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 8, 2005, at A19 ("Due process, legal procedures, and adversarial
incentives often hinder the public revelation of the truth .... ). Philpott was speaking
about trials involving major war criminals, but his words ring equally true with respect
to minor war criminals, like the terrorists in Iraq.
475.
For that reason, they were not used by the U.S. military courts in Germany
following World War II. NOBLEMAN, supra note 74, at 39-40 (U.S. military courts in
Germany "conformed closely to the procedures followed by courts-martial, and lacked,
of necessity, many of the safeguards of the Anglo-American system of justice to which
we are accustomed. For the most part, they were concerned with the protection of the
security of the armed forces of the occupant.").
476.
The "due process analysis need not blink at" the realities of war. Hamdi v.
Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. 2633, 2647 (2004) (plurality opinion).
477.
Greenholtz v. Neb. Penal Inmates, 442 U.S. 1, 12 (1979).
478.
Moyer v. Peabody, 212 U.S. 78, 84 (1909) (Holmes, J.).
479.
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. 2633, 2664 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
480.
Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 681 (1986) (noting that the
Constitution "entitles a criminal defendant to a fair trial, not a perfect one."). It is
important to remember that the insurgents in Iraq have no rights under the U.S.
Constitution, but some constitutional principles are expressions of natural rights
enjoyed by all men and women, regardless of citizenship. The point here is that if the
Constitution itself does not compel a perfect trial even for U.S. citizens, there is no
reason to believe that morality requires a perfect trial for captured terrorists.
481.
"The right of the accused in a criminal trial to due process is, in essence,
the right to a fair opportunity to defend against the state's accusations." Chambers v.
Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 294 (1973).
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It is beyond doubt that constitutional protections have immense
value in civil and military justice, but it would be ludicrous to
attempt a dispassionate application of these principles while in the
midst of a raging war.
In waging war against a murderous
insurgency the criminal law must give way to the law of necessity,
including the necessity of administering justice as the exigencies of
war permit. 48 2 U.S. military courts are better suited to deciding
when such exigencies require the curtailing of criminal process than
is the CCCI.
This is not to say that military courts would necessarily decline
to provide many of the rights available to defendants in the United
States. Some departure from such extensive rights is warranted by
the extreme circumstances of warfare, the fact that terrorists refuse
to abide by the Geneva Convention and other aspects of international
law, 483 and the costs that extensive rights entail. But there are also
important reasons for providing as many rights as the particular
situation permits, particularly in occupation courts where the native
population requires instruction in and experience with the rule of
law. 484 The military commissions created for the Al Qaeda and
Taliban terrorists ensure a long list of rights for those defendants.
These include:
(1)
(2)

(3)
(4)

the rebuttable presumption that the accused is
innocent;
the right to be informed of the charges in advance of
trial and in a language that the defendant
understands;
the right to review, before trial, the evidence the
prosecution intends to present at trial;
the right to receive from the prosecution exculpatory
or Brady evidence;

482.
See Editorial, Setting Rules for Detainees, WASH. POST, Jan. 21, 2005, at
A16 ("Only the most doctrinaire civil libertarian would contend that foreign nationals
making war on American in foreign theaters are entitled to the full protections of the
criminal justice system.").
483.
"[Clontrary to the fantasies of the international-law and human rights
lobbies, a world in which... rights are indiscriminately doled out is not a safer or more
just world." See Mac Donald, supranote 451.
484.
HUNT, supra note 98, at 100-01:
As that army conducts itself, so is the world largely to regard the country which
it represents. If its army is dishonorable in its relations with a fallen foe and
treats the population with injustice and subjects the people to a rule more
harsh than is necessary for the preservation of order and the establishment of
proper decorum and respect, that army and the country it represents are bound
to stand in disrepute before the civilized world.
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(5)
(6)

the requirement that the prosecution prove the
defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt;
48 5
a full and fair trial;

(7)

a public trial, except when classified materials are
presented or the safety of witnesses requires
otherwise;

(8)

the right to be present at his trial (except during the
presentation of classified materials or when the
safety of witnesses requires otherwise);
the opportunity to make opening and closing
statements;
the opportunity to present a defense, to testify in his
own defense, submit evidence, and to call defense
witnesses (subject to rules protecting sensitive
information);
the opportunity to cross-examine prosecution
witnesses;
48 6
the right to remain silent;

(9)
(10)

(11)
(12)
(13)

(14)

the right not to have the military commission draw
an adverse inference from the decision to remain
48 7
silent;
the right to submit rebuttal evidence;

485.
All rights granted to defendants are meant to ensure a fair trial. Thus, all
of these rights are negated and meaningless if the trials are rigged, as some have
alleged. See Jess Bravin, Two ProsecutorsAt Guantanamo Quit in Protest, WALL ST. J.,
Aug. 1, 2005, at B1 ('Two Air Force prosecutors quit last year rather than take part in
military trials they considered rigged against alleged terrorists held at Guantanamo
Bay, Cuba."); Neil A. Lewis, Two Prosecutors Faulted Trials for Detainees, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 1, 2005, at Al ("two senior prosecutors complained in confidential messages last
year that the trial system had been secretly arranged to improve the chance of
conviction and to deprive defendants of material that could prove their innocence"); but
see Guy Taylor, Pentagon Finds No Fault with Gitmo Trial System, WASH. TIMES, Aug.
2, 2005, at A3 ('The Pentagon yesterday said it had conducted an internal probe into
criticisms by military prosecutors about the fairness of the trial system for terror
suspects detained at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, and concluded that the
accusations were unfounded.").
486.
This is a right that was not enjoyed by German defendants in U.S. military
courts following Post World War II Germany. NOBLEMAN, supra note 74, at 103:
[An accused was afforded no privilege whatever against self-incrimination, and
the court was not permitted to warn him that he was not required to answer
when questions were put to him. However, neither was the court permitted to
compel the accused to answer any questions or to testify on his own behalf, and
no punishment could be imposed for so refusing.
This right, too, was not extended to Germans tried in U.S. military courts.
487.
Id. (If a defendant refused to answer a question, "the court was permitted to drawn an
unfavorable inference from such refusal.").
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the right to legal counsel of the defendant's choice
(so long as the counsel can obtain a Secret level
security clearance);
the right to appointed legal counsel, at no cost to the
defendant;
the right not to be convicted absent the concurrence
of two-thirds of the commission panel members;
the right to submit mitigating evidence during
sentencing;
the right to testify at sentencing;
the right to receive a sentence in which at least twothirds of the panel members concur;
the right not to be sentenced to death absent the
unanimous concurrence of the panel members;
the right to review of the trial and sentence by the
Appointing Authority, the Review Panel, and the
Secretary of Defense;
the right to present a written appeal to reviewing
authorities; 48 8 and
the right to appeal the decision to an Article III
48 9
court composed of civilian judges.

These are significant rights which are afforded to defendants at
considerable expense to the United States. 490 They also exceed the

488.
See 32 C.F.R. §§ 9.1-9.10, available at http://www.defenselink.mil/news/
Aug2004/commissions-orders.html (promulgated March 21, 2002). This list obviously
lacks the right to speedy trial, which would not always be possible in light of
extraordinary circumstances associated with war. To the extent that the defendant
can be excluded when certain witnesses testify or when classified evidence is
presented, these procedures also would not comport with the Confrontation Clause,
even though the Supreme Court has minimized the effect of this clause. See Maryland
v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836 (1990) (permitting testimony of child abuse victim to be
transmitted into the courtroom via one-way television so that the victim need not
encounter the defendant).
489.
Thus, these unlawful combatants enjoy rights beyond those safeguarded in
the U.S. Constitution insofar as even American Criminal defendants do not have a
constitutional right to appeal their sentences. Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751
(1983) ('There is, of course, no constitutional right to an appeal .. ");
Abney v. United
States, 431 U.S. 651, 656 (1977) ("[1]t is well settled that there is no constitutional
right to an appeal."). Rather, a defendant's right to appeal his sentence is a statutory
one. See 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a); United States v. Blick, 408 F.3d 162, 167 (4th Cir. 2005)
("A criminal defendant's right to appeal a sentence arises under 18 U.S.C. § 3742.").
490.
Despite these significant rights, "it still remains true that military
tribunals have not been and probably never can be constituted in such a way that they
can have the same kind of qualifications that the Constitution has deemed essential to
fair trials of civilians in federal courts." United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S.
11, 17 (1955). The U.S. military commissions in Germany following World War I had
similar procedures:
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rights provided defendants in many European countries where, for
example, defendants do not always enjoy the right to cross examine or
confront adverse witnesses and where an adverse inference can be
drawn from the defendant's refusal to answer questions. 49 1 They also
exceed the rights that defendants now enjoy in the CCCI (unless a
right to biased judges is counted among the rights that the terrorists
now enjoy). Thus, there is every reason to believe that U.S. military
courts employed in Iraq could operate in a fashion that affords
They could also remain
accused terrorists similar rights. 492
sufficiently flexible so as not to jeopardize the safety of military
personnel or the success of their missions. Thus, military courts
could prove both fair to defendants and effective bodies for assessing
guilty and administering punishments. 493 Ultimately, if Iraq ever
became more stable, it might be possible to give Iraqi defendants
almost identical rights to those enjoyed by U.S. military personnel

Procedure in Provost Courts, both Superior and Inferior, was required
to be uniform. Written charges were filed. They were not required to
be formal, but to state only the substance of the offense, the name of the
alleged offender, and the place where and time when the offense was
said to have occurred. It was required that every person tried by a
Provost Court should be informed of the charges upon which he was to
be tried, that he should be present in person at the trial, and that he
should be confronted with the witness against him. It was further
required that he should be permitted to be heard either in person or by
counsel. Bail was denied the accused, but a speedy hearing was
guaranteed him.
All evidence was required to be under oath.
Sentences were put into immediate execution without awaiting action
of the reviewing authority.
HUNT, supra note 98, at 93-94. Military commissions dealing with more serious
crimes-those involving punishments in excess of six months of imprisonmentgenerally followed the rules of a general court martial. Id. at 94.
491.
Civil law countries generally permit their judges to draw an adverse
inference from a defendant's refusal to answer questions. MERRYMAN, supra note 94,
at 130 (A defendant's "refusal to answer, as well as his answers, will be taken into
account in deciding questions of guilt or in fixing the penalty.").
492.
The full extent of the rights enjoyed by the Guantanamo defendants is not
clear. A commission set up in Iraq could make explicit that the defendants enjoy the
right to reasonable adjournments, the right to self representation, the right to compel
witnesses to testify and subpoena witnesses (within limits), the right not to be tried for
ex post facto crimes, the right to a speedy trial under the circumstances, and a right
against double jeopardy.
493.
Using military commissions would also entail the use of stare decisis and
precedent, a concept with both sharia and the civil law fail to fully appreciate.
ESPOSITO, supra note 91, at 86 ("Islamic lad does not recognize a case law system of
legally binding precedents."); Rahim, supra note 85, at 266 ("The Mohammedan
jurisprudence ... does not accept legislation by the State as a legitimate source of law.
Nor does it admit the principle of judge-made law. The Qadhi's legal pronouncement
were binding only for the decision of the particular case before him, but had no value as
a precedent."). These two concepts would undoubtedly benefit both the prosecution and
the defense.
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under the Uniform Code of Military Justice, 494 as the United States
did in its military courts in Germany. 495 This is a lofty goal towards
which U.S. military lawyers could strive, and a realization of this goal
would permit Iraqis to observe first-hand how the rule of law operates
496
in a democracy.
Military courts would also permit Iraqi defendants a level of
fairness they do not currently enjoy in the CCCI. This is particularly
important for accused insurgents who lack the funds to pay bribes or
who are members of a tribe that has an acrimonious relationship with
one of the judges' respective tribes.
Rather than half-hearted
representation by Iraqi defense attorneys of dubious quality, the
defendants would have the benefit of a U.S. military lawyer well
versed in the Uniform Code of Military Justice.
These skilled
advocates could assist the defendants in presenting a cogent defense,
perhaps thereby preventing the conviction of the innocent. 497 Their
zealous advocacy would prove to be a substantial improvement over
the lackluster performance exhibited by many of the Iraqi defense
attorneys.
4. Implementation of Fair and Modern Evidentiary Rules
With respect to evidentiary law, U.S. military tribunals would
entail a system much closer to the Western standards of due process
and would not involve sharia-basedrules of evidence. Because the

494.
The United States, when occupying a nation, should always strive to create
parity between its treatment of the inhabitants of the occupied zone and its own troops,
to the extent circumstances permit, and only when the inhabitants are not terrorists
and are not openly hostile to the military power. Johnson & Graham's Lessee v.
M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 589 (1823) (Marshal, C.J.) (offering that as a matter
of human dignity the conquered should not be wantonly oppressed). Moves have been
made to make the Guantanamo trials more like U.S. civilian courts. See Jess Bravin,
U.S. Moves to Bolster Rights of Guantanamo Terror Defendants, WALL ST. J., Aug. 31,
2005, at A4 ("The Bush administration, responding to criticism that it had stacked
procedures to favor convictions of Guantanamo Bay prisoners, will introduce
procedures that will significantly expand defendants' rights before military
commissions.").
495.
NOBLEMAN, supra note 74, at 178.
496.
"It may seem paradoxical that the one agency of the military government,
created primarily for the protection of the occupation forces, [the military courts], has
developed into the foremost example of democracy in action in the United States Area
of Control of Germany." Id. at 192.
497.
This would require additional Arabic translators, a scarce resource in Iraq.
See Thomas X. Hammes, Lost in Translation, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 25, 2005, at A23 (noting
the dearth of Arabic translators and Iraq, the problems this presents for troops seeking
to communicate with Iraqis and vice versa); John M. Glionna & Ashraf Khalil, "Combat
Linguists" Battle On Two Fronts, L.A. TIMES, June 5, 2005, at 1 ("U.S. troops often
must rely on hand signals in communicating with Iraqis as entire combat brigades
struggle to make do with only one native Arabic-speaking U.S. soldier."); Morre, supra
note 123, at 1 (relating how Iraqis "struggle to communicate with the troops, who often
lack interpreters.").
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sharia law entailed harsh penalties-including stoning, whipping,
amputation, and decapitation-there was a need for almost absolute
certainty in convictions. 498 Accordingly, Islamic evidentiary lawelements of which the CCCI apparently has adopted-requires an
extremely high standard of proof, what some might call proof "beyond
any doubt, reasonable or not. ' 499 Furthermore, Islamic evidentiary
law, in a misguided effort to admit only evidence ostensibly of the
highest quality, 50 0 is irrationally hung up on the form of the
evidence-namely, oral testimony, and only oral testimony, from
multiple eyewitnesses. 50 1 Indeed, as mentioned above, sharia only
allows three types of evidence which were thought to entail a high
degree of accuracy: eyewitness testimony, confessions, and religious
oaths. 50 2 Barring a confession, which jihadists are unlikely to utter
voluntarily, eyewitness testimony is seen by Islamic law as the
pinnacle of reliability. This is not so in the United States, where
eyewitness testimony is valued more realistically. In U.S. courts,
eyewitness testimony is understood to have substantial shortcomings,
50 3
which have been widely discussed of late.
These shortcomings are really defects inherent in human
memory and character. Because eyewitness testimony relies on the

498.
LIPPMAN ET AL., supra note 84, at 2-3 ("The proof of offenses under Islamic
law requires the satisfaction of strict evidentiary requirements which establish a
certainty of guilt. This certainty is said to legitimate infliction of the relatively harsh
Koranic penalties."). "[I]t is held that the rigidity of Islamic criminal procedure, which
requires a certainty of guilt, both limits and legitimizes severe punishment of offenses
against the rights of God." Id. at 121.
Id. at 121.
499.
RUTHVEN, supra note 293, at 146 (noting that sharia is 'divorced from
reality' particularly in the realm of criminal procedure, where rigid standards of proof
make conviction difficult."); see also SEYYED HOSSEIN NASR, THE HEART OF ISLAM 15253 (2002) (noting the difficulty of convicting a defendant under shariaevidentiary law).
Characterizing the prosecutor's tasks as "difficult" is a gross understatement.
"Impossible" would be more accurate.
LIPPMAN ET AL., supra note 84, at 68 (The "Islamic criminal process is
500.
preserved by rules that permit only evidence having a high degree of reliability. This is
said to limit conviction and punishment to cases in which there is a certainty of the
defendant's guilt."). The goal may be certainty, but the reality is far from it.
501.
RUTHVEN, supra note 293, at 172.
502.
LIPPMAN ET AL., supra note 84, at 68 ("Islamic law ... limits the evidence
admissible at trial to three types that are thought to possess a high degree of
reliability: eyewitness testimony, confessions, and religious oaths.").
503.
"Eyewitness descriptions are notoriously full of inaccuracies." Gramenos v.
Jewel Companies, Inc., 797 F.2d 432, 438 (7th Cir. 1986) (citing ELIZABETH F. LOFTUS,
EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY: PSYCHOLOGICAL RESEARCH AND LEGAL THOUGHT, 3 CRIME
AND JUSTICE: AN ANNUAL REVIEW OF RESEARCH 105 (1981)); Jackson v. Fogg, 589 F.2d
108, 112 (2d Cir. 1978) ("Centuries of experience in the administration of criminal
justice have shown that convictions based solely on testimony that identifies a
defendant previously unknown to the witness is highly suspect. Of all the various
kinds of evidence it is the least reliable .... "); Sharon Begley, Inertia, Hope, Morality
Score TKO in Bouts With 'Solid Science,' WALL ST. J., June 6, 2003, at Bi ("Decades of
research have demonstrated the fallibility of eyewitness memory of crimes.").
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fallible memory of humans-or in some cases humans who have
mastered the art of deceit-it does not always provide an accurate
and unbiased picture of the events at issue. The U.S. law of evidence,
though itself imperfect, is further advanced than shariainsofar as it
recognizes these inherent flaws. U.S. law places a substantial but
reasonable burden on the prosecution to prove its case with the
available evidence. U.S. evidence law also protects defendants from
obviously unreliable or incredible evidence (though not absolutely).
In balancing the interests of excluding unreliable evidence and
permitting the parties to submit the evidence they think most
helpful, U.S. law permits a greater breadth of evidence than just
eyewitness testimony-such as scientific evidence-which the Iraqis
eschew. 50 4 As many U.S. jurists have learned, on the reliability
spectrum a small strand of DNA is often worth much more than an
army of eyewitnesses. 50 5
Because some of the evidence necessary to convict insurgents is
classified "secret," military commissions are also the better venue for
these prosecutions. These tribunals would permit the utilization of
classified information by both the prosecution and the defense.
Because the judges, prosecutors, and defense attorneys would all
possess security clearances, they could review evidence presented by
the prosecutors and any exculpatory classified materials the defense
counsel might present.
A military court could also clarify when hearsay evidence,
deposition testimony, and opinion evidence would be permitted. 506

504.
Fabian, supra note 95 (noting that-according to United States Attorney
for the Middle District of Georgia, Maxwell Wood, who is working in Iraq revamping
the Iraqi judicial system-the Iraqis are not experienced with scientific evidence and
prefer to rely on direct testimony).
505.
"Of the scores of people exonerated by DNA evidence, about three-quarters
were convicted based on incorrect eyewitness IDs." Begley, supra note 502, at B1.
506.
The military tribunals at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba permit the admission of
hearsay if the judge determines that the evidence would be probative to a reasonable
person. See Department of Defense, Military Commission Order No. 1,
6(D)(1)
(March 21, 2004), available at http://www.defenselink.mil/newsMar2002d2O02O32 lord.
pdf ("Evidence shall be admitted if, in the opinion of the Presiding Officer . . .the
evidence would have probative value to a reasonable person."); Editorial, Due Process
for Terrorists, WALL ST. J., Mar. 22, 2004, at A14 (noting that the order relating to the
Guantanamo tribunals "requires that military courts consider any evidence deemed
'probative' (or tending to prove) to a 'reasonable person.'). As mentioned above, the
Uniform Code of Military Justice permits the admission of deposition testimony in
certain cases. See 10 U.S.C. § 849(d).
Some tinkering with certain evidentiary rules is not fatal to the fairness of
proceedings.
At various times evidentiary rules have been characterized as
"discretionary canons for the guidance of the trial court" from which a court may depart
"where their particular application seems unwise." Charles T. McCormick, The
Borderland of Hearsay, 39 YALE L.J. 489, 489 (1930) (criticizing this idea); see also
A.A.S. ZUCKERMAN, THE PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL EVIDENCE 183 (1989) (The hearsay

"rule is at odds with common sense and as a result our judges have had to resort to
numerous ploys to arrest the more extreme excesses of its operation."). Some legal
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Traditionally these types of evidence have been admitted in U.S.
military courts, and presumably these would be admitted with
greater liberality than in civilian courts, 50 7 so as to minimize the
disruptions to military operations that court appearances by U.S.
soldiers would create. 508 This is particularly important in Iraq,
because absence of soldiers from the theatre of operations can
deleteriously affect military actions. 50 9
Also, because Iraqi

scholars will balk at any alteration of hearsay rules, but under the law as it now
stands, there are numerous exceptions to the general rule excluding hearsay. See FED.
R. EVID. 801(d), 803, 804(b).
507.
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. 2633, 2649 (2004) (plurality opinion):
[Elnemy combatant proceedings may be tailored to alleviate their uncommon
potential to burden the Executive in time of ongoing military conflict. Hearsay,
for example, may need to be accepted as the most reliable available evidence
from the Government in such a proceeding. Likewise the Constitution would
not be offended by a presumption in favor of the Government's evidence so long
as the presumption remained a rebuttable one and fair opportunity for rebuttal
were provided.
Notably, the Hamdi plurality made these evidentiary concessions for the habeas
proceedings in a civilian court involving an U.S. citizen held in the United States.
Thus, military tribunals in a foreign jurisdiction involving non-U.S. aliens would
presumably be afforded similar latitude in light of the diminished applicability of the
Constitution to such fora.
508.
Otherwise, "military officers who are engaged in the serious work of waging
battle would be unnecessarily and dangerously distracted by litigation" of insurgency
cases. Id. at 2648 (paraphrasing the government's argument); Civilian evidentiary
rules would also endanger troops as they would be forced to pursue an oftentimes
"futile search for evidence buried under the rubble of war" or found in dangerous areas
of Iraq. Id.
U.S. soldiers in Iraq chafe under the burdens the CCCI has placed on them with
respect to evidence collection. Grossman, supra note 16. ("Yet a number of officers in
Iraq say they lack sufficient resources to consistently construct prosecutable cases for
Iraqi courts-and at the same time fight the insurgency, protect the population from
attack, and build and train the new Iraqi security forces."). So any replacement system
must be mindful of the limited resources and the priorities of a soldier.
509.
The Hamdi plurality opined that "arguments that military officers ought
not to have to wage war under the threat of litigation lose much of their steam when
factual disputes at enemy-combatant hearings are limited to the alleged combatant's
acts." Hamdi, 124 S. Ct. at 2649. This makes little sense to anyone who has been in
battle, or even read accounts of battles. The plurality appears to be clueless about the
realities of many battlefields, especially those in Iraq and Afghanistan. At least in
Iraq, these battles frequently involve ambushes by non-uniformed guerillas who give
no warning. Not only are the troops taken by complete surprise, the ambushes are
frequently preceded by detonation of explosive devices. Besides trying to keep their
wounded buddies from dying, and protecting their own lives, the troops are frequently
receiving enemy fire, from machine guns, and often rocket propelled grenades. In
returning fire-their only hope of extricating themselves alive-they must discriminate
between enemy combatants-who don't wear uniforms-and the civilian population,
which frequently includes screaming women and children, which further adds to the
confusion and impedes communication among the troops. In the back of their minds,
they have to worry about being tried for a law of war violation themselves, perhaps for
mistakenly killing a civilian, perhaps one carrying a stick which during the firefight
looked like a rifle.
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defendants might choose self-representation or representation by
Iraqi counsel-and presumably they are not intimately familiar with
common law evidentiary rules and trial procedures-incorporation of
these complexities would also prove inimical to the defense. Thus, in
fairness to defendants and to promote the consideration of a broad
scope of relevant evidence, U.S. military courts presumably would
strive to keep procedural and evidentiary rules as uncomplicated and
straightforward as possible.5 10
This liberality and evidentiary simplicity has been used before in
military courts-particularly in post-World War II Germany 51 1-and
also in U.S. civilian courts. At the time of the United States'
founding, hearsay was liberally admitted in courts, although it was
sometimes held insufficient to support a conviction when it was the
only evidence establishing a particular fact.5 12
Thus, greater
liberality in admission of hearsay is not unprecedented.
More
recently, the hearsay rule has been much criticized as excluding
highly probative evidence without producing a benefit (the exclusion
of unreliable evidence) commensurate with the extent of the
exclusion.5 13 In short, its costs may outweigh its benefits in some

In such trying times, the troops are not in a position to collect evidence, preserve
chains of custody, or carefully craft affidavits describing their ordeal. And since they
have not had a chance to spend quality time with their attackers, they can hardly
identify them by name. Zoroya & Jervis, supra note 21, at 1 (noting that 8,800 Iraqis
have been released by U.S. forces in part because "there was not enough evidence to
prosecute them").
510.
U.S. military courts in post-World War II Germany sought simplicity in
rules and procedures because "it was assumed that continental people would not be
able to comprehend the Anglo-American system with its pleas, privileges and
immunities and other fundamental safeguards." NOBLEMAN, supra note 74, at 61.
"There would have been no point in requiring the observance by military government
courts of technical rules of evidence, which are unknown to German defendants and
their attorneys and would have served only to complicate matters." Id. at 101. But,
when matters were controverted, extra effort was made to obtain direct testimony of
witnesses, as opposed to hearsay. Id.

511.

Id. at 94.

512.
Crawford v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 1354, 1374 n.1 (2004) (Rehnquist, C.J.,
concurring in the judgment) ('"Modern scholars have concluded that at the time of the
founding the law had yet to fully develop the exclusionary component of the hearsay
rule and its attendant exceptions, and thus hearsay was still often heard by the jury.")
(citing T.P. Gallanis, The Rise of Modern Evidence Law, 84 IOWA L. REV. 499, 534-35
(1999)). Professor Gallanis noted that until at least 1780, English courts permissively
admitted hearsay evidence. Id. at 514-15.
513.
In the words of one scholar:
The principal criticism of the hearsay rule is that it is wider than its rationale
requires. Exclusions may be justified if hearsay is evidentially inferior, but the
rule excludes hearsay even when it is by no means inferior and even when it
represents the best available source of information. There are situations in
which hearsay, far from being inferior to direct oral testimony, is superior to it,
but the rule excludes evidence irrespective of its probative superiority. Thus a
witness is allowed to state his present recollection of a car registration number
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cases. Of course, the hearsay rules arose to ensure that laymen
serving on juries were not misled,5 14 and this concern is not
implicated in trials conducted by a panel of military officers or a
5 15
military judge.
Furthermore, the admission of some hearsay is probably
essential to the adjudication of cases against Iraqi terrorists, since
battlefield conditions will almost certainly prevent the appearance of
some witnesses. 516 "We cannot forget that we are at war, one our
enemy declares is a fight to the death. ''5 17 In light of the difficulties
combat engenders, hearsay, deposition testimony, and affidavits have
been liberally admitted in U.S. military courts. For example, British
Major John Andre was tried, convicted, and sentenced to death by a
Revolutionary War military tribunal in which the only witness who
testified was the defendant himself. 518 The rest of the evidence
against him consisted of letters and reports from others who could not
be present at the trial. Similarly, deposition testimony was widely
used in occupation courts in Germany, 519 at the Nuremberg tribunal,

he fleetingly observed many months before, but he is not allowed to produce as
independent evidence a note of the number he made soon after the observation.
A.A.S. ZUCKERMAN, THE PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL EVIDENCE 182 (1989).

514.
See MERRYMAN, supra note 94, at 117 (The desirability of' the rule
excluding hearsay, "particularly in nonjury trials, is often questioned, and the rule
itself is riddled with exceptions; but it survives to complicate trials and keep otherwise
competent and relevant evidence out of common law cases.").
515.
NOBLEMAN, supra note 74, at 97 ("Because military government court cases
were never tried to a jury, the formal rules of evidence which bind Anglo-American
courts were neither provided for nor necessary" in occupation courts in post-World War
II Germany). The English chancery courts liberally permitted hearsay because there
was no jury in the proceedings and the judge was considered competent to give hearsay
evidence its proper weight: "The canon law courts allowed the witnesses to give
hearsay evidence. The reasons we today do not allow it is that a jury is not felt to be
able to cope with it as well as a judge .... " William Hamilton Bryson, Witnesses: A
Canonist's View, 13 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 57, 63 (1969) ("The witness should not only
testify to those thing of which he has first-hand knowledge but also to that which he
learned from others."). This history of permitting hearsay evidence, and the many
exceptions to the rule excluding hearsay, "suggest that the rule is not a foreordained,
immutable decree of the Fates." Id.
516.
United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 18 (1955) ("To the extent
that those [soldiers] responsible for performance of this primary [military] function are
diverted from it by the necessity of trying cases, the basic fighting purpose of armies is
not served."). "Unlike courts, it is the primary business of armies and navies to
fight...." Id. at 17.
517.
Chertoff, supra note 35, at 18.
518.
Thomas C. Marmon et al, Military Commissions 70 (1953) (unpublished
LL.M. thesis) (on file with the Judge Advocate General's School, Charlottesville,
Virginia).
519.
In post-World War II Germany:
It was found in Bavaria that, when cases were referred to higher courts for
trial, considerable time had elapsed between the date of the arraignment and
reference and the date upon which the case came on for trial before the higher
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and in General Yamashita's trial 52 0 - perhaps too liberally in General
Yamashita's case. 521 But in Iraq, a U.S. military judge could make
the appropriate admissibility determination on a case-by-case basis
522
and thereby ensure that any hearsay evidence is reliable.
Although sharia forbids the admission of some hearsay
evidence, 523 in accordance with its civil law tradition the CCCI
generally permits hearsay evidence (particularly since neither the
Iraqi prosecutor nor the Iraqi defense counsel is likely to object), but
will also ignore hearsay according to the court's unbounded
discretion. 524 Assuming that this capriciousness sometimes inures to
the benefit of the prosecution and other times to the accused, a
consistent application of a rule regarding the admissibility or
excludability of hearsay evidence before a military court would prove
a boon to both the prosecution and defense. The CCCI already relies

court. As a result of this lag, civilian witnesses were no longer available,
military witnesses had been redeployed and the court had no evidenced upon
which to proceed. To meet this situation, the Chief Legal Office for Bavaria
issued a directive to all summary court officers directing them to make a record
of the military government's case, so as to perpetuate the testimony, in all
cases in which it appeared that the case would be referred to a higher court for
trial. This practice proved helpful, since Military Government Regulations
provided that the record of any evidence taken in the summary court must be
made available to the intermediate or general court, after hearing the
prosecution and defense, could receive in evidence the record of the testimony
of the witnesses in the lower court. This enabled the higher courts to proceed
with trial in the event the important witnesses were no longer available.
NOBLEMAN, supra note 74, at 94.
520.
Yamashita v. Styer, 327 U.S. 1, 18 (1946) (noting the admission of hearsay
evidence and deposition testimony).
521.
The standard for admissibility in General Yamashita's trial was rather
broad. See id. at 47 n.9 (Rutledge, J., dissenting) ("The commission shall admit such
evidence as in its opinion would be of assistance in proving or disproving the charge, or
such as in the commission's opinion would have probative value in the mind of a
reasonable man.") (quoting General MacArthur's directive). Federal Rule of Evidence
401 initially defines the term "relevant evidence" broadly, but the other rules of
evidence place significant limitations on admissibility.
See FED. R. EVID. 401
("'Relevant evidence' means evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any
fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less
probable than it would be without the evidence.").
522.
Again, this is not the ideal, but battlefield conditions sometimes necessitate
compromises.
523.
LIPPMAN ET AL., supra note 84, at 70 ("Testimony is limited to directly
observed events. Hearsay is inadmissible; one may not testify concerning events that
another allegedly observed.").
524.
IRAQI LAW ON CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS 213(A) (1971):
The court's verdict in a case is based on the extent to which it is satisfied by the
evidence presented during any stage of the inquiry or the hearing. Evidence
includes reports, witness statements, written records of an interrogation, other
official discoveries, reports of experts and technicians and other legally
established evidence.
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on the equivalent of deposition testimony-a written record of
witnesses' testimony before the investigative judge-so in a U.S.
tribunal a defendant would be no worse off than he currently stands
525
in the CCCI.
5.

Trials According to U.S. Law as Opposed to Sharia-Influenced
Iraqi Law

Perhaps the best reason for using U.S. military courts in Iraq is
their ability to supplant the CCCI's practice of utilizing shariainfluenced Iraqi law, which is full of anachronistic practices and
doctrines. 52 6 Among these is the rejection of the rule of law, insofar
as sharia and Iraqi law rejects the doctrine of stare decisis, 527 instead

525.
"A U.S. civilian court would probably exclude such testimony." See Motes v.
United States, 178 U.S. 458, 473 (1900) (holding that admission of deposition
testimony of an absent witness where the defendant was not responsible for the
witness's absence violated the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to confront adverse
witnesses). Where a witness-soldier is absent because of his duties related to militarily
thwarting the terrorists, it could be argued that in some sense the defendant caused
this absence where the defendant is part of the insurgent conspiracy the soldierwitness is fighting. Like the CCCI, European criminal courts and the Yugoslavia
tribunal both admit hearsay evidence. Kenneth Anderson, What to Do with Bin Laden
and Al Qaeda Terrorists?: A Qualified Defense of Military Commissions and United
States Policy on Detainees at Guantanamo Bay Naval Base, 25 HARV. J. L. & PUB.
POL'Y 591, 609 (2002).
526.
It's worth noting that in various places Moslems have created a separate,
secular court system to avoid the strictures of Islamic law, especially the anachronistic
burdens of proof, evidentiary standards, and presumptions that benefit guilty criminals
to the detriment of justice. LIPPMAN ET AL., supra note 84, at 97:
A second element in the development of a vigorous secular jurisdiction was the
inefficiency of the Shari'a courts as a result of their complicated and stringent
standards of procedure and evidence ....
The rigid, formalistic and mechanical
nature of Shari'a made these procedures slow and inefficient, and it was
impossible to convict criminals, thus in some cases promoting injustice and
militating against the plaintiff. Rulers had therefore to provide a more
practical criminal justice system to meet the every day needs of the state.
It is interesting the way the evolution of the courts is completely opposite in the
Anglo-American world. That is, in Islamic society, the secular courts arose to overcome
the formalism of the religious courts, while the Church-sponsored equity courts arose
in England to overcome the formalism and rigidity of the law courts.
527.
AMIN, supra note 22, at 180 (noting that Iraqi law "does not recognize
judicial precedent as binding").
The most striking difference between the Iraqi legal system, being that of a
civil law country, and the Anglo-American legal system is that judicial
precedent is not recognized in Iraq as a binding source of law. The doctrine of
stare decisis, never adopted unconditionally in Iraq, has been given the rank of
only secondary source of law in the Iraqi Civil Code 1951. Being a secondary
source, judicial precedent is not commonly adhered to by Iraqi courts.
Id. at 227.
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holding that each case is sui generis.5 28 Military courts also would
free prosecutors from the onerous two-witness rule of the CCCI,
which requires that every element of a charged offense by proven by
the testimony of two witness. 5 29 A system of military trials would
permit convictions where only one witness or some other evidence is
sufficiently convincing.
U.S. military courts would also allow
prosecutors to prosecute terrorists for attempted crimes and
conspiracies. 530 In contrast, the CCCI does not currently permit such
prosecutions or strongly disfavors them, 53 1 in part because of its
532
adherence to Islamic law, which frowns upon these practices.
Similarly, military prosecutors would not be constrained by the limits
of the anachronistic Iraqi-penal code. Currently, the offenses listed in
that code-and only those offenses-constitute the whole spectrum of
potential charges against the terrorists. A military tribunal would
permit U.S. prosecutors to charge insurgents with other crimesparticularly terrorism offenses-which would more effectively combat

528.
ESPOSITO, supra note 91, at 86 ("Islamic law does not recognize a case law
system of legally binding precedents."); J.N.D. Anderson, A Law of PersonalStatus for
Iraq, 9 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 542, 545 (1960) (noting that "the doctrine of stare decisis is
unknown" in the Islamic tradition); Rahim, supra note 85, at 266 ("The Mohammedan
jurisprudence... does not accept legislation by the State as a legitimate source of law.
Nor does it admit the principle of judge-made law. The Qadhi's legal pronouncement
were binding only for the decision of the particular case before him, but had no value as
a precedent."). Stare decisis and the rule of law would undoubtedly benefit both the
prosecution and the defense.
529.
LIPPMAN ET AL., supra note 84, at 69.
530.
A plurality of the Supreme Court recently held that "conspiracy" is not a
crime under the law of war. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2780-81 (2006)
(plurality opinion). Justice Thomas's dissent, however, refutes this position. Hamdan
v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2836 n.14 (2006) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (The law of war
and of the United States "has consistently recognized that conspiracy to violate the
laws of war is an offense triable by military commission."). Regardless, the plurality's
view would not affect an American military occupation court from prosecuting Iraqi
insurgents for conspiracy because under international law an occupation government
has the legislative power to create and define crimes.
HENRY SUMNER MAINE,
INTERNATIONAL LAW: A SERIES OF LECTURES DELIVERED BEFORE THE UNIVERSITY

CAMBRIDGE 179 (1888). Also, conspiracy is already an offense under Iraqi criminal law,
and under principles of international law, an occupation government should retain as
much of the occupied country's criminal law as is possible. See Geneva Convention
Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Art. 64 (1949) ("The
penal laws of the occupied territory shall remain in force, with the exception that they
may be repealed or suspended by the Occupying power in cases where they constitute a
threat to security ....
").
531.
See HERBERT J. LIEBSNY, THE LAW OF THE NEAR & MIDDLE EAST 228 (1975)
("Penal law is that area of law which was least developed by the Muslim jurists .. ").
532.
Islam rejects the law of conspiracy to the extent that it will not ascribe
responsibility for a co-conspirator's criminal actions to other members of the
conspiracy. Nesheiwat, supra note 394, at 266 (Under Islamic law "a person cannot be
held responsible for the acts of other people. This principle is articulated in the
Prophetic Sunnah and in the Quran with such verses as 'Each soul is rewarded on its
own account,' and 'No burdened soul can bear another's burden."').
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the insurgency than the current reliance on Iraqi, civilian criminal
law.
Military tribunals would also be able to rely on a defendant's
confession, a practice Islamic law does not permit insofar as a
defendant can withdraw a voluntary confession at any time. This
5 33
tactic can render confessions and guilty pleas meaningless.
Contrary to the practices of the CCCI, U.S. military courts would also
53 4
be free to use circumstantial evidence and reasonable inferences,
hearsay evidence, 5 35 documentary evidence, 536 scientific evidence,
cross-examination, 53 7 and rebuttal evidence, 5 3 8-all of which are
forbidden or severely circumscribed in the CCCI. The burden of proof
would still be on the prosecution, but the burden would be a fixed
standard rather than one that changes from cases to case. The
burden of proof also would not be an insurmountable one, as it
sometimes is under Islamic law. 539 It would not-as in the CCCI-be
set so high that many terrorists are guaranteed acquittal. 54 0 Military
courts would also ensure that cases would be heard by judges who
would give equal weight to testimony from Iraqis as well as nonIraqis-regardless of what tribe they come from-Christians, Jews,

533.
Hossein Esmaeili & Jeremy Gans, Islamic Law Across Cultural Borders:
The Involvement of Western Nationals In Saudi Murder Trials, 28 DENV. J. INT'L L. &
POLY 145, 157 (2000) ("A general principle of Islamic criminal law is that an accused
person can withdraw a confession, even a voluntary one, at any time.").
534.
ESPOSITO, supra note 91, at 86 (noting that sharia does not look kindly
upon circumstantial evidence); LIPPMAN ET AL., supra note 84, at 70 (same). This
disdain for circumstantial evidence was probably inherited from Jewish law. Arnold N.
Enker, Aspects of Interaction Between The Torah Law, The King's Law, and the
Noahide Law in Jewish Criminal Law, 12 CARDOZO L. REV. 1137, 1137 (1991)
("circumstantial evidence is not allowed").
535.
LIPPMAN ET AL., supra note 84, at 70.
536.
Id. at 70.
537.
ESPOSITO, supra note 91, at 84 (noting "the absence of cross examination of
witnesses" under sharia);LIPPMAN ET AL., supra note 84, at 121.
538.
LIPPMAN ET AL., supra note 84, at 121.
539.
In the CCCI, the prosecution's burden of proof varies from case to case:
Part of the hurdle is in meeting Iraqi judicial tests of proof that a crime has
been committed. Judges in Iraq are given enormous latitude in determining
cases based on "the weight of the evidence," and may choose to implement
standards laid out in any of three, often conflicting sources-the 1971 Iraqi
Law on Criminal Proceedings, religious texts or precedents established by prior
cases.
Grossman, supra note 16.
540.
In the CCCI, the "burden of proof is in favor of the insurgents,' says one
officer in Iraq. Id.
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and Moslems, 541 women and men,5 42 and testimony from people who
54 3
might not be considered to be of "good character" under sharia.
6. Reaping the Benefits of Plea Bargaining
The U.S. practice of plea bargaining-which is not permitted in
the CCCI-could also be utilized in a U.S. forum, creating a boon for
both the defense and prosecution. Plea bargaining would permit lessculpable terrorists to exchange intelligence or testimony against
ringleaders for more lenient treatment, a practice explicitly permitted
under the Guantanamo tribunal rules. 544 This device alone could
save the United States countless personnel hours, while offering
defendants a substantial benefit for sharing their valuable
knowledge. 5 45 By tapping a new source of evidence and intelligence,
plea bargaining itself could save prosecutorial and judicial resources
now wasted in litigating issues that could be resolved indisputably
simply by the admissions of one defendant. Plea bargaining could
also save intelligence resources that are wasted trying to gain the
knowledge that many CCCI defendants carry within their own
brains.
Moreover, in an effort to save their own skins, terrorists likely
will turn on their comrades, some of whom may not yet have been
apprehended and may not even be known to U.S. intelligence
agencies. Such information would undoubtedly save U.S. and Iraqi
lives and would be worth providing a reduced sentence to the
cooperating individual. As it stands now, captured insurgents have

541.
LIPPMAN ET AL., supra note 84, at 69.
542.
Id. When not completely prohibited, testimony from women is given less
weight than a man's testimony. Murphy, supra note 310, at 11.
543.
LIPPMAN ET AL., supra note 84, at 69. Although Iraqi law may or may not
have derived its substantive and procedural rules from Islamic law, it is an interesting
coincidence that Iraqi law, to a greater or lesser extent, has adopted all of these Islamic
rules. The fact that the sharia is probably the source of these rules means that the
Islamic judges will give them respect, and thus will show little respect for evidence or
practices that are contrary to these rules. Because Islamic law, like the civil law
tradition, eschews judicial discretion, it is doubtful that judges will find novel solutions
to overcome these onerous rules. Id. at 121 (noting the lack of judicial discretion
permitted in Islamic law). Of course, limiting judicial discretion is not always a
negative, but it is when it inhibits judges from addressing the problem engendered by
ancient legal rules that cannot be adapted, modified, or overridden in an attempt to
address the complexities of the modern world.
544.
See Department of Defense, Military Commission Order No. 1,
6(D)(1)
(March 21, 2004), available at http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Mar2002/d20020321
ord.pdf ("The Accused, through Defense Counsel, and the Prosecution may submit for
approval to the Appointing Authority a plea agreement mandating a sentence
limitation or any other provision in exchange for an agreement to plead guilty, or any
other consideration.").
545.
As it stands now, it "is almost impossible to get witnesses to testify"including CCCI defendants-against terrorists. Grossman, supra note 16.
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no incentive to turn on their comrades, as they will face the same
penalty regardless, and by testifying against a colleague, they run the
risk of suffering reprisals at the hands of other terrorists. Because
these defendants lack any incentive to cooperate with the United
States, a wealth of intelligence is squandered, thereby leaving many
insurgents at large and free to kill Coalition and Iraqi personnel.
C. The Resources that U.S. Military Courts Would Require
Needless to say, military tribunals would be a drain on scarce
military and judicial resources, just as they were in post-World War
II Germany. 546 This is particularly true in light of the number of
Iraqi detainees. 54 7 At first blush, U.S. military courts might also be
perceived as more expensive than the CCCI insofar as military judges
receive compensation far in excess of that which Iraqi judges receive.
The due process afforded by military courts also is greater than that
afforded in Iraqi courts, and due process does not come cheap.
Because the terrorists are not prisoners of war, and thus are not
entitled by law to the same procedural rights afforded to members of
the U.S. Armed Forces, there are ways to ensure justice while
minimizing costs. 548 For example, cumbersome rules of evidence that
are not essential to the fundamental fairness of judicial proceedings
could be modified. 54 9 Similarly, as discussed above, techniques such
as plea bargaining would undoubtedly save substantial time and
money, while ensuring that the guilty are punished rather than
released to further attack U.S. soldiers. So the financial savings

546.
In the occupation of Germany after World War II, judicial matters required
a considerable amount of time." ZINK, supra note 98, at 109. "One of the most serious
problems encountered throughout the United States zone of Germany with respect to
the operation of the military government courts was the acute shortage of trained legal
personnel to staff these courts." NOBLEMAN, supra note 74, at 145.
547.
Hannah Allam, Prison Chief Finds Reform No Easy Task, MIAMI HERALD,
Jan. 22, 2005 ("The American prison system in Iraqi-Abu Ghraib and the three other
prisons throughout the country-is teeming with detainees, 12,000, the highest
number since the insurgency began in 2003."). In Germany after World War II, 80,000
prisoners were held in August 1945 in just the U.S. zone, although this numbered
dropped to 66,500 by September 1946. ZINK, supra note 98, at 140 n.I.
548.
Because governments-or at least democratic ones-possess finite financial
means, minimization of costs is an essential element of military success. Money spent
on one front of a complex and protracted war cannot be used to defeat the enemy at
another front. "'The object of war in a military point of view is to procure the complete
submission of the enemy at the earliest possible period with the least possible
expenditure of men and money."' MAINE, supra note 5, at 132 (quoting the Manual for
English Officers) (emphasis added).
549.
Many rules "determining the admissibility or inadmissibility of offered
evidence, have as their prime historical explanation the desire to prevent the jury from
being misled by untrustworthy evidence." MERRYMAN, supra note 94, at 117. The fact
that military commissions will not be composed of lay jurors, therefore, obviates the
need for some evidentiary rules.
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attributed to using the CCCI to try terrorism cases may not be so
great.
But by far the strongest reason for using military tribunals is to
ensure that justice is done. In this respect, trials in U.S. military
courts would be far superior to "trials" in the CCCI. Time and time
again the CCCI judges have proven themselves incapable or
unwilling to administer justice to their countrymen. 550 It is time to
put an end to the charade of justice that daily occurs in the CCCI and
adjudicate terrorism cases in U.S. military courts. 5 5' True, some
would argue that permitting military officers to try these cases would
be a case of "victor's justice." But sometimes the ones most qualified
to do justice-both morally and logistically-are the victors. 552 U.S.
soldiers have "earned the right and obligation to conduct such trials
not only because of victory; but also because of their own payment in
553
blood."

IV. CONCLUSION

It is unprecedented in U.S. military history for the United States
to permit nationals of an occupied land to adjudicate criminal cases
involving defendants of the same nationality who are charged with
attacking the U.S. occupation army.
The need to punish any
individual who uses violence to thwart a military occupation is so
integral to the success of a military occupation that most occupying
armies would never surrender this sword to native judges who may
not be fully loyal to the occupying power. Indeed, in a situation like
Iraq, which suffers from a broad anti-occupation insurgency that
enjoys substantial popular support, entrusting local judges with the
power to punish insurgents might be considered suicidal. Such an

550.
"[E]ven some cases backed by strong evidence have been thrown out by
[Iraqi] 'judges who appeared sympathetic to the enemy,' says one U.S. military official."
Grossman, supra note 16.
551.
"If America is to win its world-wide battle with Islamist insurgents and
terrorists, it will have to do its own dirty work whenever it has a chance .... " Michael
Scheuer, Battling the Terrorists, WASH. TIMES, Dec. 27, 2004, at A21.
552.

[V]ictor's justice is sometimes the morally correct position .... Under
some circumstances, it seems to me, victor's justice is precisely what
justice requires, because it signifies that you have been willing to pay
the price in blood to achieve it, while those who stood aside from the
fight have no moral standing with regard to justice against evil at all.

Kenneth Anderson, The Role of the United States Military Lawyer in Projecting a
Vision of the Laws of War, 4 CHIC. J. OF INT'L LAW 443, 452 n.10 (2003).

553.

Kenneth Anderson, What to Do with Bin Laden and Al Qaeda Terrorists?:

A Qualified Defense of Military Commissions and United States Policy on Detainees at
GuantanamoBay Naval Base, 25 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 591, 597 (2002).
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approach leaves too much to chance and threatens to undermine the
entire war effort.
Particularly in an occupation setting, the courtroom can become
an extension of the battlefield, a setting for lawfare. In occupation
courts, military opponents square off for courtroom combat, the
outcome of which is oftentimes as important as victory on the
battlefield. By gaining their freedom to reenter the fray, or by using
the court as a propaganda tool to demonstrate the occupier's
impotence to punish them, insurgents can thwart the occupier almost
as effectively as they can by utilizing terrorist attacks. Conversely,
the occupier can use its occupation courts to demonstrate its strength
and nobility, and contrast these with the insurgents' weakness and
depravity. Because success against a terrorist insurgency requires
the cooperation of the populace, these "secondary" goals are
particularly important.
U.S. military occupation courts would provide the most suitable
venue for the United States to carry out the duty of protection that it
owes its soldiers and the people of Iraq. These military courts could
mete out swift justice to those whose only goal is to kill, destroy, and
thwart the creation of a democratic Iraq. The CCCI has repeatedly
proven itself to be incapable or unwilling to shoulder this burden.
Whether motivated by nationalism, tribalism, greed, or incompetence,
its coddling of terrorists not only has failed to deter terrorist
attacks, 554 it has emboldened the terrorists and proclaimed to them
in no uncertain terms that they have little to fear from being
captured by U.S. forces. 555 Armed with the knowledge that they will
escape punishment if captured, and the promise from religious

intentionally thwarted-multiple
The
CCCI has squandered-or
554.
opportunities to strike back at the terrorists and thereby deter further aggression. A
swift and forceful response to terrorist violence has proven to be an effective deterrent
against future confrontations. An example was the swift and forceful response by
Army Lieutenant Colonel Nathan Sassaman when his troops were mortared:
Once when Sassaman was returning from a mission in Samarra, insurgents
fired a single mortar round into his compound, as if to welcome him back. He
responded by firing 28 155-millimeter artillery shells and 42 mortar rounds.
He called in two airstrikes, one with a 500-pound bomb and the other with a
2,000-pound bomb. Later on, his men found a crater as deep as a swimming
pool.
' You know what?" Sassaman told me. "We just didn't get hit after that."
Of course, the results of judicial proceedings
Filkins, supra note 164, at 652.
purposefully are not as swift or severe as a military counter-strike, but they can have a
proportionate deterrent effect, particularly because their results-long prison
sentences-have a greater duration than the explosions generated by artillery or
airstrikes.
555.
Bing West, America as Jailer, NAT'L REV. July 17, 2006, at 27 ("What do
insurgents have to lose from being arrested for fighting if they know they will soon be
released by authorities?").
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leaders that those slain while attacking U.S. infidels will enjoy a rich
afterlife, there is little to deter Iraqi terrorists from continuing their
jihad. By delegating to the CCCI the occupier's right and duty to
ensure swift justice for those who disturb the peace, the United
States has neglected a potential weapon to defeat the terrorists. This
weapon will continue to be neglected until the United States decides
5 56
to aggressively prosecute terrorists in U.S. military courts.
Perhaps it is too late to hope that the U.S. government will alter
its course in Iraq, but if nothing else the CCCI and political
experiment should prove to succeeding generations of U.S. military
leaders that lawfare has become an essential part of warfare. Just as
military leaders would not lightly agree to wage battle according to
the rules and terms specified by the enemy, so too they should not
agree to wage lawfare in a venue where the enemy--or those
sympathetic to the enemy--control not only the terms and rules of
the lawfare, but the outcome of the contest itself.

556.
Another alternative would be a joint Iraqi-U.S. court, where the United
States enjoys the ultimate power to decide guilt and impose a sentence, perhaps a
three-judge panel composed of two U.S. officers and an Iraqi civilian or military judge.
The problem with such a system, however, is that it ties up two U.S. officers for a job
that could easily be performed by one.

